The recent statements by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and External Affairs Minister Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on Kachchativu created a sensation in India and Sri Lanka, especially regarding what their repercussions would be. Quotes such as “every Indian” is angered, as PM Modi said, and of India needing to sit down and work out a solution, as declared by Dr. Jaishankar, insinuated Indian heartache on one hand and the potential for sober solutions on the other.
The Minister justified India’s stances on sovereign rights, exclusive jurisdiction, visa-free travel, fishing, and other rights Indians already enjoy, and explained the 50-year-old Indian political interventions on Kachchativu. To attract the favourable attention of South Indian fishermen, he rattled off issues affecting Indian fishermen after the 1974 agreements. They have been headaches to all successive Indian governments and even Sri Lankan fishermen have undergone such experiences.
He stressed on the fact that it was the Indian Central Government agents who sorted out the fishermen’s problems. I endorse it as a former Sri Lankan Secretary of Defence because we intervened with the Sri Lanka Navy, Police, and fisheries officials in the release of the Indian fishermen on submissions of the Indian High Commission in Colombo.
However, the main political queries of the Indian Minister were, “Who ‘belittled’ Kachchativu?”, “Who signed the agreements?”, “Who hid them?”, and “Who connived politically?” He fixed the responsibility on the Congress Party and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) for obvious political reasons and highlighted the public’s right to know the truth.
Indian politicians will anticipate the reactions generated by the South Indian fishery electorates at the Lok Sabha Elections and the potential antipathy that will be generated against the Congress and DMK. Both are Indian political outcomes. Hence, they are mostly immaterial to ordinary Sri Lankans. If material, they rest at high diplomatic and political levels.
Relevance of Kachchativu
In Tamil Nadu, this may be reflected after the Lok Sabha Elections and at the State Elections two years hence. The political outcome for the Indian political parties (i.e. the Congress and DMK) will be greater, due to their purported involvement in the alleged loss of Indian sovereignty, as orchestrated by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) hierarchy. These are also straightforwardly related to Indian politics and not to Sri Lankans.
However, Sri Lankan Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Sabry stated that this was a matter that had been discussed and resolved half a century ago and needed no further deliberations. Contrarily, Minister Jaishankar argues as if fresh deliberations are required and imminent. Minister Sabry’s thinking seems to be simplified and unilateral. Whether such is silently palatable to India is unknown. Let’s not forget that the Indians believe in Chanakya’s teaching: ‘Silence is a great weapon.’
For Sri Lankans, the political sensitivity is felt since the affairs of Kachchativu are connected to northern fishermen’s lives, the alleged degradation of oceanic resources, and the environment, which determine the sustainability of the Sri Lankan fishery sector in the north. Already, northerners insist that our Government should respond to India. The ball is still in the Indian political court, but it could indeed be in our court after the Lok Sabha Elections.
For domestic Opposition political groups, this opens another political flank to criticise the Government’s hesitancy to respond to India on the grounds of losing sovereignty. It is because the quoted statements are interpreted (rightly or wrongly) as the Modi Government’s interest in reclaiming Indian sovereignty over the island of Kachchativu, irrespective of the 50-year-old agreement. Dr. Jaishankar’s interest in sitting down and working out a solution is a positive and proactive approach, which dilutes the often-heard suggestion that Indians will create adverse effects against Sri Lankan sovereignty through interventions in Kachchativu.
Less-spoken basics of Kachchativu
In 1974, it was observed that the then Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, though having consented to the transfer of Kachchativu, wished to postpone the Kachchativu agreement by two years.
Nevertheless, due to domestic and external compulsions, it happened on the following grounds: (a) the presumption that Sri Lankans were unaware of the oil structures in the Wadge Bank area and that such impending knowledge would create difficulties in moving forward, (b) the existence of a supposedly strong pro-Chinese lobby in Sri Lanka, (c) the view held at the time by some that the case for India was weak, (d) the cordiality that existed at the time between the two countries, (e) the belief that India would gain about 1.5 miles of sea area from the existing boundary, and (f) the assumption that the international image created by Indian involvement in the East Pakistan war would be repaired.
These exhibit an expansion of reasoning to sign an agreement in 1974. Minister Jaishankar makes it apparent that the DMK and Congress have connived in finalising the agreement and he complains about it very harshly.
