As a result of counter insurgencies
The 1971 insurrection virtually changed the course of history in Sri Lanka in the political as well as legal spheres. That was not due to the strength of the insurgency itself.
Looking back from a distance, the insurgency was in fact extremely weak, carried out without any extensive organisation and without any kind of substantial means. Many activities of the insurgency consisted of training some young people in a few classes about the casualty of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People’s Liberation Front). The activities were mainly in making some Molotov cocktails and some work on the trade union front.
The importance of the insurgency was that it exposed the weakness of the Sri Lankan State. The insurgents mainly relied on this weakness. They thought they could create situations of disturbance in the country, although the leader and a few others may have thought of the possibility of coming to power. They had, in fact, not convinced any significant portion of the population about that capacity, nor were they prepared for such an eventuality. In fact, the insurgency was uncovered while some were making Molotov cocktails.
Later documents which came up – for example, the statements given by the organisation before the Criminal Justice Commission – clearly indicated that there was no grand plan of action for revolution or for the taking over of power. What made the insurgency have a decisive effect was that with the news of some incidents taking place in a few places, the weak State of Sri Lanka was thoroughly shaken. There was a state of panic, both among the leaders of the government and in the policing system. The documents show that there was a real fear that the government may collapse and that a revolution might take place.
The government was taken completely by surprise by the few incidents of bomb blasts and some attacks. This reaction was not based on any detailed intelligence reports or the assessment of the actual strength of the insurgent groups. The command that came from the top – to shoot on sight and to engage in whatever forms of action that were needed in order to bring down the insurgency – led to relatively large-scale killings.
While the number of security personnel killed was around 50, the number of alleged insurgents killed exceeded 5,000. It was this large-scale and ruthless reaction to a relatively weak insurgency that virtually led to a crisis in the state. It was reflected mostly in its policing system which made this event a very prominent event and decisive for a change in the political life as well as the security arrangements in Sri Lanka.
Politically, the Opposition party, which had been very seriously damaged by an electoral defeat in the 1970s, found a way to regain their strength within a short time. It was particularly through the shock and unrest caused within the population as a result of the large-scale killings that took place during the short period of the insurgency. The exploitation of this unusual situation was perhaps the major reason for the defeat of the coalition government of the 1970s and the election of the United National Party (UNP) Government with nearly 80% of the seats in Parliament in 1977. That became decisive in 1978, seven years after the insurgency.
The Constitution was completely changed from the rule of law based on a democratic system. It became an Executive-based system which could undermine the normal legal process and resort more directly to the national security law. In fact, the national security law was incorporated into the Constitution itself. That, as subsequent decades would show, altered the political culture of Sri Lanka drastically. Among other things, the decision on the legality of any action depended more on the Executive and less on the Legislature/Parliament or on the Judiciary. Both these institutions were undermined in favour of an Executive-led government.
Change of mentality due to erosion of discipline and traditions of policing
As far as the policing system was concerned, the counter insurgency measures eroded the traditions of adherence to the legal principles within the system, as the Police were used for military purposes during the time of the insurgency. The Police were mobilised for illegal arrests, detentions, and above all, the killing of persons after they had been arrested.
The entire fabric of the criminal law was based on the model introduced by the British. When a person is arrested, the protection of that person is the primary duty of the Police. This was completely abandoned. The killing of arrested persons was authorised. The arrest itself did not take place on the basis of any reliable evidence, but more on petitions and on information obtained through torture. As a result of that, many who were killed could not be in any way characterised as persons who were involved in serious insurgencies.
The theory for allowing such arrests was that in a situation of a conflict of this nature, it is not correct to find out who is involved and who is not involved. Now, the Police were given the liberty to act on the basis of their own judgment. The power of killing passed into the hands of the Police and other security personnel and their agents. Thus, there was, for the first time in modern Sri Lankan history, a unique situation. Power over life and death was passed from the Judiciary into the hands of the Police. Among the Police, those who carried out most of the actual implementing actions such as arrests, detentions, and the killings were the lower ranks of the Police. The higher ranks were silent. Some co-operated in the scheme of carrying out deaths.
The information collection at that time was about those who were engaged in the insurgency, and the main source of that were those who were arrested allegedly for insurgency-related issues. So, this was a severe, extremely serious situation where the idea was to gain more information about other insurgents. The culture of the use of torture underwent a drastic change during this period of the insurgency.
