- Part 1 of a two part series
The naval wing of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), popularly known as ‘Sea Tigers’ during its existence, became a capable adversary to the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN).
They posed a sizable challenge for SLN to maintain the control of Sea Lanes of Communication between Jaffna Peninsula of North and Trincomalee of East of Sri Lanka. Thus, attacks on sea convoys between Jaffna and Trincomalee were frequent during the LTTE launched insurgency which also used terrorism against the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and its people. This case will discuss the first sea convoy attack carried out by the LTTE against Sri Lanka Navy ships carrying 450 troops from Kankesanthurai (KKS) at Jaffna peninsula to Trincomalee on 2 October 1995. The analysis aims to draw tactical lessons and place an accurate account of the incident.
During the period from 1995 to 2006, LTTE Sea Tigers have launched attacks on Sri Lanka Navy escorted sea convoys carrying troops and military hardware between KKS and Trincomalee on six different occasions.
The first attempt was the attack on the Sri Lanka Navy Ship (SLNS) Ranagaja; a Landing Craft Mechanised (LCM) type vessel carrying 170 Army personnel on 2 October 1995.
Attack on SLNS Ranagaja
The LTTE launched its first attempt on the convoy consisting SLNS Pabbatha, SLNS Ranagaja, and L821 was bound to Trincomalee carrying 450 troops from Jaffna on leave on 2 October.
SLNS Ranagaja embarked 170 Army troops while SLNS Pabbatha and L821 embarked 187 and 93 soldiers respectively with most of the soldiers carrying their personnel weapons and other belongings onboard. The convoy left Kankesanthurai harbour at 10.30 a.m. under the protection of five fast Attack Craft (FACs). The convoy instructions and escort plan had been given to Commanding Officers (COs) and Officer In-command (OIC) of FACs as follows; SLNS Ranagaja. Commanding Officer (CO) held the total responsibility of the convoy as the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC). P485 , P486 and P458. Assigned to the Northern Naval Area (NNA) and had been tasked to escort up to the North-East Change of Operational Control (N-E CHOP Line). P466 and P473. Assigned to the Eastern Naval Area (ENA) and tasked to escort up to the port of Trincomalee. ENA to take over operational command from the N-E CHOP line and send FACs to continue escort to Trincomalee.
On this day the sea conditions were favourable, thus the convoy reached the N-E CHOP line around 5 p.m., one hour earlier than the Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA). It was expected that the FACs coming from Trincomalee would arrive early at the N-E CHOP line and sanitise the area before taking over the convoy escort duty. Conversely, the scheduled FACs were not available to take over the convoy due to its early arrival. Consequently, the OTC ordered P485, P486 and P458 to continue escort duties further until clear of the Mullaitivu sea area as it was the Sea Tiger stronghold of the Northern province at the time. The OTC felt confident the units could safely and quickly pass the sea tiger stronghold with much ease.
The units took positions in the convoy. P466 and P473 positioned between land and the main body of the convoy (SLNS Ranagaja) to provide close protection from possible enemy attack approaching landward. SLNS Pabbatha and L821 were positioned at the ‘ahead’ (in front of) and astern of SLNS Ranagaja respectively. P486, P485 and P458 were positioned trailing behind L821 with instructions to pass the critical area on the orders of OTC until the arrival of the craft expected to arrive from Trincomalee.
While the convoy was passing through Mullaitivu area which was considered the critical area, a cluster of enemy boats approaching from Mullaitivu coast was detected by the SLNS Ranagaja and SLNS Pabbatha. Having made the enemy contact report, OTC ordered P466 and P473 to intercept the enemy movement towards the main body. P466 and P473 approached the enemy cluster in a failed attempt to get the enemy boat cluster into the effective range of the 20 mm main armament. Seeing the ineffective firepower of the two FACs, 12-16 enemy craft easily penetrated the landward defence and approached directly towards the main body which is SLNS Ranagaja. During this time P486 and P485 trailing behind rushed to support SLNS Ranagaja while SLNS Pabbatha and L821 altered course to 0900 as per the evasive strategy and moved further towards the sea. Survivor’s accounts reveal that what transpired was a chaotic situation where own units could not distinguish between friend and foe through the radar leading to a pandemonium where no one knew what to do and the worst case scenario would have been attacking own units due to misidentification. However, after some time P486 and P485 approached close to the main body under the cover of darkness, despite being outnumbered by enemy craft.
