- Is it because of the recent emphasis on Hindu identity among sections of Tamil politics?
- Or should it be understood primarily in the context of seeking support from India?
Recent remarks by Tamil political representatives in New Delhi, raise an intriguing question: Is Tamil nationalism increasingly seeking legitimacy through an appeal to Hindutva?
"Hinduism is being deliberately targeted in Sri Lanka's North and East," said the Leader of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress and the Head of the Tamil National People's Front, Gajendrakumar Gangaser Ponnambalam while addressing a conference in New Delhi on 28 October. Participants at the event also met India's Union Finance and Corporate Affairs Minister, Nirmala Sitharaman.
The conference, titled "Transitional Justice and Human Rights (HR) in Contexts of Ethnic Cleansing: Narratives of Sri Lankan Tamils and Kashmiri Pandits", was organised by the Australian Tamil Congress and the United States Tamil Action Group in collaboration with the New Delhi-based All India Law Teachers Congress and the Indian Society of International Law.
Ponnambalam argued that Hinduism constitutes the most distinct marker of Tamil identity in Sri Lanka, given that Christianity is present among both Tamil and Sinhalese communities. "It is Hinduism that’s being deliberately targeted," he said, referring to Government plans to construct 1,000 Buddhist viharas in predominantly Tamil areas.
He further alleged that ancient Shiva temples were being encroached upon under the guise of archaeology, describing this as a manifestation of a Sinhala nationalist agenda. Against this backdrop, he argued that the Tamil political movement's greatest challenge is convincing the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led Government to take a greater interest in accountability and a political settlement to Sri Lanka's ethnic question.
The conference was also attended by a National Secretary of the BJP from Tamil Nadu (TN), M Venkatesan. He broadly echoed Ponnambalam's position, drawing parallels between the situation of Hindus in Sri Lanka and that of Kashmiri Pandits in India. According to Venkatesan, the challenges faced by Hindus in Sri Lanka resemble those experienced by Hindus in Kashmir, where Prime Minister Narendra Damodardas Modi's Government claims to have delivered justice.
The same themes were echoed by other Tamil speakers, including Opposition MP from the Illankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi, Elayathamby Srinath. Based on these narratives, some observers may discern a new "Hindu angle" to the Tamil political question in Sri Lanka.
But, is such a transformation really underway?
The recent emphasis on Hindu identity among sections of Tamil politics should be understood primarily in the context of seeking support from India. Following the rise of the BJP as India's dominant political force, Tamil political actors increasingly began framing the challenges faced by Northern and Eastern Tamils through the lens of Hindu victimhood.
A notable example emerged in May 2014 when the late then Leader of the Tamil National Alliance, Rajavarothiam Sampanthan wrote to Modi shortly after the BJP's Electoral victory. In the letter, Sampanthan argued that the destruction and encroachment of sites of religious and cultural importance to Tamil Hindus in the North and East formed part of a broader effort to alter the ethnic and cultural character of those regions.
Significantly, this marked one of the first occasions on which a major Tamil political leader explicitly highlighted the identity of "Tamil Hindus" rather than speaking exclusively in terms of the Tamil national identity.
The rise of the BJP was widely perceived as the political ascent of Hindutva nationalism. Yet, Hindutva has historically had little influence over the politics of the Northern Tamils. Instead, Eelam Tamil political thought was heavily influenced by the Dravidian movement in TN, which defined itself through opposition to both Hindutva and Hindi linguistic nationalism.
Elements of anti-Brahminism
Indeed, elements of anti-Brahminism derived from the Dravidian political discourse continue to surface within sections of Tamil nationalist politics in Sri Lanka. These ideas originated in a specific social and historical context in TN rather than among the Northern Tamils themselves. Nevertheless, they were absorbed into the Tamil nationalist political discourse, including by militant movements. As a result, Tamil nationalist politics traditionally positioned itself in opposition to Hindutva rather than in alignment with it.
