Although it is argued that the Donoughmore Constitution, which was in effect from 1931 to 1947, was introduced with the goal of creating a unified national identity, it actually became a negative turning point by intensifying communal politics in Sri Lanka.
By abolishing communal representation and introducing territorial representation alongside universal adult franchise, the Constitution shifted political power towards the Sinhalese majority. As a result, minority communities faced discrimination.
The provincial councils project
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, who harboured grand political ambitions, abandoned the Progressive National Party and established the Sinhala Maha Sabha. He ceased advocating for a federal system and instead began supporting decentralisation. He championed the idea of providing a high degree of autonomy through the enhancement and decentralisation of the Local Government system.
Viewing provinces as the primary units for large-scale local administration, Bandaranaike sought to establish provincial councils. While serving as the Minister of Local Administration in the second State Council, the council approved a motion to establish provincial councils, which was brought forward by R.S.S. Gunewardene, a member of his ministry’s Executive Committee.
However, the writer D.B.S. Jeyaraj notes that for reasons that remain unclear, Bandaranaike did not move forward with the plan to establish these councils at that time.
Later, after joining the United National Party (UNP) with his Sinhala Maha Sabha and becoming the Minister of Local Government in Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake’s first Cabinet in independent Ceylon, Bandaranaike attempted to revive the provincial council plan as a way to bring government closer to the people.
However, his ministerial colleagues were unwilling to lose the absolute power they enjoyed as ministers. Consequently, Bandaranaike was once again unable to move the provincial council project forward. Jeyaraj observes that during the period when Bandaranaike was considering provincial councils, they did not carry the same ethno-political dimension they do today; therefore, they could have been established then without significant conflict.
After leaving the UNP in 1951 to form the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and becoming Prime Minister five years later, the policies pursued by Bandaranaike’s Government intensified communal politics to the point where minority communities feared for their future existence. The Sinhala Only Act was a pivotal moment in this shift.
It is disheartening to note that a leader who was among the first intellectuals to advocate for a federal system in Sri Lanka underwent such a radical policy reversal. During negotiations with Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK) Leader S.J.V. Chelvanayakam to find a solution to the ethnic issue, Bandaranaike was careful to avoid even the mention of ‘federalism’.
Although the current Provincial Council system was introduced 39 years ago by the J.R. Jayewardene Government following the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord, it is noteworthy that the concept fundamentally originated in Bandaranaike’s thinking decades earlier.
We shall next examine the course of events where Jayewardene – who was at the forefront of the protests in the south against the 1957 Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact (which sought to establish regional councils) – eventually paved the way for the establishment of Provincial Councils three decades later.
Parthasarathy’s entry
There is no doubt that Provincial Councils would never have been introduced in Sri Lanka – a country that historically lacked any arrangements for the devolution of power to regions – had it not been for the intervention of India.
India faced immense difficulties at that time in persuading or bringing to terms President Jayewardene, who held a hardline stance on all matters related to the national ethnic issue, and convincing him that a devolution arrangement was essential to resolve the problem.
Following the Black July of 1983, then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi came forward to offer ‘good offices’ to mediate between the two conflicting parties in Sri Lanka. She appointed G. Parthasarathy as her special envoy, who played a pivotal role in gaining Jayewardene’s compliance.
In a newspaper article, the late Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam – a former Member of Parliament for the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) and a preeminent constitutional expert – noted that Parthasarathy once told him that despite President Jayewardene being a constitutional expert himself, it was extremely difficult to instil in him a belief in the utility of the principle of devolution.
Similarly, Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka, a former diplomat and political analyst, mentions in an article that during a meeting in New Delhi, Parthasarathy spoke about the hardships faced during negotiations held in Sri Lanka in the post-Black July period.
Dr. Jayatilleka wrote that Parthasarathy informed him that during the 1984 negotiations, at the request of President Jayewardene, he met with the Mahanayakas of the Buddhist chapters in Kandy. Through this, he realised that finding a negotiated political settlement for the Tamil problem was so difficult that it bordered on the impossible.
Gandhi sent Parthasarathy, a diplomat she deeply trusted, as her special envoy because she believed the situation required someone who fundamentally understood regional geopolitics and the complexities of the Sri Lankan Constitution to handle the intricate mediation with patience. He had previously served in various diplomatic capacities.
