The modern global economy depends on a few narrow maritime passages that carry an enormous share of the world’s energy and trade. Among them, the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca occupy a special place in strategic thinking. These two waterways are geographically distant, yet deeply connected in global politics. The Strait of Hormuz functions as the principal exit route for Gulf oil and gas, while the Strait of Malacca serves as the key maritime corridor linking the Indian Ocean to East Asia. For China, the two Straits form a continuous chain of economic dependence and strategic vulnerability.
What makes this issue especially important is the contrast between the two chokepoints. The recent crisis around the Strait of Hormuz has demonstrated how a disruption in one maritime corridor can send shockwaves across world fuel transportation, insurance markets, and shipping routes almost overnight. By contrast, the possibility of strategic pressure in the Malacca Strait was something that China had recognised much earlier. In other words, the Hormuz crisis has appeared as a dramatic and immediate shock to the world system, whereas the Malacca problem had already been identified by Beijing as a long-term geopolitical risk. This difference helps explain why China’s strategic approach has often appeared more anticipatory and forward-looking than that of many other states.
Hormuz as the immediate shock, Malacca as the foreseen risk
The Strait of Hormuz, located between Iran and Oman, remains one of the world’s most vital oil transit chokepoints. The International Energy Agency (IEA) states that about 20 million barrels per day of crude oil and oil products moved through Hormuz last year (in 2025), representing roughly a quarter of the global seaborne oil trade. It also notes that alternatives to bypass the Strait are limited, which means that any disruption has immediate consequences for global energy markets.
That is exactly why the present Hormuz crisis has had such a dramatic effect on world fuel transportation. Recent reporting shows that conflict-related restrictions in the Strait sharply reduced tanker movements, trapped vessels, increased insurance and freight costs, and pushed oil prices upward. Reuters reported that the IEA was even considering an emergency release of oil stocks on an unprecedented scale to cushion the shock.
In this sense, the Hormuz issue exposed a weakness in the global energy system that many countries had not adequately prepared for in operational terms. It would be too strong to say that no state had ever recognised Hormuz as a risk, because the Strait has long been understood as a strategic chokepoint. However, the intensity and speed of the disruption showed that most countries had not built sufficient resilience against a severe interruption. The crisis therefore appeared less as a fully anticipated event and more as a destabilising shock with worldwide implications.
For China however, the deeper strategic concern has never been limited to Hormuz alone. Once Gulf oil exits Hormuz, much of it must travel across the Indian Ocean and pass through the Strait of Malacca before reaching Chinese ports. According to the US Energy Information Administration, Hormuz and Malacca are the world’s two most important oil transit chokepoints by volume. This means that for East Asian economies, especially China, the problem is not just supply at origin but safe delivery to destination.
China recognised this danger early through what became widely known as the “Malacca dilemma.” This term refers to Beijing’s fear that excessive dependence on the Malacca Strait could leave China vulnerable to pressure, blockade, or disruption during a geopolitical crisis. Scholarly analysis has long linked this concern to China’s Indian Ocean strategy and its efforts to secure alternative routes and stronger ties with littoral states.
This is the central contrast. The Hormuz disruption has hit the world like an immediate emergency in energy transportation, while the Malacca threat was more clearly foreseen by China as a structural vulnerability. Beijing’s response, therefore, has not been improvised. It has been gradual, strategic, and built over decades.
China’s multi-layered strategy to secure oil flows beyond Malacca
Because China understood that a maritime chokepoint could become a strategic lever in times of conflict, it began developing a range of policies to reduce its dependence on a single route and to strengthen its position along the wider Indian Ocean corridor.
One of the most discussed concepts in this regard is the “String of Pearls.” Though the phrase did not originate as an official Chinese policy label, it is widely used in strategic literature to describe China’s effort to develop influence, access, and logistical relationships along the sea lines of communication stretching from the Chinese coast to the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, and beyond. These pearls are often understood as ports, infrastructure nodes, and diplomatic relationships in countries such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar.
The strategic logic behind this approach is clear. China wanted friendly or at least cooperative states positioned parallel to major oil shipping lanes so that its maritime trade would not remain entirely exposed to hostile pressure. This did not necessarily mean formal military alliances in the traditional sense. More often, it meant creating economic dependence, diplomatic goodwill, port access, and long-term political influence in countries located near critical sea routes. That is why China’s maritime strategy combined hard infrastructure with soft power instruments.
One such soft-power instrument has been educational diplomacy. China has steadily expanded scholarship opportunities for students from Belt and Road partner countries, and official and semi-official programmes have specifically targeted countries connected to the Belt and Road framework. These initiatives help build long-term elite networks among academics, administrators, and policy-oriented communities in Asia and elsewhere. While it would be an overstatement to present scholarships as a single geopolitical tool directed only at top-level policymakers, they do serve a broader influence-building function by creating familiarity with Chinese institutions and strengthening long-run ties with future decision-makers.
