History is endlessly interesting and almost impossible to reconcile as the wheels are always turning. This 21st century will provide countless points of fascination for students of history and international politics in the years ahead.
Three prominent contemporary scholars of international relations have had their names constantly repeated at various times over the last two decades and have also attained special significance in this current moment. Samuel P. Huntington, Francis Fukuyama, and John J. Mearsheimer are American political scientists who have made indelible contributions to their fields of study; they each have a specific thesis of the world that differs from one another, their worldviews are regularly challenged by the unpredictable shifts in global politics and their resulting conflicts.
Military conflicts of the last 20 years might be branched into broad areas such as the post-9/11 American ‘War on Terror’ and its many various theatres; Russia-led military operations in Georgia and Ukraine; various theatres of conflict in the Middle East such as in Yemen; and Israel/Palestine and numerous wars against insurgencies on the African continent.
The War on Terror also encapsulates some of the latter mentioned conflicts; one may argue that civil wars in Libya and Syria were derivatives, necessitated by regime change imperatives or as natural cycles of violence, from nationalist secular groups versus Islamist armies and other social movements like the Arab Spring. These groupings do not include the Sino-Indian border dispute, the Indo-Pakistani conflict for the future of Kashmir, etc., all of which have seen peaks in violence recently.
The work of the aforementioned scholars centre around the political organisation of the post-Cold War era, taking in the unipolarity of the world at that moment, Western hegemony over the international system, and the rules-based liberal (or capitalist) global order that would emerge in the decades since.
An old question asked anew
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was a symbolic event, a point of generational pride for what is perceived as a victory for liberalism and Western systems of economic, political, and social organisation. Writing prior to the events in Berlin, Francis Fukuyama would publish an essay called ‘The End of History,’ which suggested an end to the ideological evolution of political systems.
Fukuyama believed that liberal democracy had triumphed and represented the final and most advanced system of government; the world had attained “not just ... the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end-point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government”.
The most famous rebuttal to Fukuyama’s thesis came from Huntington, who had incidentally been Fukuyama’s doctoral supervisor at Harvard University. In a 1993 Foreign Affairs article titled ‘The Clash of Civilisations,’ Huntington made specific reference to Fukuyama: “World politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated to proliferate visions of what it will be – the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries between nation-states, and the decline of the nation-state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism, among others.”
Huntington suggests that conflicts of the future will be not between nation-states but between cultures: “It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.”
Fukuyama has revisited and refined his thesis in the decades since, though he does not believe he has been proved wrong in calling an end to the ideological evolution of systems; in fact, part the original thesis in ‘The End of History’ was the idea that ‘free-market capitalism’ and liberal democracies were central to these successful systems. Fukuyama has acknowledged that his terminology ‘end of history’ was misunderstood to a degree and that challenges and conflict are likely to persist even in liberal democracies.
Before we proceed further, it is important to introduce Prof. John J. Mearsheimer, who is currently perhaps the most in-demand foreign policy scholar in the world. Primarily, Prof. Mearsheimer is the most prominent contemporary exponent of ‘realism,’ the political philosophy that emphasises power as the key determinant of the actions of nation-states and their strategic interests. Realism generally holds that the dynamics and balances of power best explain the world as it exists.
I have discussed realism in previous articles and it is a broad subject, but for this purpose I will quote Prof. Mearsheimer’s 2001 book ‘The Tragedy of Great Power Politics’: “My theory argues that great powers are dangerous places. Their tragic fate is that they cannot escape the relentless pressures that force them to compete for power… All states are interested in power. Some are more interested than others, but all of them take power considerations into account to some degree.”
Ever since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Prof. Mearsheimer has been omnipresent as an expert commentator; not only did he accurately predict Russian aggression, but has since made the most compelling case for NATO expansionism being the primary driver of Russian aggression. He emphasises the dynamics of both the invasion and continued destruction of Ukraine as resulting from US foreign policy.