Annexure C
Understanding clearly that the obstacles and complications ahead were grave, Parthasarathy’s primary task was to calmly grasp the fears, longings, illusions, and mindsets of the Government and Opposition leaders of the time. He found it easier to engage with Sri Lanka’s old Leftist leaders.
Dr. Tiruchelvam’s article noted that Parthasarathy’s advice to Tamil leaders was that they must understand the limitations of their political options and that those who remained adamant on fundamentalist positions regarding the negotiation process should engage in talks even while continuing their struggle.
Parthasarathy’s unique contribution was negotiating a set of proposals for the devolution of power to regional councils. These proposals became famously known as ‘Annexure C’. It was said that Parthasarathy finalised the details of Annexure C through meetings held with President Jayewardene in Colombo and New Delhi between August and December 1983.
Jayewardene immediately agreed to the features of the plan presented by Parthasarathy, who was said to have displayed all the skills and wisdom of a consummate mediator between the Tamil political leaders and the Jayewardene Government.
However, reaching an agreement on the unit of devolution remained a persistent difficulty. A larger unit of devolution, created by merging districts within a province, was viewed as a concession that should not be granted to the Tamils.
Later, during Jayewardene’s visit to New Delhi in December 1983, Parthasarathy secured Gandhi’s support to propose the creation of a single linguistic region. Jayewardene was unwilling to agree to such a proposal, fearing he would lose his support base in southern Sri Lanka. However, he agreed to a compromise.
He requested that what was listed in Annexure C as ‘regional councils’ be limited to a provincial level. During the negotiations held at the Ashok Hotel in New Delhi, Jayewardene – losing patience at one point due to pressure from the Indian side – reportedly turned to Parthasarathy and asked: “Where should I sign?” To this, Parthasarathy replied: “This is not an agreement; no signature is required,” as reported by Indian media at the time.
Although Annexure C was presented at the All-Party Conference convened in January 1984, Jayewardene distanced himself from it following opposition from Sinhalese organisations, Buddhist groups, and certain Opposition parties. He washed his hands of the matter, claiming he was in no way responsible for the contents of Annexure C. Consequently, the All-Party Conference ended in failure.
Eventual sidelining
Following the death of Indira Gandhi and her son Rajiv Gandhi’s assumption of office as Prime Minister, negotiations resumed in New Delhi in early 1985. However, the son avoided involving Parthasarathy – who had been his mother’s confidant – in the negotiation process.
It was said that one reason Rajiv Gandhi decided to sideline Parthasarathy was the Sri Lankan Government’s growing suspicion of his role, as Tamil political leaders relied heavily on him for guidance and advice. Instead, the younger Gandhi engaged his Foreign Secretary Romesh Bhandari and Ministers P. Chidambaram and Natwar Singh to handle the Sri Lankan ethnic issue.
When Rajiv Gandhi arrived in Colombo for the peace accord on 29 July 1987, he was accompanied by a large delegation of influential ministers, diplomats, and officials. Political and diplomatic circles at the time described the absence of Parthasarathy – who had played a decisive role in the early stages of negotiations and laid the foundation for the peace accord – as a glaring void.
Nevertheless, Dr. Tiruchelvam wrote that there was no doubt that a major share of the credit for establishing the theoretical basis for devolution of power and the constitutional foundation for a multi-ethnic polity in Sri Lanka belonged to Parthasarathy.
Persistent delay tactics
Thirty-eight years have passed since the 13th Amendment was introduced to the Sri Lankan Constitution to establish Provincial Councils, yet it has not been fully implemented to date, nor have the Provincial Councils functioned properly. Provincial Council Elections have not been held for the past several years.
Although the National People’s Power (NPP) Government, led by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, promised to hold Provincial Council Elections within a year of coming to power, it appears that strategies are being pursued to postpone those elections as much as possible.
Tamil political parties continue to insist on a solution to the ethnic problem based on a federal system.
A century has passed since the idea of a federal system was first proposed by the Sinhalese side (albeit for different reasons), and three-quarters of a century since the same demand was made by the Tamil side. Despite this, the Sinhalese political establishment remains indifferent to making even the Provincial Councils, with their partial powers, function effectively.
Although the Tamil political community has been insisting on a federal solution, if the Government introduces a new constitution, it may have to fight just to protect the Provincial Councils.
(This is a continuation of a previous article titled ‘A century-old discourse on federalism,’ published in The Sunday Morning of 22 March)
(The writer is a senior journalist based in Colombo)
(The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the official position of this publication)