Potential post-Indian elections scenario
An overall victory for the BJP at the next Lok Sabha Elections appears favoured. In 2014, there was one Lok Sabha winner from the BJP in Tamil Nadu and none in 2019. If the Kachchativu issue is political rhetoric, the victory of even one parliamentarian this time would spark a heavy demand on the BJP to stick to the issue sparked by its leaders.
Knowing how PM Modi and especially Minister Jaishankar have reacted to such situations in the Lok Sabha and during international interviews (especially in the West), respectively, one can expect impulsive demands after the formation of the potential third-term BJP government in order to appease the South Indian Tamil Nadu fisherfolk.
What Dr. Jaishankar envisages appears to be to study and work out a solution, not to gain ownership of the Kachchativu island as feared by some in Colombo. It is to find solutions to the “seizure, detention, or apprehension of a large number of Indian fishermen and fishing vessels” by Sri Lankan authorities. To Indian politicians, it is a satisfying intervention.
Other boundary disputes
India has had boundary-related disputes elsewhere. One such case was with Nepal, with the Kalapani district boundary issue that transpired with a new map released by India after the Article 370 abrogation. This was in 2019, not 50 years ago.
In this instance, when Nepal objected to this ‘encroachment’ of the Lipulekh Pass that belonged to it, as mentioned in the Treaty of Sugauli signed between the British East India Company and Nepal in 1816, India took the position that the “Indian map accurately depicts the sovereign territory of India and it has in no manner revised the Indian boundary with Nepal”.
The Nepal Cabinet released a political map that showed the tri-junction as a part of Nepal and the country’s Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli threatened to retrieve the land area somehow. India did not give in and interpreted the Nepalese reaction “as an effort by PM Oli to consolidate himself in the Nepal Communist Party Government by whipping up ultra-nationalistic sentiments against India”. Ultimately, the Indian map remained intact.
Indian officials also unhesitatingly stick to such stances as seen from the Kalapani issue, where Indian Army Chief Gen. Manoj Mukund Naravane articulated the assessment in New Delhi when he suggested that the protests could be at the behest of “someone else” – a veiled reference to China. Political commentators support India and Nepal chalking out their borders in a formal and friendly manner in order to avoid other disputes such as the one over the Kalapani area, and this could be applied to Kachchativu too.
For India, Kachchativu may appear amazingly minor and straightforward compared to what it has experienced with Pakistan or China, where conflict has extended to wars. The pro-Chinese attitude of the incumbent Maldivian Government must be a concern for India, though the Maldives does not border India. India has been involved in the Bhutan-China border dispute (i.e. Doklam) reflecting the value it places on the tri-junctional boundary between Bhutan, India, and China.
Indians are concerned about the effects of clashes between Myanmar’s military and armed ethnic groups near the border with India, disrupting the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the presence of runaway soldiers on Indian soil, threatening to drive a rift between the two countries. With Bangladesh, the boundary issues have been sorted out through negotiations and agreements, which could serve to inspire similar negotiations between Sri Lanka and India too.
When such major and minor boundary issues are reviewed, India must be content to have a sustainable trouble-free southern tip, and Kachchativu need not be a tool of bother.
Indian responses to Palk Bay issues
On the fishing issue in the Palk Bay, Indian officials usually highlight initiatives taken by India under the new ‘Pradhan Mantri Matsya Sampada Yojana’ and other schemes of the Central Government and the governments of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry to diversify and reduce fishing pressures in the bay. Jaishankar also insisted on these in his quoted presentation. Unfortunately, the outputs and outcomes of it are extremely slow to be realised. Coordinating and cooperating with such approaches may be safer than going on a collision course.
Many Indian websites critically referring to the Kachchativu issue may also fall by the wayside soon. However, one may entertain concerns if Prime Minister Modi uses a tough and demanding approach toward Palk Bay with the licensed fishing system or executes new operational arrangements as proposed to then Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa in February 2020.
Do not forget President Abdul Kalam proposed a three-day rule for fishing by Indians sometime back. The roles to be played by Fisheries Minister Douglas Devananda, National Security Advisor Sagala Ratnayaka, and Foreign Minister Sabry will be vital in strategising on the potential Indian entry point before the Indian elections are concluded.
Weakness of international interventions
In the unlikely event that Prime Minister Modi rescinds the 1974 and 1976 agreements, the domestic political Opposition may propose international interventions to sort it out. However, it is not a granted supplement or alternative to friendly negotiations with India. When the food drop happened on 4 June 1987, we experienced this. While a small number of nations like Nepal, Bhutan, Libya, and Bangladesh stood with us, the larger, more powerful nations were noncommittal.