Order or anarchy
The Israeli military response to the attacks of 7 October has brought a fresh perspective to the debate on the ‘rules-based order’ that had been raging ever since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This was a pivotal moment in history, which suggests that the powerful have the means at their disposal to shun the rules-based order, as Mearsheimer insists: “In the anarchic world of international politics, states are security maximisers.”
Sri Lanka, an island nation on the doorstep of a regional superpower and situated in a geo-strategic location along some of the world’s busiest sea lanes, is completely dependent on a rules-based international order. It is thus in Sri Lanka’s vital interests to always uphold its obligations in this regard, even if the rules are being applied selectively, as suggested by President Wickremesinghe at a recent event organised by the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS).
In fact, with a clear understanding of Mearsheimer’s thesis, this selective application of the rules is predictable and should have determined how Sri Lanka postures on this issue. Simply pointing out the double standard is unhelpful and counter-productive, if you acknowledge and accept the power dynamics at play in a ‘realist’ manner.
During Israel’s offensive retaliation to 7 October, there are many parallels to Sri Lanka’s own violent conflict, specifically the final phase of the war that has drawn so much ire from the international community. Right now, there are debates surrounding the intensity of Israel’s response; its broad stated goal of destroying Hamas and whether these conform to principles of international law such as those governing proportionality or ‘collective punishment’ of a civilian population.
It is worth noting that during the 2009 sessions at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) when Western powers sought resolutions that may have interfered with the conflict or at the least scrutinised the war effort more closely, Sri Lanka was able to coalesce a broad group of nations to support its own case that emphasised principles of non-interference in internal affairs and the concept of sovereignty.
This broad coalition was the result of successful diplomatic interventions by Sri Lanka’s Permanent Mission which unified expression in favour of non-interference, led by nations of the Global South. Despite Sri Lanka’s utilisation of sovereignty and non-interference, it is conceivable that members of the Global South with power dynamics similar to those of Sri Lanka might have been better served by aligning themselves with the Western ideal of how to apply the rules-based order in the case of Sri Lanka in 2009.
What drove the nations of the Global South, even Arab nations such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, etc., to support Sri Lanka at the UNHRC given their responses to civilian deaths during this and previous editions of the Gaza war? Well, part of this might be explained by Huntington as much as Mearsheimer.
Through Huntington’s lens, we might notice the ‘cultural’ unity generating the Global South’s coalescence against the Western bloc; the traditional north-south divide. Yet Mearsheimer also applies, because as he states in ‘The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,’ “balancing is the principal way that states check aggressive powers”. Was the Global South acting as a check on Western power and interference?
Normalisation and alienation
The Global South has been forthright in its condemnation of Israel’s aggression in the Gaza Strip in a manner that it simply was not in the period following the Russian invasion. To some extent, Huntington works in favour of the Palestinian cause, in terms of the broad base of support it receives from the Global South, but specifically from Arab states with whom they share cultural markers. Thus, the Arab and Muslim worlds have condemned Israel in unison; Huntington is alive and well.
But take a deeper look. While there is condemnation and rhetoric, try to identify the material benefits accrued to the Palestinians in the current conflict from these allies, in say, the Arab world. Has the Israeli assault been slowed or its intensity weakened? Have they succeeded in achieving humanitarian goals, reducing civilian casualties, or getting aid supplies into the Gaza Strip? The most material benefit comes from Egypt’s belated opening of the Rafah Crossing to allow supplies to reach Gazans in desperate need.
Then consider one of the factors that might explain the timing of the Hamas attack on 7 October; the project of Saudi-Israeli normalisation of relations, which would have created a singular, Western-aligned bulwark against Iran, which funds Hamas to the tune of $ 100 million per year.
Saudi Arabia is specifically interesting because it is a major military power in the region; it is extremely wealthy and crucial to the global supply and price of energy. It is thus a state with significant leverage on international affairs, especially conflicts that are in its immediate sphere of influence.