As such, the entire system of policing underwent a transformation for the worst. Experiences of some countries in the use of police units for insurgency control show the following. It is only those units that would have the power to use extra legal means that are used, while the basic institution is kept out of such activities so that the normal rule of law-related functions could be exercised by the Police. However, in Sri Lanka, this was not the case. The entire system was used, causing extreme violence, including the killing of persons and the disposal of their bodies.
There was no real attempt to undo the damage that was done to the institution during this kind of police mobilisation for such illegal and basically criminal activities. Instead, the situations which unfolded in the later decades increased the use of the Police for military purposes. This had been acknowledged by persons like a former Secretary to the Ministry of Justice, and later a former President of Sri Lanka. Now the problem of the Sri Lankan Police is that it is not usable for the enforcement of the law according to the basic principles of the rule of law. And the problem has become so complicated that none of the governments in recent decades have made any serious attempt at seriously reforming the institution. Instead, many actions that have been taken have aggravated the situation.
Take, for example, the recruitment of over 30,000 policemen without any training. It was done purely for the purpose of deployment as a political gesture by the then President Mahinda Rajapaksa Government. Thus, out of the 75,000-strong police force, over 30,000 persons were those who were recruited without any basic training. They gradually gained additional persons within the organisation through promotions.
The institution today is not capable of acting as a rule of law-based law enforcement agency. It acts outside the law. It replaces discussion as against the basic legal norms and legislative requirements. The supervisory capacity at the top has deteriorated to such a level that they are unable to carry out discipline within the system.
This perhaps is the greatest reason as to why the use of torture has become so commonplace in dealing with the ordinary people of the country.
(The writer is the Director of Policy and Programmes of the Asian Human Rights Commission)Torture and the change of institutional mentality
09 Apr 2021
Torture and the change of institutional mentality
09 Apr 2021
As a result of counter insurgencies
The 1971 insurrection virtually changed the course of history in Sri Lanka in the political as well as legal spheres. That was not due to the strength of the insurgency itself.
Looking back from a distance, the insurgency was in fact extremely weak, carried out without any extensive organisation and without any kind of substantial means. Many activities of the insurgency consisted of training some young people in a few classes about the casualty of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People’s Liberation Front). The activities were mainly in making some Molotov cocktails and some work on the trade union front.
The importance of the insurgency was that it exposed the weakness of the Sri Lankan State. The insurgents mainly relied on this weakness. They thought they could create situations of disturbance in the country, although the leader and a few others may have thought of the possibility of coming to power. They had, in fact, not convinced any significant portion of the population about that capacity, nor were they prepared for such an eventuality. In fact, the insurgency was uncovered while some were making Molotov cocktails.
Later documents which came up – for example, the statements given by the organisation before the Criminal Justice Commission – clearly indicated that there was no grand plan of action for revolution or for the taking over of power. What made the insurgency have a decisive effect was that with the news of some incidents taking place in a few places, the weak State of Sri Lanka was thoroughly shaken. There was a state of panic, both among the leaders of the government and in the policing system. The documents show that there was a real fear that the government may collapse and that a revolution might take place.
The government was taken completely by surprise by the few incidents of bomb blasts and some attacks. This reaction was not based on any detailed intelligence reports or the assessment of the actual strength of the insurgent groups. The command that came from the top – to shoot on sight and to engage in whatever forms of action that were needed in order to bring down the insurgency – led to relatively large-scale killings.
While the number of security personnel killed was around 50, the number of alleged insurgents killed exceeded 5,000. It was this large-scale and ruthless reaction to a relatively weak insurgency that virtually led to a crisis in the state. It was reflected mostly in its policing system which made this event a very prominent event and decisive for a change in the political life as well as the security arrangements in Sri Lanka.
Politically, the Opposition party, which had been very seriously damaged by an electoral defeat in the 1970s, found a way to regain their strength within a short time. It was particularly through the shock and unrest caused within the population as a result of the large-scale killings that took place during the short period of the insurgency. The exploitation of this unusual situation was perhaps the major reason for the defeat of the coalition government of the 1970s and the election of the United National Party (UNP) Government with nearly 80% of the seats in Parliament in 1977. That became decisive in 1978, seven years after the insurgency.
