A nation’s public administration is not an abstract institution. It is the engine that turns laws into lived reality, policies into services, and promises into outcomes. When that engine falters, the consequences are not theoretical. They are felt in erratic regulation, broken infrastructure, and ultimately, in the erosion of public trust. Sri Lanka knows this story all too well.
The Sri Lanka Administrative Service has long been regarded as one of the most prestigious avenues through which citizens can serve the State. Governments come and go, as they should in a democracy, but administrative officers remain. Their duty is not to party or personality, but to the public and to the continuity of the State itself. That is the principle. The reality, however, has grown increasingly troubling.
Over the years, the integrity and public confidence in public officials appear to have been steadily undermined by persistent political interference. This interference has not been confined to day-to-day administration. It has, according to repeated allegations, seeped into appointments, transfers, promotions, and even recruitment. The damage of such practices is cumulative. Each compromised decision chips away at professionalism. Each politicised appointment weakens institutional credibility. Eventually, the system itself begins to bend.
In this context, former President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s recent warning deserves serious reflection. She argued that no Government can function without a professional, efficient, and honest public service. That observation is neither novel nor controversial. Elected leaders, regardless of personal capability, depend fundamentally on a competent bureaucracy to design, implement, and sustain policy.
Her more pointed allegation, that the present administration appears intent on weakening what remains of Sri Lanka’s public administration by replacing qualified officers with party loyalists lacking the required expertise, is a claim that should alarm any citizen who cares about the State’s capacity to function. Even those who disagree with her politics should recognise the validity of the underlying concern. A politicised civil service does not serve the Government of the day. It serves short-term interests at the expense of long-term stability.
Sri Lanka has already witnessed where deteriorating governance can lead.
Yet, it would be intellectually dishonest to pretend that the corrosion of administrative independence began with the current Government. The decline is older, layered, and bipartisan.
Successive administrations have treated sections of the public service as instruments of political convenience rather than guardians of institutional continuity. That culture, once normalised, is difficult to reverse.
This is not to deny the presence of courageous, capable, and principled officers within the system. Sri Lanka has many. There have always been officials who resisted improper pressure, upheld procedure, and protected the public interest, often at personal cost. They are the custodians of whatever credibility still survives. But integrity should not depend on individual heroism. It should be safeguarded by structure.
For a Government that rose to power promising a system change, there exists an opportunity, perhaps even an obligation, to act decisively. One meaningful reform would be to insulate the Sri Lanka Administrative Service from political manipulation and to restore its prestige through credible protections. For this, we need not search far for a model.
India’s Administrative Service, often described as the ‘Steel Frame’, offers instructive lessons embedded in constitutional design. Articles 311 and 312 of the Constitution of India provide safeguards that protect officers from arbitrary dismissal and create a structure of dual accountability that limits localised political pressure. They cannot be fired by anyone lower than the President of India.
In Sri Lanka, under Article 55 of the Constitution, public officers generally ‘hold office at pleasure’. This means the legal floor for protection is lower. However, in practice, this ‘pleasure’ is regulated by the Establishments Code, which outlines strict disciplinary procedures that must be followed before an officer can be penalised.
No system is flawless, and India’s bureaucracy has its own critics. But the underlying philosophy is clear. Administrative independence, meritocracy, and continuity are treated as pillars of governance.
The political leadership is subject to electoral cycles, often every five years. The public service is not. That permanence is not a privilege. It is a responsibility. Officers must remain apolitical, professional, and guided by law rather than loyalty. In return, they must be protected from undue interference.
Affording stronger constitutional and legal protections to Sri Lanka’s administrative service would not weaken democracy. It would strengthen it. A competent, independent public administration does not obstruct elected leaders. It enables them to govern effectively and with accountability.