As the global economic engine shifts to Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) continues to become more entangled in the strategic competition of big powers, the lack of a cohesive regional maritime security infrastructure for the IOR leaves the smaller states like Sri Lanka in a vulnerable position.

The need for better engagement on the topic and the need to address deficits in maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean were also recently discussed at a Trilateral Dialogue on Maritime Cooperation in Colombo, organised by three think tanks: Factum Sri Lanka, the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS), and the Baani Centre for International Policy – the Maldives.

Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean holds almost 20% of the world’s ocean area and borders three continents. It consists of 36 countries, with a total coastline area of 66,526 km. Almost one-third of the world’s bulk cargo traffic and two-thirds of the world’s oil shipments flow through the Indian Ocean each year.

Over the last two decades, the Indian Ocean Region has increasingly attracted great power competition, with smaller IOR nations disproportionately affected. The increasing tensions between the US and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the strategic competition have done little to keep the Indian Ocean a zone of peace and avoid an arms race, which many fear will only be the beginning of a slippery slope to disaster.   

With the formulation of the AUKUS and the ‘Quad’ strategically linking Japan, Australia, the UK, and the US with the regional power India and the continued push into the IOR by China, forming a maritime security architecture for the IOR where the smaller states get significant influence will only become more complicated. This is especially due to the European Union and others formulating their own plans to ‘return’ to the Indian Ocean, after a prolonged absence.

Small state vulnerability

Commenting on how the lack of a cohesive regional maritime security architecture affects the smaller states in the IOR, BIPSS President Major General (Retd) A.N.M. Muniruzzaman told The Sunday Morning that smaller states were left vulnerable to the actions of both regional and extra-regional powers.

“The smaller states, in the absence of a security architecture, do not have a clear understanding and mandate for governing the IOR. Especially in an environment of strategic competition, it leaves smaller states vulnerable because the policies would then be dictated and decided by major powers, either within the IOR or extra-regional powers, without consultation of small or maritime states in the region. Therefore, the architecture that might eventually develop may not be based on a consultative process and be inclusive,” Maj. Gen. Muniruzzaman stated.

According to former Chief of Staff of the Sri Lanka Navy Admiral (Retd) Y.N. Jayarathna, small states stand vulnerable in the face of maritime security threats due to the lack of proactive measures and poor political leadership. Jayarathna also flagged a lack of will to address the maritime security-related issues by some countries.

“Sri Lanka, despite having several security architectures in the form of the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC), Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) where maritime security is one out of eight priority and focus areas, and also security-related forums such as the Colombo Plan, SAARC, and numerous other multilateral or bilateral forums, has failed to lead and inspire its inward political culture or the regional political environment. Due to lack of visible policy frameworks, Sri Lanka’s maritime security architecture is interpreted by other nations through the Government’s action whenever a situation arises and is handled,” Jayarathna opined.

However, according to visiting expert, US Institute of Peace East-West Center Adjunct Fellow  Nilanthi Samaranayake, the formulation of a robust security architecture will be difficult. “The Indian Ocean is vast and has diverse stakeholders. As a result, developing a robust maritime security architecture has been difficult for the region.”

According to Muniruzzaman, the smaller countries in the IOR should encourage further dialogue. “It has to go through a series of dialogues and understanding and consultative processes. In those processes, smaller countries like Sri Lanka and Bangladesh should encourage all parties to talk, discuss, and reach a conclusion on how a security architecture can be formulated. It is not a one-shot process. It is a long run process of dialogue and consultation, and the process must start now.”

Existing models

Sri Lanka currently has several maritime security agreements, such as the India-Sri Lanka-Maldives Tripartite Security Conclave and the Indo-Lanka Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between nations’ coast guards. The latter was used to good effect during two recent maritime disasters; the crude oil tanker fire involving MT New Diamond and the marine ecological disaster caused by the Singaporean-flagged MV X-Press Pearl.

Both instances saw Sri Lanka seeking assistance from the Indian Coast Guard via the MoU. Both instances also highlighted a key challenge faced by smaller IOR nations, in lacking capability and capacity to effectively respond to major maritime safety and security incidents.  

When asked if existing regional security instruments could be used as a template to build on as a basis for a future regional maritime security architecture, Adm. Jayarathna said: “These need not be templates for other IOR Rim nations as individual interests will be varying as per the circumstances and environments. 

“However, the CSC [Colombo Security Conclave] can be duplicated in smaller groups on one hand as per the sub-regions. For example, India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka can form up a security conclave for the Bay of Bengal. Similarly, Seychelles, Mauritius, and Reunion can form another security conclave for Western Indian Ocean island states. 

“With maturity and understanding, they all can become a security conclave for IORA. Although the key subject matters remain the same for each of these security conclaves, the application of law enforcement and maritime surveillance networks differ from each other, therefore allowing the available strengths to develop the conclaves, generating a more belongingness than driving someone else’s security architecture.”

However, Maj. Gen. Muniruzzaman was of the view that existing bilateral models could be helpful, but shouldn’t be the only basis a maritime security architecture was built on.

“For this reason, these bilateral agreements have been drawn on the basis of mutual agreements between two or three parties. In the cases that are being referred to, it is not an inclusive process. Many littoral countries in the IOR have not been in the process of formulating the existing agreements on trilateral or bilateral processes. It can be taken as a point of help, which cannot be completely inclusive for that reason and may not be the only foundation upon which to build the architecture,” Muniruzzaman explained.

When asked if IOR nations, especially the small states, could draw inspiration from the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to formulate a maritime security architecture, Maj. Gen. Muniruzzaman pointed out that the lesson could be learned, but that the collective did not have any security architecture.

“They have just evolved some mechanisms under which security can be discussed in general. The first one is ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which is a window of ASEAN where countries that are members of ARF can discuss security issues, both traditional and non-traditional. However, ARF is a slightly larger body than ASEAN because it has members beyond ASEAN. For example, Bangladesh is not a member of ASEAN, but is a member of ARF. That’s a window and such windows don’t exist in South Asia or in the IOR, and those windows are useful – they can be created. 

“ASEAN has also created a process of an ADMM [ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting] under which the defence heads or defence ministers of each ASEAN country can meet exclusively to discuss security issues, which is an existing platform under which ASEAN securities are discussed. 

“In addition to that, there is also an ADMM+, where there are extra-regional countries like China and the US that can come into the process and discuss security issues. That is an additional platform. Such arrangements are useful in ASEAN but these examples can only be a small input in developing a security architecture. The development of a security architecture needs further effort and more detailed discussions and dialogues,” Muniruzzaman explained.

However, according to Samaranayake, the IORA can be used as a platform to promote maritime security cooperation among its members – a task Sri Lanka is now well placed to perform.

“The Indian Ocean Rim Association expanded its remit in the past decade to include maritime safety and security. Its membership is also widening through the inclusion of the Maldives, France upgrading its status, and Russia becoming a dialogue partner. Also, IORA has given smaller states an opportunity to participate in regional leadership. Sri Lanka has served as Vice Chair of IORA for the past two years and is expected to become Chair of IORA later this year. 

“Through its two-year term, Sri Lanka can pursue efforts to enhance the Indian Ocean’s maritime security architecture and intensify the region’s responses to shared challenges such as the trafficking of narcotics and humans and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. Sri Lanka has a track record of advancing international norms in the Indian Ocean through its contributions to the development of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which has been in force for four decades,” Samaranayake opined.