From its inception till now, the Ambuluwawa Dissanayake Mudiyanselage Jayaratne Religious Centre and Bio-diversity Complex Trust Fund (hereinafter referred to as the Ambuluwawa Complex), has been mired in controversy. and allegations of irregularities and causing environmental harm. 

Warnings from 1998 to 2025 

In May 1998, journalist Dilrukshi Handunnetti wrote about the nightmare of living next to Ambuluwawa, due to a development project that includes a cable car project. She pointed out the fears of local residents, that the area had been declared an erodible area under the Soil Conservation Act, No. 25 of 1951 since 1960 and that construction had begun in April 1997, before then Agriculture, Land and Forestry Minister D.M. Jayaratne had presented a Cabinet of Ministers proposal in November 1997. She quoted local residents as saying, “we dread the rains and the ensuing consequences” and reported cracks on the walls of houses. 

More than 27 years later, in November of last year (2025), journalist Tharindu Jayawardhana warned about imminent disaster at Ambuluwawa, days before cyclone Ditwah. Jayawardhana has pointed out that the Ambuluwawa Complex’s founder, Jayaratne, had stated in the Parliament there were no plans or professional engineers involved in its construction, and that present President Anura Kumara Dissanayake had been amongst those who had vehemently opposed the Act (No. 44 of 2009) that established the Ambuluwawa Complex as an entity, with control and benefits remaining with one family. 

Post-Ditwah situation at Ambuluwawa

After cyclone Ditwah, I visited Ambuluwawa several times with local residents, State officials, journalists and activists. I saw massive landslides that blocked off the main access road and large rocks precariously perched on slopes. Residents spoke angrily that Ambuluwawa’s constructions had caused or contributed to the landslides and tragedies that destroyed lives, properties and the environment. The husband of a teacher who died buried in the landslide suspects breaking large rocks and water gathering at the top of Ambuluwawa as the cause of this unprecedented disaster which led to his wife’s death and his illness. He believes that his wife’s death could have been avoided if there was a proper investigation into the warning by the Divisional Secretary about a year ago. My last visit to Ambuluwawa was during a joint fact finding visit by the Environment Minister on 4 February of this year (2026), and I heard an official of the Wildlife Conservation Department saying that the tower at the peak of the Ambuluwawa hill was built on land belonging to that Department. On 9 January 2026, the said Ministry had informed the Central Environmental Authority (CEA) to take actions to stop all constructions at Ambuluwawa temporarily, until a decision is taken based on expert reports. 

NBRI/NBRO and key findings related to Ambuluwawa

The National Building Research Institute (NBRI) was set up under the Act, No 20 of 2025. Amongst its objectives is “to ensure that construction and development activities are conducted in a manner that is disaster resilient in the areas prone to landslides or an area having geotechnical instability”. Its functions include to identify and declare an area with the risk of a potential landslide as a “landslide danger zone” for the purpose of the evacuation of persons and to issue an early warning for areas with potential impacts due to landslides. The NBRI had been referred to as the National Building Research Organisation (NBRO) for several years. 

The NBRO had examined risks associated with the cable car project at the Ambuluwawa Complex, with the three pillars - A, B and C - being the major locations examined. Below are some significant findings: 

• Location was previously marked by the NBRO as a landslide hazard zone where landslides are likely (September 2023)
• Landslides and the instability of slopes since 2020 due to unplanned land modernisation (May 2024) 
• Rainwater was going down the slope without a proper system due to the development activities connected to the cable car project (July 2025)
• No temporary storage mechanism for waste generated from constructions and they were going down the slope with rain (November 2024) 
• Water management was weak (January 2025) 
• Instability in the access road to the tower (May 2024 and January 2025)
• Cracks on the road since about 2020 (May 2024)
• Erosion near the foreigners’ toilets (May 2024) 
• Cracks in the staircase of the old building near the tower due to unsystematic constructions (May 2024)
• A “soldier pile” fence, erected as a temporary solution to protect the soil at the construction site, was bent as no vertical support has been provided and some cracks were visible in the soil (January 2025).