The Constitution was completely changed from the rule of law based on a democratic system. It became an Executive-based system which could undermine the normal legal process and resort more directly to the national security law. In fact, the national security law was incorporated into the Constitution itself. That, as subsequent decades would show, altered the political culture of Sri Lanka drastically. Among other things, the decision on the legality of any action depended more on the Executive and less on the Legislature/Parliament or on the Judiciary. Both these institutions were undermined in favour of an Executive-led government.
Change of mentality due to erosion of discipline and traditions of policing
As far as the policing system was concerned, the counter insurgency measures eroded the traditions of adherence to the legal principles within the system, as the Police were used for military purposes during the time of the insurgency. The Police were mobilised for illegal arrests, detentions, and above all, the killing of persons after they had been arrested.
The entire fabric of the criminal law was based on the model introduced by the British. When a person is arrested, the protection of that person is the primary duty of the Police. This was completely abandoned. The killing of arrested persons was authorised. The arrest itself did not take place on the basis of any reliable evidence, but more on petitions and on information obtained through torture. As a result of that, many who were killed could not be in any way characterised as persons who were involved in serious insurgencies.
The theory for allowing such arrests was that in a situation of a conflict of this nature, it is not correct to find out who is involved and who is not involved. Now, the Police were given the liberty to act on the basis of their own judgment. The power of killing passed into the hands of the Police and other security personnel and their agents. Thus, there was, for the first time in modern Sri Lankan history, a unique situation. Power over life and death was passed from the Judiciary into the hands of the Police. Among the Police, those who carried out most of the actual implementing actions such as arrests, detentions, and the killings were the lower ranks of the Police. The higher ranks were silent. Some co-operated in the scheme of carrying out deaths.
The information collection at that time was about those who were engaged in the insurgency, and the main source of that were those who were arrested allegedly for insurgency-related issues. So, this was a severe, extremely serious situation where the idea was to gain more information about other insurgents. The culture of the use of torture underwent a drastic change during this period of the insurgency.
As such, the entire system of policing underwent a transformation for the worst. Experiences of some countries in the use of police units for insurgency control show the following. It is only those units that would have the power to use extra legal means that are used, while the basic institution is kept out of such activities so that the normal rule of law-related functions could be exercised by the Police. However, in Sri Lanka, this was not the case. The entire system was used, causing extreme violence, including the killing of persons and the disposal of their bodies.
There was no real attempt to undo the damage that was done to the institution during this kind of police mobilisation for such illegal and basically criminal activities. Instead, the situations which unfolded in the later decades increased the use of the Police for military purposes. This had been acknowledged by persons like a former Secretary to the Ministry of Justice, and later a former President of Sri Lanka. Now the problem of the Sri Lankan Police is that it is not usable for the enforcement of the law according to the basic principles of the rule of law. And the problem has become so complicated that none of the governments in recent decades have made any serious attempt at seriously reforming the institution. Instead, many actions that have been taken have aggravated the situation.
Take, for example, the recruitment of over 30,000 policemen without any training. It was done purely for the purpose of deployment as a political gesture by the then President Mahinda Rajapaksa Government. Thus, out of the 75,000-strong police force, over 30,000 persons were those who were recruited without any basic training. They gradually gained additional persons within the organisation through promotions.
The institution today is not capable of acting as a rule of law-based law enforcement agency. It acts outside the law. It replaces discussion as against the basic legal norms and legislative requirements. The supervisory capacity at the top has deteriorated to such a level that they are unable to carry out discipline within the system.
This perhaps is the greatest reason as to why the use of torture has become so commonplace in dealing with the ordinary people of the country.
(The writer is the Director of Policy and Programmes of the Asian Human Rights Commission)Kapruka
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Discover Kapruka, the leading online shopping platform in Sri Lanka, where you can conveniently send Gifts and Flowers to your loved ones for any event. Explore a wide range of popular Shopping Categories on Kapruka, including Toys, Groceries, Electronics, Birthday Cakes, Fruits, Chocolates, Automobile, Mother and Baby Products, Clothing, and Fashion. Additionally, Kapruka offers unique online services like Money Remittance, Astrology, Medicine Delivery, and access to over 700 Top Brands. Also If you’re interested in selling with Kapruka, Partner Central by Kapruka is the best solution to start with. Moreover, through Kapruka Global Shop, you can also enjoy the convenience of purchasing products from renowned platforms like Amazon and eBay and have them delivered to Sri Lanka.Send love straight to their heart this Valentine's with our thoughtful gifts!