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India-Sri Lanka ties hit a bumpy road

21 Feb 2021

By M.R. Narayan Swamy   Despite a public exhibition of bonhomie, it is more than evident that relations between Sri Lanka and India have hit a new low. Though it may be a coincidence, this has happened just ahead of a keenly expected battle for power in Tamil Nadu whose internal politics often casts a shadow on Sri Lanka. While it will not be easy to pinpoint when the rupturing began, some contentious bilateral issues can be easily identified. One is Sri Lanka’s decision not to let India and Japan develop the East Container Terminal (ECT), and another is linked to the continuing killings of Tamil Nadu fishermen in the narrow sea dividing the two countries. The third is the award of a contract to a Chinese company to set up a hybrid wind and solar energy project on three of four Sri Lankan islands located not far from Tamil Nadu. The fourth factor, although not the final (Colombo has her concerns too), is India’s decision to speak publicly and loudly about the need for ethnic reconciliation in Sri Lanka. It is curious that the slide in bilateral ties has occurred when both countries have strong governments led by charismatic leaders. This makes the issues that much more complex and not easy to resolve. Less than a month after External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar asserted that India was open to strengthening its friendship with Sri Lanka, Colombo simply scrapped an agreement signed by the previous regime with New Delhi and Tokyo to develop the ECT at the Colombo Port. This was done fully knowing that the investing company from India would be one headed by a friend of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The offer by Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa to develop the West Container Terminal (WCT) looks more like a face saver for India. If that is the case, it won’t match the loss of the ECT. The vocal opposition to India’s involvement in the ECT has no doubt been lingering. But the Rajapaksas, who wield the same authority in Sri Lanka today, which Modi does in India, could have changed the course of the objection to the Indian involvement if they wanted. It is clear they did not want to. From the time when Shyam Saran, one of India’s more respected foreign secretaries, India has drawn an unofficial red line to the active presence of Pakistanis and Chinese close to its southern borders. A lot of water has flown since the acerbic 1980s when India noisily objected to a Voice of America base in Trincomalee. Since then, India has moved closer to the US and even Israel than Sri Lanka ever was. But Pakistan and China remain taboo. No wonder India has officially objected to the award of a contract to a Chinese company to implement a $ 12 million joint venture with the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) to provide power in the Delft, Nainativu, and Analaitivu islands. These islands lie close to the Indian coastline and it will be naïve to see the Indian objection as a case of grapes gone sour since the Chinese firm won an international bid. Jaffna is not Hambantota. Surely, the Sri Lankan Government would have anticipated that the presence of Chinese personnel, in whatever garb, in a place so close to India would rile New Delhi. If Colombo still went ahead, then it is evidence that India-Sri Lanka relations are in choppy waters. The killing of four Tamil Nadu fishermen in January and the discovery of the bodies by the Sri Lanka Navy four days after they went missing in the Palk Strait have provoked widespread anger in Tamil Nadu. It is true that Indian fishermen do cross the international maritime zone. If the violators were to be detained or arrested, it would be one thing. Civilian and even stray uniformed intruders from Pakistan and China are routinely caught and sent home. This is why Minister Jaishankar told the Indian Parliament that the January killings were “particularly unacceptable” and that this has been “made very, very clear to them” (note the two “very”s). With Tamil Nadu set to vote to elect a new Assembly, Modi would not like to be seen as someone who could not end the killings of Tamil fishermen on the sea. Sri Lanka has already deferred elections to the provincial councils, which were an outcome of the now controversial 1987 India-Sri Lanka agreement. While Covid-19 was cited as the reason, this could well be the first decisive step towards moving away from the 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution to mark a final burial of the 1987 accord. If that happens, then the choppy waters might turn really stormy. Pressure is mounting on the Indian establishment to be more vocal on Sri Lanka’s Tamil issue. “It is in Sri Lanka’s own interests that the expectations of the Tamil people for equality, justice, peace, and dignity within a united Sri Lanka are fulfilled,” Jaishankar said in Colombo recently. “That applies equally to the commitments made by the Sri Lankan Government on meaningful devolution including the 13th Amendment.” It is not difficult to understand that Jaishankar’s appeal would not have been music to the ears of the Rajapaksas, whose overwhelming popular base lies in the Sinhalese territory and who clearly don’t want to be publicly lectured on the ethnic issue. The Rajapaksas have a grudge against India over the fall of their previous Government. Jaishankar’s appeal is a sign that India is going back to megaphone diplomacy when it comes to Sri Lanka. Similar loud advisories in the 1980s endeared India to Sri Lankan Tamils but caused a lot of unhappiness among the Sinhalese. Where will India-Sri Lanka relations go from here? The answer, for now, lies with one man: Modi. The Indian Prime Minister is known to forget real or perceived slight. Some in Tamil Nadu feel that the Indian Government may come under pressure ahead of the Tamil Nadu elections to do something major. Irrespective of what actually happens, expect a bumpy, diplomatic road ahead.


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