The incident where an Iranian warship sank off Sri Lanka’s southern coast after what the US later acknowledged was a submarine torpedo strike, should force us to confront an uncomfortable truth. The Indian Ocean has never been the peaceful maritime commons that diplomatic language would like to suggest. It has always been a theatre where global powers project influence and compete for control.
Sri Lanka has long tried to resist that reality. In 1971, under Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the country spearheaded UN General Assembly Resolution 2832, calling for the Indian Ocean to be declared a Zone of Peace. The idea was simple and morally compelling. Remove great power military bases, prevent nuclear weapons from entering the region, and ensure that the ocean linking Africa, the Middle East, and Asia remains open and safe for all.
The resolution passed, but peace never arrived.
During the Cold War, the US consolidated its strategic base at Diego Garcia, while the Soviet Union expanded naval operations across the region. Instead of demilitarisation, the Indian Ocean became increasingly militarised.
Today, the language has changed but the reality has not.
India promotes its Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) doctrine, announced by PM Narendra Modi in 2015. The US advances its Indo-Pacific strategy, implemented through United States Indo-Pacific Command, promising a “free and open Indo-Pacific”. These doctrines speak of cooperation, maritime safety, disaster relief, and shared prosperity.
Yet, the sinking of an Iranian naval vessel only 40 nautical miles from Galle demonstrates that these visions coexist with hard power realities. Warships move through the region. Submarines operate unseen beneath its waters.
Perhaps the most troubling element of the incident was not the attack itself but the silence surrounding it. Sri Lanka, a country located at the centre of the Indian Ocean sea lanes, appears to have received no warning that a military engagement was about to occur near its maritime approaches. This silence reveals the limits of partnership rhetoric. Even friendly nations prioritise their own strategic interests when conducting military operations.
The waters surrounding Sri Lanka carry a significant share of the world’s oil shipments and container trade. Any Naval power seeking influence between the Middle East and East Asia must operate in this space. That strategic reality means Sri Lanka’s location is both an advantage and a vulnerability.
History offers several reminders of how easily global conflict spills into the region. During World War II, the Indian Ocean Raid saw Japanese carrier forces strike British naval bases in Ceylon, sinking warships and forcing the Royal Navy to withdraw westward. The island’s location turned it into a strategic target overnight.
More recently, the Indian Ocean has become increasingly crowded with competing naval deployments. China has expanded its maritime presence through anti-piracy patrols and port infrastructure across the region. India has strengthened its naval surveillance and security partnerships. The US maintains carrier strike groups and long-range submarine patrols.
Each of these powers speaks the language of stability. Each simultaneously prepares for confrontation. But smaller States like Sri Lanka do not possess the surveillance capacity to monitor every submarine that may pass through nearby waters. Nor does it have the military strength to shape the behaviour of great powers operating in international waters.
Sri Lanka must therefore strengthen maritime domain awareness through regional cooperation, investing in coastal surveillance technologies, and ensuring that its ports and waters are not drawn into military logistics networks. It also means reviving the diplomatic spirit behind the Zone of Peace concept, even if its full realisation remains unrealistic.
Maritime law also provides tools. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, coastal States have rights and responsibilities within their maritime zones. Sri Lanka should insist that military operations conducted near its waters respect those frameworks and do not endanger civilian navigation or environmental security.
Above all, Sri Lanka must resist the temptation to align itself too closely with any single strategic bloc. History shows that the Indian Ocean’s balance of power shifts constantly. Today’s security partner may become tomorrow’s rival.
The tragedy of Galle should therefore serve as a warning. Grand doctrines, whether the Zone of Peace, SAGAR, or the Indo-Pacific strategy, cannot erase the basic reality that the Indian Ocean is one of the world’s most contested strategic spaces. For Sri Lanka, survival in that environment cannot depend on idealism alone, but on a clear understanding of the geopolitical waters in which it sits.