Today, the global political stage is a complex scenario with the post-Cold War unipolar order being replaced by one of multipolarity.
It has been suggested that the 21st century will be the century of Asia, but for that to happen, it will require all of Asia to step forward and leave its mark on the international order.
In a previously written piece, (see ‘SL falls off the ledge of international relations,’ The Sunday Morning, 12 October), this writer outlined Sri Lanka’s post-independence role on the international stage. However, the question that needs to be answered is what can be learnt from the country’s prior forays in global diplomacy.
DS and independence
As the international community emerged from the Second World War, coinciding with the decline of colonialism, many countries, including the former colonies, were crafting their foreign policy and marking their positions on the global stage.
These efforts, however, were complicated by the fact that the global political stage was facing a growing polarisation as the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) were embarking upon what would be a drawn out and, at times, tense Cold War.
For Sri Lanka, then Ceylon, the political and diplomatic classes were not only having to navigate this emerging Cold War but also a splintering of the subcontinental region. While domestically the country was facing its own issues borne from centuries of colonial rule, the international stage was viewed not through a lens of anxiety and uncertainty but rather one of confidence and opportunity.
When the country gained its independence in 1948, it was done not through popular protest and satyagraha, as had been witnessed in India, but rather through backroom discussions and negotiations with an international tint.
The success of Ceylon’s independence movement was reliant on the country effectively leveraging its support for the Allies’ war efforts in the Second World War. However, D.S. Senanayake was faced not just with the unenviable task of negotiating with the British, but also with convincing members of his own Cabinet, including his son, Dudley Senanayake, and J.R. Jayewardene, to abandon their support of Japan.
The two younger Ministers were of the belief that Ceylon’s support for Japan would secure the country’s independence far sooner. Yet, it was Senanayake’s foresight that recognised a Japanese victory was unlikely, and as such, the time was ideal to secure an agreement from the British over the country’s independence.
Much has been written on the essential nature of South Asia’s involvement in the Second World War, with over 2.5 million soldiers departing from the region to various theatres of war. Yet it was not just manpower or resources that played a key role; it was also the strategic location of countries such as Ceylon that helped turn the tide for the Allies.
Following the fall of Singapore to the advancing Japanese forces, the British moved their Eastern Fleet to Trincomalee, while several key Allied headquarters were established in the country, including the Army’s Headquarters at the Colombo Museum.
With the strategic location of the country playing an integral role in the war effort, the British recognised that the support of the country was essential in ensuring a halt to the Japanese advance. Public support in India towards the war effort was divided at the time, with members of the Congress Party, including Jawaharlal Nehru, refusing their support. In the backdrop of this the importance of Sri Lanka’s role was further elevated.
Faced with the reality of the British needing a supportive populace in the island, D.S. Senanayake and the independence movement took the British on at their own game of political discourse. A series of negotiations and discussions led by Senanayake, with the ample support of key figures such as L.M.D. de Silva and Ivor Jennings followed, which saw the Ceylonese delegation secure an agreement of independence from the British.
It is on the back of a successful independence campaign, characterised by discourse and negotiations, that Sri Lanka was now preparing to face up to the prospect of navigating the country’s post-colonial foray into foreign policy on a global stage that was increasingly polarised. In a manner similar to that which was adopted during the independence movement, the Sri Lankan political and diplomatic class approached their foreign policy with a sense of fearlessness, almost bordering on arrogance.
Kotelawala and the Bandung Conference
When Sir John Kotelawala took over as Prime Minister, he inherited a Government that had lost its leadership following the 1953 Hartal organised by Leftist groups in the country.
Faced with political uncertainty at home and the growing threat of the Leftist groups assisting in the spread of communism, Kotelawala convened the Colombo Conference, a gathering of five Asian nations (Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Myanmar, and Indonesia). Subsequently declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) cables have highlighted that the purpose of this meeting was to drive an anti-communist initiative in the region.
Kotelawala, recognising the looming threat of communism within Sri Lanka, felt it prudent to once again leverage the global context to the country’s benefit. Furthermore, with the US having suspended aid to the country following the Rubber-Rice Pact with China in 1952, this provided an opportunity to once again bring the US back onside.
While the Colombo Conference itself failed to yield tangible results, it took on a life of its own which saw Indonesia’s Prime Minister propose an expanded Asia-Africa meeting in Bandung, Indonesia to discuss increased cooperation.
Faced with a larger audience and a more pointed agenda of discussion, Kotelawala took it upon himself to chart Sri Lanka’s foreign policy. Outlining the uncertainty and suspicion that had overtaken the global community, he proposed that those very nations who were then representing the world of the impoverished and underdeveloped may in fact act as mediators in the growing rivalry between the great powers.
Going further, Kotelawala proposed that “the countries of Asia and Africa will then have an historic opportunity to demand that the United Nations Organization (UNO) be reconstructed so that it can be in fact what it was intended to be in theory – an effective instrument of peace, and not merely a forum for the wrangling of opposed power groups”.
Today, we continue to witness the “wrangling of opposed power groups” in the United Nations (UN), with those very changes that Kotelawala called for and were subsequently ignored, such as the power of the veto and the reframing of the otherwise unaccountable Security Council, continuing to hinder its operations. Speaking further, the Prime Minister called a unified Afro-Asian voice on world affairs, urging those in attendance to lead by example, thereby unquestionably ensuring their voices were heard on the global stage.
The impact of Kotelawala’s words were seen through the final declaration following the conclusion of the conference, which included the principles of “settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement, as well as other peaceful means of the parties’ own choice”.
While the declaration of the Bandung Conference has been forgotten by many today, its principles, and those espoused by Kotelawala, have resurfaced, taking on a new dimension in regional bodies such as BRICS and the Group of 20 (G20). These bodies work along the principle that ensures the voices of nations, which are otherwise underrepresented in the UN and other global forums, are not only heard but take on leading roles as well.
Today we are witnessing the emergence of regional bodies that are pushing back against the polarising big power rivalry in global politics. More importantly, it is bodies such as these that are providing opportunities for discussion and negotiation with the involvement of all parties concerned.
For Sri Lankans, Kotelawala’s words should not ring hollow, but should rather serve as an example of how smaller nations have it within them to chart future courses of action on the global stage. Today the country’s foreign policy has found itself rudderless, yet this is an opportune moment for us to reframe our international approach along a path similar to that which was undertaken in the 1940s and ’50s.
Lessons for SL today
For Sri Lanka to succeed, we must engage the international stage free of apprehension or fear, recognising that a proactive and principled approach will yield results for the country both domestically and internationally.
When D.S. Senanayake negotiated Ceylon’s independence, he undertook the task of beating the colonialists at their own game. He demonstrated that while Sri Lanka may be a small country, our value both internally and externally was something that must be leveraged to our own benefit.
When Kotelawala took on the ‘big five’ of the UN in Bandung, he did so without fear of repercussions; when he labelled communism as another form of colonialism, he did so with the intention of positioning Sri Lanka as taking a stance on a global issue.
Today Sri Lanka’s role on the international stage is marked by an absence of principles or willingness to drive forward our voices on a moral standing. Our diplomats have been silenced through an inability to speak up and guide the country’s international journey.
Faced once again with growing polarity on the global stage, we have not adequately leveraged our position as a country that has maintained strong relations with all countries. The role of mediator, convenor, or even simply a host to international discussions remains within our grasp, if only it were to be grabbed.
(The writer served previously as the Director of International Affairs to former President Ranil Wickremesinghe and is Director Research at the Geopolitical Cartographer)
(The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the official position of this publication)