I don’t claim to be a prophet, but you don’t have to be one to realise that we are still reeling from the ruptures of 2022. 

We have come a long way since then, but the tensions of that year are still with us, and it would be ridiculous to say that they won’t be with us in 2026. 

The way I see it, 2026 will be dominated by 10 developments, and I will end my last column for the year in The Sunday Morning with them.

1. US President Donald Trump’s crusades against what he labels, in every screed he posts on X and Truth Social, as radical Left-woke ideology will continue and amplify, and these will heighten the contradictions between the US’s advocacy of human rights abroad and its curtailment of civil liberties at home. 

This will only be partially tempered by a growing tide of civil society opposition to his policies, but that will be countered by the burgeoning alliance between corporate oligarchs, media moguls, the military-industrial-technological complex, and Trump’s agenda. The ‘60 Minutes’ controversy at CBS, now overseen by a Trump ideologue, is a case in point.

1. Trump’s continuing subjugation of American think tanks, foundations, and academic institutions will also continue, since this has now become for his administration a crucial part of its campaign against radical-Left-woke ideology. The renaming of the US Institute of Peace and the Kennedy Centre – particularly the latter – are just two portents of what is yet to come. 

The thin line between Executive authority and institutional autonomy, which defenders of the US would invoke vis-à-vis China and Russia, is fading. The fact that a US Embassy could post on social media that it would be closed for Christmas thanks to Trump shows as much.

1. Trump’s sudden recall of ambassadors, especially across Africa and Asia, shows that he wants his yes-men in high positions. For better or worse, this includes South Asia, specifically India and Sri Lanka. 

While most ambassadors in these countries were appointed under former US President Joe Biden and are seen as having promoted Biden’s agenda, Trump would want officials more aligned with his America First ideology: in essence, an inversion of the Washington’s support for causes like gender rights, minority rights, sexual orientation rights, media freedom, and the like.

1. The discourse of rights, democracy, and freedom, which previous US administrations, Democratic or Republican, would invoke in their relations with other countries, is no longer the criterion for Washington’s dealings with its partners or adversaries. 

This is not to say the Trump administration will not invoke these values in its actions, as its ongoing gunboat gung-ho diplomacy against Venezuela shows. Yet while previous administrations distinguished between their upholding of those values and their selective application of them to particular countries, Trump’s invocation of them in some contexts and rejection of them in others is more random.

1. Trump’s definition of ally and adversary is more complex and less consistent than his predecessors. He is as ready to come down hard on allies as he is to soften his stance on rivals. This explains his relationship with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping on the one hand and with Europe, Canada, and Australia on the other. 

Washington’s policies will continue to embolden his close coterie – the pro-Israel, Christian white nationalist, evangelical Republican Right – to make the most outrageous remarks on these countries. 

Mike Huckabee’s comments on Australia, aptly countered by Anthony Albanese, and Trump’s appointment of a special envoy to Greenland, countered by all North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members minus the United States, are revealing.

1. Much of the US foreign policy establishment is still framing things through the prism of the past. One example here is Ely Ratner’s proposal for an Asian security alliance, tentatively described as an Asian NATO. While appreciating the Trump factor, Ratner does not appear to have considered it enough. 

A security alliance requires reciprocity at all levels, and Trump’s actions and inactions have shown that he does not care for reciprocity at any level. Former Foreign Secretary of India Vijay Gokhale has argued that in this day and age, such alliances are impractical, given the ground realities in Asia and the Indo-Pacific. The critique holds true, with or without Trump.

1. Europe is caught between the rock of diminishing US commitment on the one hand and the hard place of the Russia threat on the other. Europe is still wedded to the idea of a Ukrainian victory; it is an eventuality it wants to realise at any cost. The issue is that the US can no longer be expected to cough up more money. 

Yet Europe has no choice but to play second fiddle to Washington, even as Washington goes to extraordinary lengths to sabotage its relationship with Europe. The recent sanctions package on several former EU officials, especially over the proposed Online Safety Act, is one case in point. 

Trump sees himself as a disruptor, and he defines relations with Europe along those lines on two fronts: a shift in policy in Ukraine, and open support for Right-wing parties in the continent. 

On both counts, Europe has had to bear the brunt. It has attempted to resolve this by cutting down spending on foreign aid and ramping up defence spending. This too is counterproductive, since it risks slashing Europe’s soft power in its neighbourhood.

1. However, not even Trump will temper the Western axis’s – which comprises NATO and its East Asian allies, including Japan – hostility to China and Russia. This is true even if Trump softens Washington’s relations with Beijing. They are too wedded to US hegemony to be a part of any coalition which risks breaking up that hegemony. 

This is probably why foreign policy experts are quick to frame Trump as an aberration, something that can easily be cast aside three years down the line at Presidential Elections. 

What this optimism masks is Trump’s succession plans: as a prominent Sri Lankan foreign policy analyst stated at a recent discussion, J.D. Vance, the heir presumptive, is capable of being more bellicose yet articulate in his policies. What that portends for Europe, Canada, Australia, and US allies is debatable.

1. It is not entirely correct to say that Trump has pushed India towards China. India and China are still in a relationship of what Gokhale calls “armed coexistence”. For better or worse, this is independent of who is in power in Washington, though that is certainly a major determinant, if not catalyst. 

I am not pessimistic enough to say no rapprochement will take place between these two countries, but a major opening up à la, say, US President Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to Beijing is unlikely. All too often, Trump officials let their jaundiced views determine relations with this country or the other: Scott Bessent’s hysterical harangues about Brahmins profiteering at the expense of Indian people are just one example. 

If this continues – which, I think, it will – the Washington-New Delhi dynamic will continue its downward trajectory. This is a win-win for China, but there is no reason why India should not seek opportunities there.

1. Finally, a word about Gaza. The ceasefire that is in operation now continues to be broken by the Israeli Government on the flimsiest pretexts. And yet, so long as it sees Washington as a dependable ally, Jerusalem will wear impunity on its collar even as other Western countries, including England and Finland, come down hard on it at the United Nations and other forums. 

This is the biggest humanitarian crime of the last, I would say, decade and a half; it is a blot on the world’s conscience and anyone who takes selective positions on issues like Ukraine while speaking derogatorily about Palestinians – and there are a number of commentators who are selective on those counts – need to take a hard look at themselves in the mirror.

There you have it: some takeaways for 2026. I think we are in for some interesting times. We always have been, since 2022. But 2026 will be interesting for other reasons. More than anything, it will be the year Trump puts into action his objective of exporting America First to other countries, through a radical reshuffle of the Foreign Service.

(The writer is a researcher, writer, and foreign policy and political analyst from Sri Lanka. He can be reached at udakdev1@gmail.com)

(The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the official position of this publication)