Yet as an American ally, Saudi Arabia must manage its power dynamic against American interests in the region, and America’s foremost interest in the region seems to be the State of Israel. The very fact of a normalisation between the world’s most powerful Islamic nation and its only Jewish state lends itself to Mearsheimer’s doctrine of power relations; the normalisation was a movement towards maximising power through a strategic partnership.
Palestinians have cultural links to many powerful Arab nations in the region, but does the Palestinian cause attract the attention of these nations in absolute solidarity? The outcomes and trajectory of over 60 years of a brutal and illegal occupation suggest that whatever solidarity there might have been seems to be waning.
If you consider the two-state solution, it is not as elusive as the commentary might suggest, as if the calculus is endlessness complex; most of the world has agreed on a solution along the lines of the internationally accepted pre-1967 borders, the so-called Green Line, with some adjustments to take in more recent changes.
Most of Europe, the non-aligned nations, Arab states, the organisation of Islamic states which includes Iran, much of Asia, Russia, and China agree with the broad lines of the proposed borders. The only states that are not in agreement are Israel and the US.
The Palestinian power deficit
Thus, while we witnessed millions of citizens marching in support of Palestine from the US, Germany, France, and across much of Europe, with public sentiment united in calling for a ceasefire, there has been little to no actual change in policy from most Western governments. The US has the most leverage in this conflict and yet refuses to unambiguously call for a ceasefire, only calling for a ‘humanitarian pause’.
One must notice that the 7 October attack was in itself a manifestation of a lack of elite political support for the Palestinian cause, the decades-long side-stepping of the Palestinian issue while new alliances were being formed between Israel and neighbouring Arab states under the watchful eye of the US.
President Trump acquiesced to many of Israel’s demands such as moving the capital to Jerusalem, giving Israel sovereignty over Syria’s resource-rich Golan Heights, and escalating tensions with Iran by unilaterally exiting the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA). The Trump administration did so in return for quite literally zero concessions from Israel with regard to the Palestinian issue; the final Trump peace plan did not include any input from the Palestinian Authority as it boycotted the negotiations in protest of Trump’s aforementioned gifts to Israel.
There simply was no public outcry for Palestinian rights; the issue was essentially being relegated to the back-benches, and for all their cultural ties to great powers in the region and beyond, Palestine found itself with no leverage, not even a seat at the table.
This might well have changed since the events of 7 October; the eyes of the media and minds of the commentariat have once again been focused on the Palestinian project for self-determination. One only hopes attention spans last long enough for the commentary to ask logical questions about the two-state solution.
While Mearsheimer’s thesis perfectly explains and rationalises the Russian invasion within the spectrum of the pursuit of power maximisation, we must also look at Huntington’s ‘cultural critique’. The Russian polity and its notions of national identity and statehood are derived from its own long and tumultuous history of withstanding and defeating countless invasions and conflicts in its region, conflicts that threatened its territory and sovereignty, always at great cost.
This has imbued the Russian citizenry and state with a cultural identity of a nation of great consequence, a great power that is suspicious of and aggressive towards Western hegemony, with historical scars utilised to remind the Russian people of their past and present position in the world and the forces it may have to face once again.
President Putin’s own persona and leadership credentials were built upon some notion of this cultural identity, especially during the conflict with Chechen separatists. Cultural identity and embedded notions of some nationalistic ideal can have powerful effects on how nation-states might behave or react, who they fall back on, and just how far they are willing to push the limits of their own power calculus.
In the current status quo, from Judea and Samaria to the Donbas, we find ourselves adrift in a world that reflects Mearsheimer’s ‘tragedy,’ staring blankly into the distance, hoping to glimpse some version of Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’.
(The writer has 15 years of experience in the financial and corporate sectors after completing a Degree in Accounting and Finance at the University of Kent [UK] while also completing a Masters in International Relations from the University of Colombo. He is a media resource person, presenter, political commentator, and researcher. He also presents an interview show that is available on Instagram, Facebook, and YouTube. He is also a member of the Working Committee of the Samagi Jana Balawegaya [SJB]. He can be contacted via email: kusumw@gmail.com and Twitter: @kusumw)