• An appeal to the President to reconsider the Refusal to remove the Wall at the Galle Road end of Colombo International Airport, Ratmalana.

Your Excellency,                     

 I write to Your Excellency with the utmost respect, but also with deep concern, to appeal against the refusal by the Ministry of Defence to permit the removal of the wall at the Galle Road end of Colombo International Airport, Ratmalana.

After the Jeju Air crash in South Korea on 29th December 2024, when it hit a man-made structure, causing destruction and death to 175 passengers, since a similar dangerous concrete wall was present at the Ratmalana Airport, the Civil Aviation Authority of Sri Lanka issued a Report.

Based on this report, both the Civil Aviation Authority of Sri Lanka (CAASL) and Airport and Aviation Services (Sri Lanka) (AASL) have issued their no-objection to the removal of this structure, acknowledging that it poses a direct and unnecessary risk to aircraft operations and airport safety.

Their expert assessment reflects not only international best practice but also Sri Lanka’s obligations under the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The Ministry of Defence’s decision to maintain this obstruction directly contradicts the professional judgment of the nation’s mandated aviation regulators. This inconsistency raises a grave question: are we prepared to accept the risk of a preventable disaster in the name of Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) ‘Welfare Fund’? Big money is earned by SLAF ‘Welfare’ by leasing out advertising space to a private company.

 Recent history has shown the tragic consequences of boundary walls and fixed man-made obstacles near runways: Mangalore, India (2010): An Air India Express Boeing 737 overshot the runway and struck the boundary wall before plunging into a gorge, killing 158 people. In Kathmandu, Nepal (2018), A US-Bangla Airlines Bombardier Dash-8 skidded and struck the airport perimeter wall, resulting in 51 fatalities. In Tiruchirappalli, India (2018), Air India Express Boeing 737 -800 hit the boundary wall, with the aircraft badly damaged but no fatalities. Lukla, Nepal (2019): A Summit Air aircraft collided with the boundary wall during take-off, leading to multiple deaths and injuries. Muan Airport, South Korea (2024), hit a concrete structure, causing 175 fatalities.

These examples underline that boundary walls are not only theoretical hazards — they have been proven killers. Aviation regulators around the world insist on the removal of such obstacles because history has taught us the cost of ignoring them.

Sri Lanka’s aviation system is judged not only on performance but on the integrity of its regulatory decisions, like what happened in Ahmadabad, India, after the Air India Boeing 787 crash on 12th June 2025, killing 229 passengers and 19 on the ground.

Every time an accident or serious incident occurs anywhere in the world, the aviation network, both international and domestic, scrutiny focuses sharply on whether regulatory bodies acted with diligence and independence.

If a tragedy were to occur linked to the presence of this wall, the refusal to act—despite the regulators’ no-objection—would be seen globally as a failure of our safety governance, undermining the credibility of Sri Lanka’s aviation oversight and damaging the nation’s reputation.

I therefore urge Your Excellency to reconsider this decision on the following grounds:

A. Expert Authority – Both CAASL and AASL, the bodies legally mandated to safeguard air navigation and safety, have confirmed that the wall need not remain. Their technical assessments must be respected.

B. Public Safety and Accountability – Any avoidable risk to passengers, crew, or surrounding communities cannot be justified. The refusal to remove a known hazard shifts responsibility squarely onto those maintaining the obstruction.

C. Evidence from Recent Accidents – Boundary walls and man-made obstacles have been directly linked to catastrophic accidents such as Mangalore (2010), Kathmandu (2018), Lukla (2019) and Muan, South Korea (2024). Maintaining such a hazard at Ratmalana exposes Sri Lanka to the same risks and consequences.

E. National Reputation – Aviation safety is unforgiving; one preventable accident could permanently harm Sri Lanka’s standing in the global aviation community. Decisions today will be judged tomorrow by international regulators, airlines, and the travelling public.

F. Regulatory Integrity – A refusal against expert no-objections calls into question the independence and credibility of our national regulatory framework. This exposes the State not only to reputational loss but also to potential liability.

Your Excellency, I respectfully ask: Is this the price of air safety?

Allowing a man-made obstacle to remain, against the professional judgment of our aviation experts and in defiance of lessons from recent accidents, creates an unnecessary and unacceptable risk.

Instead, I would like to suggest a transparent fence that breaks on impact, which is recommended by ICAO, Annex 14. Picture below.

 For the safety of our skies, the protection of our people, and the preservation of Sri Lanka’s aviation reputation, I appeal for your urgent intervention to reverse the refusal and authorise the removal of the dangerous wall.

Respectfully

Capt. G A Fernando MBA

About the Author – The author has over 50 years of flying experience with RCyAF/ SLAF, Air Ceylon, Air Lanka, Singapore Airlines and SriLankan Airlines. He is a former Chief Pilot B737-200, and Acting Chief Pilot Lockheed L1011 Air Lanka, and is a former Member CAASL Accident Investigation Team. He has also held the following positions: Former Crew Resource Management (CRM) Facilitator Singapore Airlines, Former Designated Flight Operations Inspector CAASL, Immediate Past President, Aircraft Owners and Operators Association Sri Lanka, President, the Colombo Flying Club, President, UL Club (association of former employees of Air Lanka and SriLankan Airlines), Representative for ‘Aviation’ in the Organisation of Professional Associations (OPA)

(The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the official position of this publication)