In the annals of Sri Lanka’s turbulent security history, from the brutal Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) insurgency that claimed tens of thousands of lives to the devastating 2019 Easter Sunday attacks, one pattern persists with frustrating regularity: successive governments wield draconian tools like the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provisions, and Emergency Regulations with zeal while in power, only to decry them as authoritarian when in opposition.
This selective amnesia reflects not strategic depth but political expediency. Amid evolving hybrid threats from lingering Tamil diaspora networks and ethnic hate speech to drug trafficking and cyber vulnerabilities, Sri Lanka urgently needs principled, proactive tools that transcend partisan cycles.
A sustainable framework
The EVIL DONE framework, developed by criminologists Ronald V. Clarke and Graeme R. Newman in their seminal 2006 work ‘Outsmarting the Terrorists,’ offers precisely such an instrument.
Rooted in Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) and Rational Choice Theory (RCT), it shifts the focus from reactive force to intelligent opportunity reduction. Adapting it could fortify our national resilience while upholding human rights and interfaith harmony.
At its core, EVIL DONE is a pragmatic diagnostic tool for assessing why terrorists select specific targets. It posits that attackers, like other rational actors, weigh costs, benefits, risks, and rewards.
The acronym evaluates target attractiveness across eight criteria, typically scored from 0 to 5 (higher scores signalling greater vulnerability): Exposed (highly visible or accessible sites), Vital (critical infrastructure like power plants or ports), Iconic (symbolically potent locations such as religious shrines or monuments), Legitimate (targets framed as ideologically justified), Destructible (easily damaged with available means), Occupied (crowded venues maximising casualties and media impact), Near (proximate to attacker networks), and Easy (lacking robust guardianship or surveillance).
This framework draws directly from the broader principles of SCP, pioneered by Clarke, which manipulates immediate environmental factors to make crimes harder to commit, riskier, less rewarding, less provocative, or less excusable.
SCP organises 25 practical techniques into five categories: increasing effort (e.g. target hardening and access controls), increasing risks (e.g. enhanced surveillance and guardianship), reducing rewards (e.g. concealing targets and denying benefits), reducing provocations (e.g. managing frustrations and neutralising peer pressure), and removing excuses (e.g. setting clear rules and alerting conscience).
In the context of terrorism prevention, these techniques operationalise EVIL DONE by informing risk registers, layered defences, and multi-agency strategies. As featured in programmes like the Institute of Strategic Risk Management’s (ISRM) Level 5 Award in Terrorism Prevention and Management, SCP fosters integrated, whole-of-society approaches that complement Sri Lanka’s intelligence-led policing and major event security expertise, proving far more sustainable than episodic reliance on emergency powers.
Applications in SL
Sri Lanka’s past provides compelling case studies. During the LTTE era, attackers masterfully exploited Iconic, Legitimate, and Vital targets: the Dalada Maligawa bombing, political assassinations, and economic infrastructure strikes. The group’s calculated campaigns demonstrated bounded rationality: timing assaults for maximum propaganda value while minimising immediate risks.
Post-2009, the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage starkly illustrated Easy + Occupied + Iconic vulnerabilities. Coordinated suicide bombings on churches and luxury hotels during peak hours exploited soft targets, intelligence gaps, and communal tensions, resulting in over 270 deaths.
Major international events, such as the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) 2013 and cricket World Cups, where robust coordination proved effective, further underscore the value of layered defences informed by opportunity reduction.
Yet today’s threats extend far beyond conventional terrorism, demanding an expanded application of EVIL DONE. The Tamil diaspora, particularly segments in Canada, the UK, Europe, and Australia, presents a complex transnational dimension. While much diaspora activity centres on legitimate advocacy for accountability and reconciliation, residual networks have historically facilitated financing, propaganda, and logistics.
In EVIL DONE terms, these amplify Near, Easy, and Iconic risks through digital coordination and grievance narratives. Proactive strategies, balanced intelligence sharing, diaspora outreach, and counter-narratives could reduce opportunities without alienating communities. Models from the Sri Lanka Wakfs Board’s interfaith initiatives offer a blueprint for inclusive engagement.
Ethnic and racial tensions, exacerbated by hate speech, further elevate vulnerabilities. In our multi-ethnic society, online and offline incitement targeting Tamils, Muslims, or other groups turns religious sites and cultural events into high-scoring Iconic + Legitimate + Occupied targets. Sri Lanka’s ICCPR Act No.56 of 2007, incorporating Article 20(2) prohibitions on incitement to hatred, provides a legal foundation, yet selective enforcement erodes credibility and fuels cycles of distrust.