Throughout the history of Eelam Tamil politics, whether under the Federal Party and later the Tamil United Liberation Front, or during the rise of militant organisations, there was a conscious tendency to avoid framing Tamil political aspirations through religion. The social structure of the Tamil community played an important role in this outcome.
Among North-Eastern Tamils, Hinduism functioned more as a cultural and ritual tradition than as an organised political institution. Unlike Buddhism, Islam or Christianity, it rarely developed a clergy-led political influence. Consequently, when religious actors intervened in Tamil politics, it was often the Christian clergy who played the more prominent role.
During the civil war, the Catholic and wider Christian communities frequently emerged as advocates for Tamil HR concerns. Their links with Western institutions and international networks enabled them to establish a notable presence within Tamil nationalist politics.
Not exercising political influence
Even during the period of direct Indian involvement in Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict, Hindu religious institutions did not exercise significant political influence. However, after 2009, signs of change began to emerge. Hindu ascetics dressed in saffron increasingly appeared at protests and political demonstrations. Figures such as Velan Swamigal and the head of the Trincomalee Aadheenam became visible participants in Tamil political activism. The political landscape, once dominated by the white robes of the Christian clergy, gradually expanded to include saffron-clad Hindu religious figures.
Even when the LTTE became the dominant militant force, the organisation did not demonstrate a distinct religious orientation. Although the LTTE possessed a strongly nationalist and authoritarian outlook, it never embraced Hindutva. Instead, it often appeared more receptive to the Christian clergy than to Hindu religious leaders. Indeed, questions regarding whether LTTE Leader Velupillai Prabhakaran himself was Christian occasionally surfaced among foreign observers.
There are also accounts suggesting that figures associated with the Sangh Parivar attempted to establish contact with the LTTE during the 1980s. Whether accurate or not, such stories reinforce a broader point: the LTTE never showed any meaningful inclination towards Hindutva politics.
Following the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ratna Gandhi, the LTTE was banned in India as a terrorist organisation. One notable exception came from the Maharashtra-based Shiv Sena Leader Bal Keshav Thackeray, who called for the LTTE ban to be lifted and argued that the organisation could serve as a counterweight to Islamist terrorists backed by Pakistan. Such instances, however, remained rare.
Although Hindutva nationalism has expanded significantly across India, the BJP has continued to struggle against the entrenched Dravidian political culture of TN. Against this backdrop, sections of the BJP's TN leadership have increasingly taken up the cause of Sri Lankan Tamils. Former TN BJP President Annamalai Kuppusamy, for example, publicly referred to allegations of genocide and criticised India's handling of the final stages of the war in 2009 while addressing members of the Tamil diaspora in the United Kingdom.
Not all Tamil Hindu voices share the political narrative
Yet, not all Tamil Hindu voices share the political narrative advanced by Tamil nationalist parties. The founder of the Siva Senai movement established in Vavuniya in 2016, Maravanpulavu Sachchithananthan has argued that post-war Saivite Tamils have adopted a more measured approach. He has accused certain self-styled Tamil leaders of acting as "puppets for Christians and Muslims intent on inciting conflict between Buddhists and Saivites". According to Sachchithananthan, Buddhists did not destroy Saivite temples on the scale that Catholic colonial authorities allegedly did in Sri Lanka or Muslim rulers did in parts of North India.
Ultimately, while some Northern Tamil politicians and sections of the Tamil diaspora may seek political resonance by framing Tamil grievances through a Hindutva lens, New Delhi's policy towards Sri Lanka remains rooted in broader strategic and diplomatic interests rather than ideological affinity. As India's External Affairs Minister Dr Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has repeatedly stated: "It’s in Sri Lanka's own interest that the expectations of the Tamil people for equality, justice, peace and dignity within a united Sri Lanka are fulfilled. That applies equally to the commitments made by the Sri Lankan Government on meaningful devolution, including the 13th Amendment to the Constitution."
The writer is a political analyst and the founding Director of the think tank based in Trincomalee, the Trinco Centre for Strategic Studies
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The views and opinions expressed in this column are those of the writer, and do not necessarily reflect those of this publication