It is easy to start, difficult to fight, hard to win, and almost impossible to end wars.

This is not an overstatement of modern-day conflicts, which are fought across multiple domains and spheres.

In fact, the concept of continuum of competition espouses “a world of enduring competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation, competition, and armed conflict”. According to this idea, the competition (in other words, conflicts) between geostrategic players is enduring.

This competition will continue across all spheres, not only in the military domain with guns and bombs, but also in the diplomatic, economic, trade, political, and legal spheres, and especially in the information domain. The Full Spectrum of Conflict Design by Robert S. Burrell (2023) hypothesises that world power players compete across a quadrant of conventional warfare, irregular warfare, deterrence, and competition.

The quadrant is made of two axes: war-peace (state of affairs) and direct-indirect (means of competing). At any given time, contending players will be in one or more quadrants, denoting the unceasing nature of modern conflicts. I invite the reader to refer to my previous article titled ‘Are we ready for the weaponisation of competition?’ which appeared in The Daily Morning on 30 May 2025, in which I tried to elucidate the above in more detail.

The US-Iran-Israel conflict in the Middle East serves as a contemporary case study to prove the above ideas. These competing players are engaged in an enduring conflict in which diplomatic deterrence and economic coercion have been intermittently used. Information warfare has persisted throughout the conflict, and irregular warfare through proxies and clandestine operations has also remained a constant feature.

What we are experiencing right now in this unceasing competition is a conventional military episode honey-coated within a complex web of diplomatic engagements. The causes of this competition, as per analysts, are diverse. International and regional politics constitute a major cause. The most critical root of the conflict is connected to oil and natural resources. Some observe religious strife or a clash of civilisations in the conflict.

All other violent and non-violent rivalries across the globe have similar causes. Within this quagmire of Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) elements of power play, the future strategic posture of countries of the world will have to be crafted to ensure their national survival.

Cold War 2.0

What has affected global affairs in the short term due to the current episode of the Middle East conflict is the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, thereby resulting in the weaponisation of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) and disruptions to world energy supply.

While the conflict continues to escalate, there are several other unmistakable global features characterised by the deterioration of the rules-based global order and the disintegration of the Euro-US partnership, which has endured for decades through thick and thin since the end of World War II.

Some analysts point out that the stoic nature of China and Russia during the conflict is also noticeable. The events that are taking place in the Middle East have unavoidable adverse effects globally, particularly on small and middle powers.

These repercussions provide an unmistakable signal to the small and middle powers to brace for the inevitable realities of the future. They must be ready for future global affairs defined by Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Ambiguity (VUCA), requiring future-oriented foreign policy reforms.

Most of the small and middle powers referred to above were members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) during the former Cold War period.

The end of the first Cold War geopolitics in the 1990s marked the end of the bipolar system, and the world subsequently started experiencing the unipolar dynamics dominated by a single superpower: the US. Nevertheless, it is not an exaggeration to state that we are experiencing a Cold War 2.0, or a new cold war, between the US, the existing superpower, and China, the emerging superpower.

What adds more complexity to Cold War 2.0 is the emergence of multiple power players and power blocs, which extrapolates the modern geopolitical dynamic that says: ‘No one is the boss anymore.’ Globalisation and economic and political interdependence have created diverse power players and regional blocs, which have become the basis for the current multipolar world order.

Critically, regional powers have asserted themselves more vigorously in recent years to solidify their sphere of influence, making small powers within those spheres more vulnerable. This multipolar world order revolves around the undeniable underlying feature of the Sino-US Cold War.

Therefore, what we are experiencing is a mega-power rivalry surrounded by numerous mini-power rivalries across the globe. In this hotbed of power dynamics, what should be the strategy of small and middle powers? As they embraced non-alignment during the Cold War, they should embrace its new version in the era of Cold War 2.0. This crucial choice will decide the fate of most small and middle powers of the globe, including Sri Lanka.