Key risks identified by the NBRO 

• Minimum/medium risks of landslides or the slope becoming unstable (September 2023 and July 2025)
• High risk of the slope becoming unstable as no effort taken to stabilise (November 2024) 
• Severe erosion and the instability of slope may happen when the soil moves downwards due to rain (January 2025) 
• Risk of soil erosion (September 2023) 
• Weak water management patterns may increase existing natural disaster risks (July 2025)
• Due to the area being a steep slope, instability at the top may cause direct risks to those below (July 2025) 
• Risk of heavy rains causing waste materials from constructions to go down and damage the houses below (December 2024)
• Some rocks were bent downwards (January 2025) and the risk of rocks that had become unstable rolling down the slope (December 2024 and January 2025) 
• Support structures for waste materials were bent, not strong enough and at high risk (November 2024)
• Vibrations during construction could affect the overall stability of the slope (January 2025) 
• Medium risk of the tower and the building near the tower becoming unstable (May 2024)
• Natural disaster risks could increase due to unsystematic constructions (May 2024)
• High risks if unplanned development happens (September 2023)
• Risks in using the approach road below (November 2024)
• If more soil was added, the bend in the “soldier pile” fence may increase (January 2025)
• Building of the pillar may affect the overall stability of the slope (January 2025)

NBRO observations after Ditwah

A total of 48 houses in five locations within the Sinhapitiya North Grama Niladhari Division, where the Ambuluwawa Complex is located, were categorised as high or medium risk (five reports issued on 25 December 2025). 

Through a one-page letter dated 20 January 2026 to the CEA based on a field visit the previous day, the NBRO says that there is no risks at location A. But, it observes that there is soil erosion and some instability at location B and along the access road to location B. The letter does not observe any instability at location C but notes that there is no system for draining surface rainwater. Surprisingly and in contrast to previous observations, the NBRO observes that constructions at locations A, B and C have no connection to landslides and the instability of slopes below and around the Ambuluwawa Complex. 

The need for more documents 

The 27 January 2025 report states that in order to deeply assess the risks of landslides and submit the final report of the expert committee with final recommendations, the submission of the slope stability analysis, the geotechnical investigation report and the design report for slopes of A, B and C was needed. On 25 November 2025, in response to a letter from Amber Adventures on 26 September 2025, requesting an expert evaluation and recommendations on the slope stability in relation to location C of the cable car project, the NBRO sent a letter signed by the Geotechnical Engineering Division Director, K.N. Bandara, requesting a number of documents. In a letter dated 9 January 2026 to the Ambuluwawa Complex, the NBRO has requested documents and information under seven headings. It is not known whether any of these had been submitted.

Recommendations 

The NBRO makes 51 recommendations through five reports between September 2023 and July 2025. The report of 4 December 2024 highlights that risks at that time were due to the non-implementation of recommendations in the previous report dated 4 November 2024 and warns that non-implementation may lead to a medium risk escalating to a high risk after heavy rain. It warns that implementing recommendations in the reports of 4 September 2023 and 4 November 2024 are mandatory and that parties to the project are responsible for risks that will arise due to instability caused by the non-implementation of recommendations. The 20 January 2026 letter recommends the implementation of four previous NBRO reports in 2023-2025, which implies that these have not been implemented. 

The 27 January 2025 report cautioned that unless specified measures were taken, the slope could become unstable. The 20 January 2026 letter recommends that all surface rainwater must be systematically directed to a natural valley. 

The reports of 4 November 2024 and 18 July 2025 and the letter of 20 January 2026 say that any preliminary signs of the instability of the soil or landslides should be brought to the NBRO’s attention and recommendations be obtained, which must be implemented. 

The 18 July 2025 report says that plans must be presented and that new recommendations be obtained before any future development activities are done. The letter of 20 January 2026 recommends that all construction must be under the supervision of the CEA and other authorities. 

In the five reports of 25 December 2025, 26 houses were categorised as high risk, with recommendations for permanent evacuation, no constructions or development activities and for the area to be protected as highly sensitive for landslides. It is not known whether this has been done. In the same reports, 22 houses were categorised as medium risk. They were asked to be vigilant when there is more than 75 millimetres (mm) of rain for 24 hours, to be on alert when there is more than 100 mm rain for 24 hours and to temporarily evacuate if there is more than 150 mm rain for 24 hours or more than 75 mm rain in one hour.  

Conclusions 

It is crucial to address the risks identified by the NBRO. There must also be an assessment into which of the 51 NBRO recommendations have been implemented to what extent, and if not fully implemented, the present temporary stop on constructions at Ambuluwawa must continue. There must be a serious inquiry into the non-implementation of the recommendations and if needed, a criminal investigation, whether any deaths, injuries and destruction of property, were caused by negligence. If such evidence is uncovered, there must be criminal prosecutions to hold those responsible accountable. 

The writer is a human rights activist

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The views and opinions expressed in this column are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of this publication