Applying EVIL DONE here means integrating hate speech monitoring into risk registers, bolstering digital guardianship, and promoting community policing to deny attackers the social fissures they exploit. Consistent application across governments is essential, not the ‘crying foul’ hypocrisy that characterises much of our politics.
The narcotics-terror nexus demands unrelenting vigilance. Sri Lanka’s strategic position as an Indian Ocean transit hub has long exposed us to heroin, synthetic drugs, and organised crime networks.
Battling the drug mafia is not a peripheral law enforcement issue but a core national security imperative. These syndicates corrupt institutions, erode community cohesion through widespread addiction, generate illicit funds that potentially finance extremism, and create vulnerable recruitment pools for radical ideologies.
In EVIL DONE analysis, trafficking operations exploit Vital + Destructible + Easy nodes, ports, border controls, financial systems, and urban distribution networks, while turning addiction-plagued neighbourhoods into Occupied soft targets ripe for exploitation.
Continuing this battle requires sustained intelligence-led operations, inter-agency coordination, maritime domain awareness, and community rehabilitation programmes. Only by dismantling these mafia networks can we sever symbiotic links between drug profits and terrorism, preventing the social decay that undermines hard-won peace.
Cyber threats compound these risks in our digital age. Ransomware attacks, phishing campaigns, and data breaches on government and private systems expose Exposed + Vital + Easy infrastructure. Breaches not only erode public trust but enable disinformation that inflames ethnic divisions or facilitates hybrid operations.
Adapting EVIL DONE to the cyber domain, scoring digital assets for visibility, criticality, and guardianship, alongside enhancements to the Sri Lanka Computer Emergency Readiness Team (Sri Lanka CERT) and public-private partnerships, is imperative. The emphasis on capability development through training and exercises provides a ready pathway.
The path forward
Globally, the framework’s strengths lie in its actionability and flexibility. It enables cost-effective prioritisation, adapts to static and dynamic targets (including major events and urban resilience), and integrates seamlessly with intelligence-led policing. Empirical applications in the UK, Istanbul, and beyond demonstrate its predictive value, particularly the DONE elements for modern lone-actor and low-tech threats.
Supplements like the TRACK framework can address spatial dynamics. (The TRACK – Tolerant, Relevant, Accessible, Known – framework is a contemporary extension of the EVIL DONE model, developed by researchers Zoe Marchment and Paul Gill around 2020. It focuses specifically on the spatial and operational dynamics of how terrorists choose targets in modern contexts). Limitations must be acknowledged honestly.
EVIL DONE assumes bounded rationality, potentially undervaluing deeply ideological or suicidal actors. Over-reliance risks creating a ‘fortress society’ or unintended threat displacement without tackling grievances. In Sri Lanka, empirical validation through local case studies is needed, alongside safeguards to ensure ICCPR compliance and avoid over-hardening that stifles freedoms.
The path forward is clear.
First, pilot EVIL DONE scoring in national risk registers, incorporating hybrid scenarios involving diaspora links, hate speech, drugs, and cyber vectors.
Second, embed it in professional development at the National Police Academy, military institutions, and other stakeholders such as the Department of Immigration and Emigration, Customs, National Dangerous Drugs Control Board, Coast Guard, etc.
Third, develop Sri Lanka-specific analyses for training, policy, and publications, including contributions to the national security discourse.
Fourth, institutionalise consistent, oversight-driven application to transcend political cycles.
Finally, foster regional South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) collaboration and leverage interfaith platforms for community resilience.
SL’s choice
Sri Lanka’s hard-won peace after defeating LTTE terrorism and navigating post-Easter Sunday reforms positions us as a global thought leader in counter-terrorism.
Embracing tools like EVIL DONE honours the sacrifices of the past while securing the future. It demands statesmanship over short-termism, principled consistency in law application, intelligence-driven prevention, and whole-of-society unity.
As we confront hybrid threats in an interconnected world, opportunity reduction offers not just defence, but a pathway to enduring harmony and resilience.
Our policymakers must choose brains over power, and strategy over expediency. The alternative is perpetual vulnerability.
(The writer is a security analyst, a retired Senior Superintendent of Police, a former Head of the Counter-Terrorism Division of the State Intelligence Service, and the Managing Director of Smart Security Solutions Ltd. He has also served as head of the Sri Lankan delegation at three BIMSTEC security conferences. With over 40 years of experience in policing and intelligence, he writes on regional security, interfaith relations, and geopolitical strategy)
(The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the official position of this publication)