• This is the final part of a two-part series of articles. The first was published in the 13 September issue

Betrayal comes in many forms; and in the military during wartime, these stem from the highest level of the country’s political leadership to the military's own chain of command. Some of them were direct relevance and some were indirect; in my part one, I narrated the direct effect as I experienced it way back in 2002. Being a Naval Officer, I have experienced indirect betrayal in several forms among which at least one has a direct link with me surviving an assassination plan.

In this Part 2 of the article, I wish to focus on how I survived the LTTE manhunt, twice in 1999 and in 2007. As there are several lessons to learnt in surviving assassination attempts, I thought of penning down these experiences.

We once had a prominent politician from the suburb of Colombo who was famous for distributing hand-operated sirens in border villages to raise alarms in a terrorist attack. This politician had several links with the separatist terrorists, and I analysed that it was the terrorists that used the politician whilst the politician being no-fool used the terrorist links to consolidate his position of influence both in the Government, Church and in his circle of influence through power and money. It was through this politician that once the terrorist’s send an attractive female suicide cadre to Colombo to target a prominent figure. The Army Intelligence knew about it and they were tracing the developments and links and during these trailing my details came to be surfaced. The terrorists were targeting me in 2007 to be eliminated by a claymore attack. I was warned by the Commander of the Navy at that time, on the intelligence warning and along with another Commodore rank senior officer, both were instructed to take extra precautions. Then the Military Intelligence also contacted me and explained the developments and the cadres who came to take me out, and I was targeted to be assassinated in Ragama, where I frequented whenever I came home for leave, at that time. The details narrated to me by Army Intelligence were in detail, and I was shocked how deep the terrorists have studied me despite the fact they were not able to get a photograph of mine for the assassination team.

Back in 1999-2000, I was the Flotilla Training Officer under two brilliant Flotilla Commanders where I performed the Flotilla’s second in command role and the Operational Sea Training role. Both then Captains; Travis Sinnaih and Manoj Jaysuriya used to be avid readers that triggered their thinking, analysing and grasping capacities more than any at that time in fighting the asymmetric threats at sea. Both introduced many new ways of fighting and concepts, and it was my responsibility to make them work at a tactical level. Both gave me freedom to design and conduct realistic training that were unheard of at that time.

By 1999, Trincomalee was in a mess and Jayasikuru Operation has drained all military resources and will-power and simply speaking there was no political will nor a miliary will in fighting a war by that time; it’s all about surviving day-to-day basis till some sunshine is showed up over the horizon. I, as a Lieutenant Commander, had my private vehicle (A Toyota Carina, 15 Sri 4602, a very lucky car indeed) that I used to keep in Trincomalee as I was in a married quarter inside the Naval Base. Both me and my wife used to go to Trincomalee market every Saturday morning to stock up our weekly groceries. This was going on and I was very mindful of potential pistol groups that were operating in the Trincomalee town area. I was alerted one day by the Navy's Intelligence Officer operating in the town area of a possible attempt on me and advised that I do not leave the Base. He said that the Navy Intelligence is putting up a counterintelligence operation in incoming Saturday where they believe the pistol group is waiting to take me out. I was forewarned and did not leave the Naval Base. And on Saturday, it happened. A pistol group of two members were waiting for me in the town and the young intelligence officer riding his trailer bike was shot at as the assassins sensed that they were being followed. There was a shoot-out in the Trincomalee town, near the market at the Main Street in morning hours but the pistol group vanished into the crowd before they were able to be rounded up.

