• This is the final part of a two-part series of articles. The first was published on 4 October issue

To achieve victory, willpower and courage must always be used in tandem with  tactical art and science. The effective mix of these elements often allow military forces to dominate the battlespace and decide the outcome of the battle. 

The LTTE carried out coordinated attacks that at times resembled ‘wolf-packs’ attacks. ‘Wolf-pack’ tactics were first employed at sea against allied convoys  by the Motor Torpedo Boats (MTBs) and U-boat submarines of the Kriegsmarine during the Battle of the Atlantic and in particular during channel dash runs by convoys.  Submarines and MTBs of the United States Navy against Japanese shipping in the Pacific Ocean in World War II, while the Royal Navy MTB used similar tactics in the Mediterranean. 

Application of Wolf-pack tactics by LTTE made a significant impact on the battle outcome. They coordinated many of their attack craft to single out SLNS  Ranagaja carrying the biggest number of troops and attacked continuously at the same target leaving little room for other craft to assist. It is my opinion that only the FAC P485 was able to stay close to SLNS Ranagaja to assist in fighting the enemy. SLN also employed attack tactics by carrying out ‘attack runs’ to employ  a continuous fire on the enemy, however failed due to communication and radar  failures and lesser effective ranges of main armament. 

Need for good communication

One of the greatest challenges faced by military commanders is in communications. Clear and concise exchange of information has always been vital to any successful military operation and none more so than in modern times. It was  revealed that the communication between naval units had lost during the first few hours  of the battle. P485 had not known about the disappearance of her ‘buddy craft’ P486 until the signal centre at KKS had informed them of it. The impact of the attack on the convoy and many lives that were lost may have been prevented if the other craft could reach Ranagaja to support her. However, no craft could approach the ship due to the fear of misidentification. 

The situation started favourable only when the Ranagaja could establish communication with their own units and coordinated fire which shaped the situation for P485 to tow the damaged ship out of danger. Conversely,  the enemy had wisely used the communication means to better coordinate the wolf-pack attack. However, the enemy used coloured lighting system to regroup after each attack run, which immensely improved their communication without using voice communication. In each enemy attack run LCM crew suffered casualties. Therefore,  this battle reiterates the importance of communication by many means and wise use  of various communication means is essential and a deciding factor in a battle.

Technology 

The technology is not tactics, but it may have a decisive effect in both altering the face of battle and affecting its outcome. Survivors of the ship observed  that LTTE used an infrared beam to aim and fire Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) at the vessel in an effective manner. Also the  low profile silhouette of the LTTE attack craft offered a difficult target for SLN units. LTTE also used a lighting system to coordinate attack craft which eased up communication and improved their fighting efficiency. On the other hand, SLN units also wisely used  technology for their advantage. One of the main advantages of the compact design  of this 19 metres-long P48 series FAC was that she could deliver similar fire power of a 71-feet Israel-built FAC and could operate in extremely shallow water where the  depth was less than one metre. Also, P485 being small, lightweight and low profile had the advantage of mingling with the enemy craft in the darkness. The low profile of the craft made it difficult to distinguish as friend or foe to the enemy. P485 transformed its technological advantage into tactical advantage and inflicted considerable losses to enemy changing  the battle’s outcome.  

Figure 3: P 485 

Source: Developed by Author 

This battle also proves the need for new technological advances as a  conventional Navy. Main technological challenges faced by the SLN units include; shorter effective range of main armament, unavailability of radars with tracking facilities and the lack of secure communication systems. These technological lapses lead to a situation where identification of friend or foe became difficult and enemies could easily listen in on our communication. 

Fighting Spirit 

The battle lasted for many hours. LCM had to fight her way through with three coordinated enemy groups who took turns attacking her, while the escorting SLN units were in disarray.  At the very beginning ordinary seaman L.W.G. Wettasinghe who accurately hit the  suicide craft sustained a fatal injury and lost his life due to the explosion. The Commanding Officer also sustained minor injuries. Executive officer and  two senior administrative officers on-board did a remarkable job before sustaining serious injuries. Their decision to use army soldiers who were familiar with 12.7mm guns when sailors got injured helped the  ship to fight back in spite of the losses. 

The only remaining option to save Ranagaja was to tow her out of the danger. It was a challenge for the FAC with 28 tonnes displacement to tow a 700 tonnes  LCM. Further, the water jet propulsion system on-board P48 series had not been tested for towing. Also, it was evident the mismatch of the displacement and the power between towing and towed vessel that the towing operation was not a possibility. However, instructions from the engineering staff at the command operations room at Trincomalee were given to make an attempt to tow the LCM out of the danger area  even at the expense of the main engines of P485 considering the lives on-board the  LCM were more important than the engines. 

Thereafter, OIC P485 obtained a towing rope from LCM and secured it  to the 20mm stern gun mount due to the absence of a proper towing bollard to  take on the heavy weight of the 700 tonnes LCM. The trial and error that worked  on that day reminded me of the famous quote “fortune favours the brave”. The 28 tonnes  boat supported by the long stay of the heavy rope gently gathered the momentum of  the LCM. The delicate balance of RPM (Revolutions Per Minute) and the cavitation did the trick of the day despite having no previous knowledge of towing of such a large type of vessel. 

The bravery of the fighting men of both vessels, their decisive actions, the comradery while under fire, risk taking, adaptability, and determination to establish communication with command centres proved vital in this towing operation.

Lessons learnt 

The incident led to uncover many areas of inefficiencies, lessons and to  introduce developments to the naval fleet. Among many lessons, following proved  vital takeaways of the incident; 

• The tactics used by the enemy enabled them to inflict heavy damages to SLN units. Also they were able to take full control of the  situation at the initial fighting as SLN units experienced difficulties in coordination. Therefore, tactical art is a prerequisite for victory at any  battle. Development of tactical art through battle studies and providing  opportunities to exercise tactical situations is emphasised. 

• Loss of communication at the initial stage led to a chaotic situation  where units could not launch a coordinated attack on the enemy instead the enemy used better communication to overpower the technically advanced naval units. Therefore, it is reiterated that availability of different means to communicate, communication security and technical competency of using communication equipment should never be underestimated. 

• Units involved in the operation did not have night fighting capability  and secure communication sets. Therefore, the identification of the friend  or foe became a main challenge. In a naval battle, though the courage and  manpower are significant, technology plays a vital role in deciding the  outcome of the battle. 

• The incident sparked a lot of debate and some questions were raised about the morale of the FAC squadron despite the credible action of few officers and crew.  At the tactical level lack of fighting efficiency and the fighting spirit had  been observed by the leadership. Lack of confidence, boldness and poor commitment resulted due to absence of proper operational directives and briefings by the relevant command segments prior deployment of operational duties. However, despite the shortcomings, the courage and determination shown by all officers and sailors involved were of the highest order. 

• The towing operation of the SLNS Ranagaja was never considered  possible, however, 28 tonnes FAC towed 700 tonnes LCM out of danger  which is a clear display of courage, risk taking and comradeship of the  officers involved. It further teaches that decisiveness pays high dividends at  the right time.

(Rear Admiral [Retd.] Rathnayake served in the Sri Lanka Navy for over 36 years and was its Chief of Staff prior to retirement. He holds a Master's in Maritime Policy from the University of Wollongong, Australia, and a Master's in Military Science & Strategic Studies from the National Defence University, China)

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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of this publication