Our weak status was orchestrated by the Sri Lankan Foreign Ministry statement that said India had given short notice to clear our airspace before food was dropped and the statement expected lavish cooperation from us! Additionally, for instance, the Press Trust of India claimed that Indian External Affairs Minister N.D. Tiwari had discussed the issue with Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev, and that Moscow had shown “a perfect understanding” of the Indian position on the Sri Lankan crisis and not the Sri Lankan position related to violation of national airspace, and thus, sovereignty.
The statement issued by United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar on the food drop was considered ‘mild’ by some. Washington regretted the Indian action, which may sometimes dwindle today due to diplomatic developments that have taken place geopolitically and the importance India has earned in political, international, economic, military, demographic, and market spheres.
Pressure on Lankan politics
It is political rhetoric for the BJP at this juncture. It will end soon. However, it is election season for President Ranil Wickremesinghe too. He will be pressured by Tamil political elements and northern fishermen’s organisations to protest against Indians, which has been toned down by Minister Sabry.
If the President protests, it will amount to challenging the election campaign of Prime Minister Modi, for which President Wickremesinghe will not bargain. If he does not react, he will be criticised by his opponents as selling out Sri Lankan sovereignty. The current implicit silence is self-explanatory.
In a similar situation, President R. Premadasa took a stern position. It was when he demanded the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) based on sovereignty, despite the invitation to the IPKF being extended by President J.R. Jayewardene (JRJ) immediately after signing the Rajiv-JRJ Agreement. President Premadasa did not win Indian kudos for that. However, taking such a stand currently would be a bleak position.
We must be mindful of the fact that India helped Sri Lanka during our economic difficulties by extending $ 4 billion and supporting us with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Our Government will think of this immediate past and it has to handle such obligations diplomatically. Because of the current difficult situation and election environment, it would have been ideal if the issue had never arisen. For the BJP, however, it may be the most opportune moment!
In making a decision, the overall socioeconomic and political environments must also be reviewed, especially about investments made by Indians in Sri Lanka. Under the incumbent Government, there have been major Indian investment inflows. However, under external pressure or independently, there has been concurrent criticism against those investments and investors.
In this regard, the media reported that when Prime Minister Dinesh Gunawardena met Chinese President Xi Jinping, the latter had emphasised on the necessity of establishing a fair and transparent environment in Sri Lanka that encouraged Chinese investments. ‘A fair and transparent environment’ is a notion that can be evaluated subjectively, and when the Chinese say so, it means distancing Indians!
Hence, both countries should be mindful of balancing hearts and minds in a competitive environment. The results of screaming about Kachchativu may abort Indian investments in Sri Lanka on one hand and even create space for inroads to be made by other competitive interested parties to get involved with Sri Lanka on a disputed track and plant other complexities.
Conclusion
To avoid such complexities, the friendly political and economic relations both countries enjoy could be the guiding path. It could be expedited by the opening given by Jaishankar to sit and work out a solution. Parties need not revert to the Shakespearean era of demanding a pound of flesh!
Working toward avoiding any calamitous situation is in Sri Lanka’s best interests. Hence, the messages conveyed by the Indian hierarchy must be converted into positive guiding processes. Therefore, early mitigatory action, around which negotiations could progress without losing sight of sovereignty, will pay in the long run rather than sticking only to the contents of the 50-year-old agreement. Failing to access a reasonable, cautious, justified solution through negotiations may provoke unpredicted ex parte solutions detrimental to friendly, healthy, and neighbourly relationships.
In that respect, Sri Lanka has an Indian ‘vehicle’ to search for a solution – the Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) initiative, which is a maritime initiative that prioritises the Indian Ocean region to ensure India’s peace, stability, and prosperity. Its goals match the emerged issues as demonstrated by (a) a climate of trust and openness, (b) addressing regional concerns, (c) increasing maritime cooperation, (d) resolution of maritime issues in a peaceful manner, and (e) adherence to international maritime rules and norms by all countries in the Indian Ocean region.
If India asserts itself using this vehicle rather than meddling in the ownership of Kachchativu just to satisfy minor political harvests, it will sound very helpful. Additionally, when simplified paths are available, why move on complex routes?
(The writer is a former Secretary to the President)