Cold War 1.0 and NAM   

The Cold War, as it is known to us, was the rivalry between the US – the democratic, capitalist faction – and the USSR – the communist, socialist faction. Until the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, the bipolar world order dictated that countries around the world would align with either the US or the USSR.

The third option, chosen by many countries that did not wish to be labelled as such, was to be non-aligned. Thus, the NAM became a very strong intergovernmental organisation, largely representing newly independent and developing nations, while the concept of non-alignment became a practical and viable alternative for small and middle powers to position themselves more effectively during the Cold War.

Sri Lanka was one of the forerunners and founding members of the NAM. Non-alignment was, and, as per some analysts, still is, a defining feature of our foreign policy.

The primary feature of the erstwhile non-aligned model, the ‘keeping away’ strategy, enabled small and middle powers to circumvent any possible adverse influence from rival blocs. As most of the NAM nations were newly independent former colonies, they also maintained a staunch anti-colonial stance. Their poor economies compelled them to make poverty alleviation a primary focus.

Due to these shared characteristics, the NAM countries created their own ‘bloc’ and strongly believed in mutual support. However, the reality is that many of these dynamics have changed in the contemporary world order.

As the bipolar system collapsed and, particularly, because the political rhetoric of capitalism versus socialism has deteriorated in practice, the traditional power bloc dynamics have diminished. Anti-colonialism no longer serves as a binding factor among nations, and some of the leading NAM nations have emerged from extreme poverty. Consequently, the NAM power bloc is no longer as strong or as mutually supportive as it was.

The new world order

Does this mean the world is no longer polarised? Well, quite the contrary. The West-dominated world order is shifting, giving way to leading players from none other than the Global South.

During a public lecture at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in April, Prof. Barry Buzan stated: “The post-Western world order, which is now in the driving seat, is deeply pluralist. It is dominated by multilateralism, regional spheres of influence for great powers, economic nationalism, authoritarian capitalism, and multi-alignment foreign policies. It will have several great powers, a lot of regional powers, and probably no superpowers.”

A defining feature of the power blocs emerging in the contemporary world order is that they are not necessarily geographically contiguous. Prominent examples of such ‘non-regional alliances’ are BRICS, Five Eyes, Quad, and AUKUS.

Nevertheless, emerging regional alliances such as the African Union and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation also play a critical role. Accordingly, analysts strongly opine that small and middle powers cannot rely solely on strategic independence to assist in their path to progress, which brings us to the Non-Alignment 2.0 in the new world order.

Non-Alignment 2.0

Non-Alignment 2.0 is quite the opposite of its former version. It basically advocates abandoning strategic independence and the resulting self-isolation, while strongly supporting the idea of proactive multi-alignment.

In the bygone Cold War, rivalry was primarily based on political ideologies. Scholars strongly argue that economy-related political concerns have taken precedence in the new Cold War. John Mearsheimer argues that Cold War 2.0 is driven by the power politics of Sino-US rivalry, which has a strong economic bias.

These economy-centric rivalries, while focusing on military buildup, have more concentration towards accumulating strategic reserves of resources, implementing proactive policies on controlling global commons, protecting market share and foreign investments, securing SLOCs and supply chains, developing technologies, and maintaining mega production bases. This form of power competition is certainly different from that of the first Cold War between two superpowers.

In the second Cold War, while the US remains the First World contender, China represents the Global South. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi specifically said in 2025: “China remains a key member of the Global South and will always be a developing country.”

While it is clear that China intends to lead the Global South, experts argue that it also asserts to reconceptualise the world order. This intention was made amply clear by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2023 when he said: “Chinese-style modernisation breaks the myth of modernisation equals Westernisation.”

There is another critical feature of the second Cold War. That is the disintegration of what we have traditionally known as the world order, which was largely West-driven. Yet, recently, it was observed by scholars that this institutional framework has started to deteriorate.

