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Discipline must outlive the IMF

Discipline must outlive the IMF

15 Nov 2026



The 2027 Budget presented to Parliament last week will be debated, as every budget in this country is debated, in the vocabulary of relief and burden, of who secured a concession and who was denied one. Yet, its real significance lies in the fact that it is the last the country will frame under an International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme before the obligations deferred by the debt restructuring begin to fall due in 2028. Whatever its merits as an exercise in welfare or growth, it must be read as an answer to a question Sri Lanka has spent most of its independent history evading, namely whether it can govern its public finances with restraint when no creditor is standing over its shoulder.

The record offers little comfort. Successive governments, whatever their ideology, treated the national budget as an instrument of patronage, swelling the public payroll before elections, extending subsidies to those with the loudest claim, and surrendering revenue with a casualness no private enterprise could have survived, while the deficits they accumulated were met first by the printing press and later by commercial borrowing abroad on terms that hardened with every issue. Sixteen programmes with the fund preceded the present one, and almost every episode followed the same course, in which a crisis brought a rescue, the rescue brought a brief season of reform, and the old indulgences returned the moment the reserves recovered enough to make indulgence affordable again.

That habit reached its natural conclusion in 2022, when a country that had never before defaulted on its external debt found itself unable to pay for fuel, cooking gas, or medicine, and when the consequences of decades of laxity were visited, within a few months, upon households that had never been consulted about the borrowing done in their name. Inflation consumed the savings of pensioners and the wages of the salaried, small businesses closed for want of foreign exchange, and a generation of young professionals concluded that their future lay abroad, a loss that no agreement with bondholders can reverse. The tax cuts of 2019 are often cited as the cause of the collapse, although they were merely the final and most reckless expression of a disposition that had governed the Treasury for decades.

The years since have restored a measure of order, with revenue rebuilt, the Central Bank insulated from the appetites of the Treasury, and primary surpluses achieved that would once have been dismissed as politically impossible. Honesty nonetheless requires the acknowledgement that these gains were secured under conditions the country did not set for itself, each disbursement contingent upon a review and each review a reminder that much of the discipline on display had been imposed from outside. A habit corrected under supervision has yet to prove itself a habit changed, and Sri Lanka has too often in the past mistaken the one for the other.

That distinction acquires its full weight in 2027. The present programme concludes in the opening months of the year, the stricter surplus target relaxed to finance reconstruction after Cyclone Ditwah returns in full, and in the following year repayments to bilateral lenders and on the restructured bonds commence, with the burden rising as the economy grows. Creditors and the investors whose capital the country will need on its return to international markets will form their judgement of Sri Lanka during these 12 months, and they will form it by watching what the Government does with the latitude that the end of supervision affords. A single year of slippage dressed up as relief would be enough to revive every doubt the restructuring was designed to lay to rest, and a country hoping to borrow again at tolerable cost can ill afford to hand the markets such a reason.

The temptation, after four years of austerity endured with remarkable patience, will be to treat the end of the programme as permission to ease, and there are voices in Parliament that will make that case, some with sincerity and some with an election in view. The hardship they describe is genuine, yet relief financed by borrowing merely transfers its cost to the same households at a later and more perilous moment, when the country’s external obligations will be at their heaviest and its tolerance for error at its lowest.

Sri Lanka has discovered, at a price it will be paying for a decade, what it costs to govern without discipline, and 2027 will reveal whether that lesson has been learnt or merely endured.




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