A second major instrument has been large-scale infrastructure investment. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also widely referred to in its earlier phase as One Belt One Road, China financed ports, highways, industrial zones, rail links, and energy infrastructure across South Asia and the wider Indian Ocean region. These projects did more than promote trade. They also increased China’s strategic depth by connecting partner countries more closely to Chinese finance, construction, and logistics systems. In effect, infrastructure became a geopolitical tool as well as an economic one.
China also pursued route diversification to reduce its dependence on Malacca. Pipelines from Russia, Central Asia, and Myanmar were developed to ensure that at least a portion of China’s oil and gas could reach the country without transiting the full Malacca route. The China-Myanmar corridor is particularly relevant because it allows energy imports from the Bay of Bengal to enter southwestern China directly. This does not eliminate maritime dependence, but it reduces the scale of exposure.
Another important strategy has been supplier diversification. China has expanded energy ties not only with the Gulf but also with Russia, Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The goal is straightforward: if one supplier or one route becomes unstable, the national economy should not face paralysis. This approach reflects an understanding that energy security depends not merely on volume, but on diversity and redundancy.
China has also invested heavily in naval modernisation and maritime presence. A state that depends on distant sea routes cannot remain strategically comfortable with only coastal defence. China’s growing blue-water naval ambition, anti-piracy operations, and increased logistical access in the Indian Ocean all indicate a broader objective of protecting sea lines of communication. While the US remains the stronger naval power globally, China’s approach has been to steadily improve its ability to operate farther from home and reduce the strategic vulnerability associated with maritime dependence.
There is, of course, an important analytical caution here. Claims that China has fully solved the Malacca problem, or that it could easily overcome a determined blockade, would be overstated. The Malacca Strait remains one of the shortest and most efficient routes for East Asian trade, and no alternative can fully replace it at comparable cost and scale. However, China’s achievement lies elsewhere: it has built a layered strategy of ports, partnerships, infrastructure, overland corridors, educational engagement, supplier diversity, and maritime capability to reduce the degree of risk.
What other countries can learn from China’s forward-looking strategic planning
China’s approach to the Malacca issue is noteworthy not because it has removed vulnerability entirely, but because it addressed a foreseeable threat long before that threat matured into a full-scale crisis. This is where the comparison with Hormuz becomes especially revealing. The recent Hormuz disruption showed how dramatically world fuel transportation can be affected when states and markets are insufficiently prepared. China’s earlier response to Malacca, by contrast, illustrates the value of strategic foresight.
The broader lesson is not that every country should copy China mechanically. China’s scale, financial capacity, political system, and geopolitical ambitions are unique. Nor should one romanticise every aspect of Chinese strategy, since some projects under the BRI have been criticised for debt risks, political influence concerns, and uneven local benefits. Still, as a case of long-term planning, China offers an important example of how states can think ahead about chokepoint risks, energy security, and geopolitical exposure.
What stands out most is China’s willingness to combine multiple tools rather than depend on a single solution. It did not rely only on diplomacy, naval power, or trade. Instead, it integrated infrastructure, education, partnerships, route diversification, economic statecraft, and maritime capability into one strategic framework. That kind of comprehensive thinking is a valuable lesson for many developing and middle-income countries that still treat energy security, foreign policy, and infrastructure planning as separate domains.
In that sense, China’s strategic projections appear distinctly forward-looking. Beijing recognised that the real contest in the 21st Century would not be limited to armies and borders; it would also involve ports, supply chains, scholarships, corridors, and influence over strategic nodes of connectivity. It understood that national resilience depends on the ability to anticipate disruption before it occurs. That foresight is perhaps the strongest aspect of China’s response to the Malacca challenge.
Therefore, while China’s model should not be copied uncritically, it can certainly serve as a useful reference point for other nations. The essential lesson is simple but powerful: countries that foresee strategic vulnerabilities early, and respond through diversified, long-term, and multi-dimensional policy, are better prepared for global shocks than those that react only after crisis erupts.
In the final analysis, the Hormuz issue has reminded the world how fragile fuel transportation can become when a single chokepoint is disrupted. China’s long-standing concern over Malacca, and the many strategies that it adopted in response, show what it means to treat geopolitics as a matter of preparation rather than improvisation. In a Century defined by interdependence, maritime corridors will continue to shape the destiny of nations. The countries that plan ahead, build resilience, and think strategically across decades will be the ones best equipped to withstand the next global shock.
The writer is a Professor in Economics and the Head of the Uva Wellassa University’s Management Faculty’s Management Sciences Department
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The views and opinions expressed in this column are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of this publication