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Contradictions haunting the mineral regime

Contradictions haunting the mineral regime

17 Jul 2026 | BY The Collective for Ecological and Economic Justice


 

The Daily Morning’s report on 8 July, with reference to the Government’s admission the National Mineral Policy of 2026 was drafted without a direct impact study, exposes a much deeper policy problem than a missing technical report. It reveals a contradiction between the Government’s stated intention to protect Sri Lanka’s mineral wealth and the weak, incomplete governance framework now being presented as reform and implemented in the name of development.

Industry and Entrepreneurship Development Minister Sunil Handunneththi is correct to say that Sri Lanka’s mineral sector has suffered from corruption, licence hoarding, speculative exploration, weak enforcement, and raw-material exports that deny the country fair value. However, identifying the problem is not the same as fixing it. He did not clearly tell Parliament the Policy itself was shaped through consultations that included the private sector and mining-related companies.

The published policy says that “public and private sector entities” were consulted. If mining companies, licence holders, exporters, or their consultants influenced the policy, that must be disclosed transparently. A National Mineral Policy concerns non-renewable public asset. Citizens have a right to know who was consulted, what they proposed, and whether conflict-of-interest declarations were obtained.

Not summoned

If he knew that 25 Geological Survey and Mines Bureau (GSMB) District officials were involved in corrupt practices, why are they not being summoned and questioned? Why have they not been suspended pending inquiry, referred to the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption, or prosecuted where evidence exists? Alleging corruption in Parliament while allowing the same administrative machinery to continue is not a good anti-corruption practice. It risks becoming political theatre. If there are reports, photographs, video recordings, and repeated evidence of abuse, the Government must act through proper disciplinary and criminal processes.

Blaming the problem on the claim that all good professionals have migrated is unfair and inaccurate. Sri Lanka still has qualified geologists, mining engineers, environmental scientists, economists, lawyers, compliance specialists, and public administrators. The issue is not an absence of capable people; it is whether the State is willing to appoint them transparently, protect them from political and private sector interference, and pay for competent regulation. The brain drain argument should not be used to excuse weak governance.

The policy’s treatment of value addition remains inadequate. Although the document includes a broad description, it does not set enforceable thresholds. Value addition must be defined in measurable terms: minimum value added in Sri Lanka, technology used, the transformation achieved, export classification, local employment and skills transfer, and distance from the final consumer good. Washing, bagging, grading, or minimal processing should not qualify as value addition. Without a strict definition, exporters can re-label low-level processing as national industrialisation.

Not replaced previous Ministers Memorandum

The Government has still not withdrawn or replaced the previous Cabinet of Ministers Memorandum Number MIP/CP/22/2023 dated 17 July 2023 associated with the President Ranil Wickremesinghe administration that allows 30 per cent of raw mineral - calculated based on proven reserves, which is very high - exports within the first two years of the company starting operation. This is the most important inconsistency. The new Policy claims to prohibit exports in minimal or non-value-added form, but, unless earlier Cabinet approvals, regulations, contracts, and licences are formally revoked or amended, the old loophole may survive in practice. Policy speeches cannot override binding approvals or contractual rights.

Inconsistencies

There are other inconsistencies too. The Policy says that mining decisions must consider environmental and socio-economic costs, yet, Handunneththi admits that no direct assessment was done before drafting it. The Policy says that mineral resources are non-renewable and must be managed for future generations, yet, it does not require a national depletion accounting framework. It promotes investment but does not explain how Sri Lanka will prevent licence speculation, related-party consulting, beneficial ownership abuse, or former GSMB officials advising companies that they once regulated.

 

Furthermore, Handunneththi should also prioritise consulting communities living in proximity to selected mining areas. As experiences with the Titanium Sands project in Mannar illustrate, community consultations have been either marginal or post-facto. There can be no development if such development initiatives destroy habitat, people, or wildlife. Spillovers of mining on social, environmental, livelihood, health and security, including incalculable economic costs, should be thoroughly evaluated before granting exploratory and mining licences. The narrative that both the Government and the private sector highlight - “minerals constitute a valuable resource to be exploited for economic gain” - indicates that everything else is subordinate to economic benefits.

Get six things done

The Government should therefore do six things immediately: publish the full consultation record; disclose all current exploration and mining licences; suspend and investigate officials against whom credible evidence exists; issue a legally binding definition of value addition; consult communities; and formally withdraw any Cabinet decision or administrative approval allowing raw mineral exports inconsistent with the 2026 policy.

Sri Lanka does not need another Policy document filled with good intentions. It needs a mineral governance system that is transparent, enforceable, technically competent, and insulated from political and commercial capture. Until that happens, the National Mineral Policy 2026 will remain vulnerable to the same old problem: public minerals being converted into means of private gain while the people of the country receive only slogans in return. All that said, the speed at which the new Mineral Policy is developed, approved by the Cabinet, and the start of the re-issuance of licenses point to the fact that corruption and corporate capture may still be alive, well, and continuing, in a different form and with different actors.

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The views and opinions expressed in this column are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of this publication

 

 


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