In 2006, when I was hand-picked to be the Flotilla’s Training Officer, I ensure that the men of the 4th Fast Attack Flotilla (the Dvora Squadron) be briefed on force protection measures; as separatist terrorist outfit was trying to penetrate the Flotilla to know what is happening, what our techniques are, who are the prominent leaders, and what were the capacities of the Fast Attack Craft etc. We had several instances where crew member on leave in his home-place being approached by a friend of a friend to meet day’s needs meet by financial support, unknown friends appearing at ‘drinking-parties’ at home place with generous sponsoring of expensive whiskey and parties, and new acquittances for the family members etc. The most prominent engagement was how one officer was approached by a friend’s friend and through this friend’s friend contact the officer was approached by another friend working in the Trincomalee Fish Market. This 'friend' who was active in the fish market visited the Navy Officer inside the Naval Base for a glass of beer and dinner, when the Navy intelligence identified the visiting friend as a staunch supporter of a key logistic supplier for terrorists. Fortunately, all these happening and developments were briefed to entire Flotilla during my  briefings (a mass debriefing sessions using audio-visual means I designed for the entire Flotilla on road-side due to the nature of circumstances prevailed at that time to conduct more close-door sessions) emphasising that we all are responsible for each other; and not to disclose the Flotilla battle plans. 

Force protection measures which we learn in depth at Staff Course level, are real time and very relevant aspects of any defence services. But that needs to be taught in a very practical manner for the men to understand why force protection measures are much needed and how they will be applicable to individuals. The best of Sri Lanka Navy’s application of force protection measures against potential intelligence leak could have been the steps Navy had taken when it was decided to go after the separatist terrorist’s Gun Runner ships in the High Seas in 2007-2008. There, for the first time I observed how ‘force protection’ measures were executed in actual terms although this terminology is taught in staff colleges and in higher defence learning forums.

Counter surveillance

I developed several techniques on surviving enemy surveillance. These includes my 24/7 routine, keeping my travel intentions not known to others (I used to apply for leave and stay in the Naval Base, thus my movements became erratic and unpredictable. And I used to travel at night, mostly without anyone coming to know of my movements) and if at all I needed to travel by road, to drive the vehicle by myself. My assigned staff member for the vehicle was instructed to keep a bag of toiletries and an extra pair of clothes in the vehicle as I never disclosed my travelling instructions to him. He always kept my vehicle in prime condition and was a very loyal member with a high degree of integrity. If I drive, I used to keep my decoy dressed in bright colours at the front left-hand seat. The reason is that whenever we see a person dressed in bright colours in the front seats of the vehicle, our eyes focus on them missing who is driving. This is human behaviour, and I used that to the best to avoid spotting me as the bright colour gives me much needed seconds to pass the terrorist informants. Further, I always avoid sitting on the left rear seat, as it was customary for the officer to be seated in this position and used to change seating if I had to for some official reasons.

The application of counter measurers was numerous, from changes in vehicles to different route adoptions and to avoid communication. This was a challenging task for a military personnel as most often the in and out movements from the Military establishments are tightly regulated and policed. But the less others know of your movements, the better it will be in countering surveillance.

My reading on history and even that on various intelligence operations world over has given me an edge to grasp the essence of these matters. There are several books written on these and I recall reading full-page paper articles on execution of these intelligence operations as they, many years later, get declassified. I remember a movie called ‘Little Drummer Girl’ (1984) where the main character gets identified by the ring he wore despite hidden identifications. These intrigued my studies on aspects of intelligence, espionage, and behavioural studies. 

I wish to conclude the article with another case study where aftermath of 16 October 2006, Deegampathana suicide explosion which killed 110 Naval personnel, then Commander of the Navy wanted to trace and track the mastermind for the suicide attack. As a result, Navy Intelligence undertook a covert operation to uncover the brains behind the attack and after several months of painstaking investigations finally focused on the key figure who planned and executed the suicide truck attack on Navy convoy. This figure was the chief financial supporter for yet another provincial political bigwig in the area and has many connections with almost all government agencies in nearby provincial township. He was operating under the protection of the local political bigwig and before the Navy Intelligence apprehend him, the figure was shot dead possibly by the separatist terrorist outfit to prevent information leak. And our conflict time is full of these kinds of betrayal by politicians and high-ups in the Governance let alone the defence structure.

(The writer is a retired Rear Admiral and was a former Chief of Staff and the Chief Hydrographer of the Sri Lanka Navy, and the Joint Chief Hydrographer to the Government. He is an international consultant for undersea cables for the United Nations)

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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of this publication