- The process for fair decision-making
A centuries’ old Latin maxim is making fresh waves in legal and administrative circles nemo judex in causa sua -“no one should be a judge in their own case.” Though rooted in ancient Roman law, the principle remains a cornerstone of modern justice systems, and recent debates have thrust it back into public attention.
At its heart, nemo judex demands that any person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative power must be free from personal interest in the matter before them. The rule is simple but uncompromising. Decision-makers cannot sit in judgment where they stand to gain or lose.
Legal scholars note the maxim is not merely a procedural nicety but a safeguard of public confidence. Recent rulings from Ireland, Hong Kong, and academic commentary from the UK highlight how courts are tightening standards around judicial impartiality amid rising public sensitivity to bias.
The maxim, central to the rule against bias, has long been described as one of the “twin pillars” of natural justice. Its modern articulation is often traced to R v. Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy (1924), where Lord Chief Justice Gordon Hewart famously declared that “justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.”
Recent scholarship underscores that even the appearance of bias, not merely actual bias, can undermine public confidence. An academic review written last in 2025 by the Director of Studies of the Murray Edwards College of the Cambridge University notes the first goal is accuracy in doing justice. In other words, filtering out undue influences renders the justice more likely to be done. This is founded on the idea that a just or an accurate decision is more likely to be reached by a decision-maker who is genuinely impartial, disinterested in the outcome. The second goal is public confidence. Judgments by their nature cannot please everyone and the repugnance felt towards biased decision-makers is reflected in constitutions and administrative law codes around the world. The slightest hint of bias can dint general confidence, making the appearance of impartiality a key for public acceptance of the process, even if they do not agree with the outcome.
One of the most detailed recent examinations of nemo judex comes from the High Court of Ireland in Gaultier and Anor v. Reilly and Others (Number 2) (2024). The plaintiff sought the recusal of the presiding judge on the grounds of subjective bias, the lack of integrity, and incompetence. The Court rejected the application, reaffirming that: The test for recusal is objective, not subjective; The question is whether a reasonable and informed observer would apprehend bias; and that Repeated, unfounded recusal applications may amount to an abuse of process.
The judgment drew heavily on established precedents such as Battle v. Irish Art Promotion Centre (1968), the Allied Irish Bank Plc v. Aqua Fresh Fish Limited (2019), and Bula Ltd. v. Tara Mines Ltd. (2000), reinforcing the high threshold required to displace the presumption of judicial impartiality.
In WSSA v. SYH (2024), the Hong Kong Court of Appeal revisited the standard for apparent bias in the emotionally charged context of family litigation. The husband alleged that interim orders, remarks by the judge, and case-management decisions demonstrated bias. The Court dismissed the claim, reaffirming that: Apparent bias is a binary question — “like a light switch, either on or off.”; Adverse rulings or stern judicial comments do not constitute bias unless they show an unwillingness to consider opposing views.; and A fair‑minded and informed observer would not infer bias from routine case‑management decisions.
The Court relied on the established “reasonable apprehension of bias” test from Gm-sa Aka Dg, M-s v. Ddpj (Recusal) (2022).
In Gachagua and Five Others v. Maingi and 80 Others (2025), the Kenyan Court of Appeal addressed concerns about the assignment of politically sensitive constitutional petitions. The Court quashed earlier administrative orders and directed the Chief Justice to empanel a fresh bench, underscoring the importance of institutional impartiality in politically charged litigation. While the case did not involve personal bias by a judge, it reaffirmed that procedural fairness in bench selection is integral to the nemo judex principle.
Indian jurisprudence continues to treat nemo judex as a core component of natural justice. Recent commentary revisits classic cases such as: A.K. Kraipak and Others Etc. v. Union of India and Others — where a selection committee member was also a candidate, violating the rule against bias; and Mohinder Singh Gill and Another v. Chief Election Commissioner and Others — affirming that fairness applies to all administrative actions.
These cases remain frequently cited in contemporary administrative law analysis.
The earlier mentioned academic review points out that in the UK, there are two routes to establish a violation of the nemo judex rule. The first route is the ‘automatic disqualification’ route. According to this, a decision-maker who is a party to the matter to be decided, or who has a financial interest in the decision to be made (or exceptionally, a non-financial interest), is automatically disqualified as a decision-maker if the decision has not yet been made; and if a decision has been made, it can be set aside.
The second route is called the fair minded and informed observer test. In such situations, the court must first ascertain the relevant circumstances and ask whether those circumstances would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility that the decision-maker was biased.
Lord Nicolas Christopher Henry Browne-Wilkinson’s remarks in R (Pinochet Ugarte) v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate (No. 2) (2000), contrasting financial bias with bias related to the promotion of a cause, provide significant insight. “The rationale of the whole rule is that there cannot be a judge in their own cause. In civil litigation, the matters in issue will normally have an economic impact; therefore, a judge is automatically disqualified if they stand to make a financial gain as a consequence of their own decision of the case. If the matter at issue does not relate to money or economic advantage but is concerned with the promotion of the cause, the rationale disqualifying a judge applies just as much if the judge’s decision will lead to the promotion of a cause in which the judge is involved together with one of the parties”.
A frequently cited illustration of alleged non-pecuniary bias arises from California’s Proposition 8 litigation, which sought to prohibit same-sex marriage in 2008. Although the measure was approved by voters and upheld by the State Supreme Court, it was later struck down in Federal Court by Judge Vaughn Richard Walker. When it emerged that Judge, Walker had been in a long-term same-sex relationship, critics questioned whether this created an appearance of partiality. However, this argument did not see the light of the day in the Ninth Circuit.
Recent cases across various jurisdictions have highlighted the principle’s enduring relevance. In several high-profile disputes, courts have overturned decisions after finding that officials failed to recuse themselves despite personal, financial, or political interests. These rulings have sparked renewed calls for stronger conflict-of-interest rules in public institutions.
Critics argue that the modern administrative state, with its overlapping roles and complex hierarchies, makes strict adherence to nemo judex increasingly challenging. Supporters counter that the principle is more vital than ever, especially in small jurisdictions where professional circles are tight and conflicts can be subtle.
Beyond the courtroom, the maxim resonates in corporate governance, regulatory bodies, and even community organisations. From boardroom decisions to disciplinary hearings, the expectation of impartiality remains a universal standard.
As Governments and institutions grapple with rising public scrutiny, nemo judex stands as a reminder that fairness is not negotiable. Whether in ancient Rome or the digital age, the rule continues to echo a timeless truth: no one should sit in judgment where their own interests lie.
The writer is a lawyer, judicial officer and law reformer in three Commonwealth jurisdictions
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The views and opinions expressed in this column are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of this publication