Initially, the FAC P486 engaged the enemy boats in a series of daring attacks. It was a perfect asymmetric situation in which enemy boats largely outnumbered the SLN attack craft. P486 drew heavy enemy fire from many directions. Also they may have got into the crossfire of their own units. In the midst of the confusion P485 thought it was not the LCM but the P486 which was surrounded by enemy boats having assessed the scattered echo pattern on the radar display yet to be clarified through communication. After considerable time lapse Signal Centre at KKS confirmed that P486 had left the scene one and half hour ago on sustaining damages to craft also with injuries to the OIC and one sailor. The withdrawal of the P 486 from the situation was not known to units present at the time.
During the first few hours of the battle all the FACs engaged in the escort were disoriented and did not know where the enemy and their own units were located. In the ensuing battle SLNS Ranagaja got isolated, yet was able to fire and destroy one approaching suicide craft just before it got close enough to hit the LCM. The ship’s communication and steering system was badly damaged due to the huge impact of the explosion in the close proximity. This made the ship spin around herself and move in a circular pattern without any communication.
SLNS Ranagaja, being a stable platform fitted with 14.5 mm guns, continued to attack when the enemy groups got close to the LCM, despite the serious casualties onboard. It was the sheer courage and determination of five gunnery sailors on board who fought back being on-board LCM during the most difficult situation that anyone could imagine.
FACs could not effectively assist SLNS Ranagaja due to the difficulty involving identification where the continuous firing of the vessel’s armament, which included two 14.5 mm and four 12.7 mm Heavy Machine Guns (HMGs), 7.62 mm MPMGs and 7.62 mm LMGs, and a 40 mm Automatic grenade launcher. The assortment of weapons and its fire from SLNS Ranagaja kept the enemy away and also inflicted some serious damages to the enemy craft as well. The LCM had to fight alone until the situation and the tactical picture became very clear to everyone present.
Another favourable situation of that time, the ship was drifting towards the sea as a result of monsoonal current pattern. At the very beginning Ordinary Seaman Wettasinghe who accurately hit the suicide craft sustained a fatal injury and was killed in action due to the explosion. Some of the Army soldiers onboard also died and while there were heavy casualties amongst them as they were on the open vehicle deck. The Commanding Officer also sustained minor injuries. The Executive Officer (XO) and Senior Administrative Officers on-board had done a remarkable job before sustaining them with serious injuries. They had quickly replaced the injured navy gun crews with Army soldiers who were familiar with 12.7 mm HMGs when gunnery sailors got injured due to enemy fire. Therefore, the ship could continue to fight back in spite of the losses.
The battle lasted for many hours. LCM had to fight her way through with three coordinated enemy groups who took turns attacking the convoy while the SLN units were in disarray. The enemy used coloured lighting system to regroup after each attack run. Survivors of the ship told, the LTTE used an infrared beam to fire RPGs. In each enemy attack run LCM crew suffered casualties. However, LCM crew kept on firing until they ran short of ammunition during the late night. In the meantime, the ship managed to assemble a handheld communication set. Finally, CO Ranagaja communicated the inability to continue further and expected the only remaining FAC, P485 to intervene. LCM crew was instructed to cease fire before P485 approached LCM. Seizing the initiative and cutting through enemy fire, P485 reached closer to the LCM in the midst of cheers and applause of the Army soldiers. The other FACs, P453 and P458 in the vicinity also approached LCM from two directions and joined in. But the enemy was still looming at large, desperate as they could neither destroy, nor capture LCM.
By this time two FACs, P457 and P467 commanded by Lieutenant (Lt.) rank officers had set sail from Trincomalee. P457 had boarded two SBS officers and a team of Special Boat Squadron (SBS) personnel to board the ship in case of enemy capture of the LCM. However, by the time they arrived on the scene the LCM situation had already settled, and the LCM was being towed by P485 and P457. The two smaller boats had embarked all the serious casualties while on tow and rushed back to Trincomalee for early medical treatments.
The attack on the SLNS Ranagaja and other ships carrying 450 troops was recorded as the first ever sea convoy attack in the history of SLN. The confrontation lasted for more than seven hours from 5.45 p.m. on 2 October to 2 a.m. on 3 October 1995 morning, costing the Navy 20 lives and sustaining injuries to half of the ship’s crew. This convoy attack marks a significant milestone in the history of SLN as the first ever sea convoy attack, one of the longest confrontations at sea and drawing many lessons for subsequent convoys that are valid even for future applications.
(Rear Admiral [Retd.] RAPP Rathnayake served in the Sri Lanka Navy for over 36 years and was its Chief of Staff prior to retirement. He holds a Master's in Maritime Policy from the University of Wollongong, Australia, and a Master's in Military Science & Strategic Studies from the National Defence University, China)
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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of this publication