The rules-based international order, the Western financial framework, and such Western institutionalism are “not coming back,” as per Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney (he was the former Governor of the Bank of England as well). He made these comments during the World Economic Forum in Davos in January.

Thus, on one hand, we could observe that the Global South is picking up, and on the other, it has become apparent that the existing West-driven order is becoming weak. In this new Cold War, what should non-alignment look like?

Non-Alignment 2.0 in contemporary geopolitics means multi-alignment. The Canadian Prime Minister said: “From the fracture [of the old order], we can build something better, stronger, and more just.” When he says “we,” he refers to the middle powers: those who are neither superpowers nor great powers, but who have considerable strength in the world order.

He calls for new alliances and partnerships while avoiding excessive dependence on the US or China. A case in point is energy security. Analysts opine that the world is currently divided into two, in terms of energy: the US-led petro-power bloc and the China-led electro-power bloc.

Becoming overly dependent on either bloc may compel a country to choose a side during times of crisis. The answer is to maintain a balance and the appropriate mix – not only in terms of energy sources, but also from whom energy is obtained from.

Another prominent area is arms and defence supplies. Currently, we see not only Europe but also major powers in other regions such as South Asia and the Middle East diversify their defence procurement from traditional suppliers towards the emerging ones, with countries such as India, Indonesia, and Brazil, which are gaining increasing prominence as defence suppliers.   

A small power strategy

In the era of the new Cold War, in order to formulate their path for stability and growth, small powers will ideally have to adhere to a foreign policy based on several core strategic pillars. This policy should lead to a balanced mix of strategic options.

Analysts have opined diversely on these strategic pillars. A careful collation of their ideas gives us two cardinal outcomes.

The first is to choose strategic autonomy over strategic independence. While independence would provide physical leverage to a country, much broader autonomy provides the psychological strength to make choices.

The second outcome flows from strategic autonomy. Small powers should be ready to leverage their DIME to prevent economic or political coercion by different power blocs. This is easier said than done. So, what can be done?

Small powers should define their Non-Alignment 2.0 strategy on multi-alignment, proactive diplomacy, economic and energy security diversification, and internal resilience. Multi-alignment denotes not getting isolated or selective but to grow partnerships and affiliations with multiple power blocs. This gives much-needed flexibility and will certainly cater for possible foreign relations redundancies.

Proactive diplomacy, as a part of multi-alignment, is the key to achieving strategic autonomy for small countries. This will ensure small powers become valuable partners or even bridging partners of various power blocs rather than becoming isolated, and thereby running out of options in crises.

Economic/energy security diversification is critical considering the VUCA nature of the global economic dynamics. Small powers should diversify their Gross National Product (GNP) options so that the country will be less affected during global economic shocks. They also need to proactively expand their international markets and increase options available to grow the economy.

Energy security is particularly critical as the entire Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and socio-economic stability of a country is based on it. Diversification of the national energy mix (sources of energy) and suppliers of energy has become far more critical in the contemporary world order.

Internal or national resilience is inalienable to achieve all the above. The basis to achieve national resilience is having a strong desire to champion the national identity of the country. Strong institutional/procedural structures and democratic space are critical requirements to enhance national cohesion and character, which provides the foundation for national resilience.

Basically, laws, institutions, and procedures of the state need to be conditioned through transparency, rule of law, accountability, and predictability for a state to become internally resilient. Clear demarcation of state and government functions from political institutions will ensure this resilience is solidified.

Through a robust non-alignment policy, a small power needs to move away from dependency while maintaining strategic options to ensure the continued achievement of national strategic objectives. This is perhaps the only way to ensure national survival in the contemporary chaotic world order. Being a country situated in the most critical and contested Indian Ocean Region, Sri Lanka is no exception.                              

(The writer is a serving Armoured Corps officer of the Sri Lanka Army. He is currently employed as a Directing Staff at the Defence Services Command and Staff College, Sri Lanka)

(The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the official position of this publication)