- An analytical discourse of the status after the action at sea
On the invitation of India, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) despatched a three-ship flotilla to the Indian Ocean where the IRI Ship IRIS Dena was to participate in India’s International Fleet Review at Visakhapatnam (Vizag) in Bay of Bengal (BoB) on 18 February. Thereafter, the ship was engaged in the 13th edition of the annual Naval exercise of the Indian Navy called MILAN 2026 from 18-25 February. As per the event web page, 74 countries participated with Naval vessels. The Naval vessels left Vizag at different time intervals. On 28 February, the US-Israel alliance started attacking Iran. It is noteworthy that the Indian Prime Minister returned to New Delhi on 26 February after a two-day State visit to Israel where he even addressed the Israel Parliament, the Knesset.
As the conflict broke out in the Persian Gulf, the region, more specifically the northern part of the Arabian Sea, became a sea area where warring parties might get involved in sea battles. It appears that when the conflict started on 28 February, the Iranian Navy was clustered around Bandar Abbas at the Strait of Hormuz and the three-ship flotilla (IRIS Dena; the frigate IRIS Bushehr; and the supply ship IRIS Lavan) having left Iran were the only Naval vessels in the Indian Ocean away from the Arabian Sea.
The incident
Having left Vizag on 26 February, the IRIS Dena was in her passage for her home port and the supply ship was in company. They must have been instructed by Teheran by this time to not to enter the Arabian Sea as on 28 February, the US-Israel coalition started to attack Iran. Thus, sometime around 1 March, the Colombo-based Iranian Embassy forwarded a diplomatic note requesting for a port call for two vessels, namely for IRIS Dena and IRIS Bushehr. Whilst waiting for these diplomatic clearances, IRIS Dena was torpedoed in Sri Lanka’s contiguous zone at around 5 a.m. by an American submarine that must have been tracking the target for some hours. The passage of IRIS Dena around Sri Lanka’s south-eastern corner is the normal route that any warship is likely to use, avoiding the territorial seas and the location of the torpedo attack as officially made known is 21 nautical miles from Galle, bearing 266 degrees. That is the standard position indicating system in Naval systems where always a prominent land point is used to indicate the range (distance) and the bearing. When plotted on a nautical chart, the location’s nearest landfall (the closest land: the closest land may not be the land-point used for the position indication) is at Hikkaduwa at a distance of 15 nautical miles. The depth of water at the location is within the 1,000 metres (m) depth contour (called isobath in naval terminology, to distinctively separate from the height contours used on land), at around 760 m of water depth.
What is at stake: Sri Lanka
The incident exposed Sri Lanka’s lack of decision-making capacity on maritime matters, and when the authorities, on receipt of the said diplomatic note for the port calls, seem to have dragged their feet, probably assuming that the Iranians will opt for an alternative solution to seek a port call elsewhere. The idea of naval vessel vulnerability was never taken into consideration with only the political repercussion of allowing Iranian vessels to make a port call when the US is engaged in attacking Iran, being the topmost concern. It has been learnt that the port call request has been discussed at the Security Council meeting held on 28 February without making a decision, where the Navy Commander, being the top-most advisor to the Government, may not have either briefed the Council of alternative options available, and likely scenarios or his opinion was not sought at all.
The Sri Lanka Navy (SLN), having robust maritime domain awareness (MDA) tools to track the surface ships, knew about the three Iranian ships presence in the Indian Ocean region, with two ships very close to Sri Lanka’s south-eastern coastline. And when Iran was attacked on 28 February, it appears the Navy’s operational command failed to see the possibility of these Iranian Naval vessels becoming a target. Thus, it appears the days just spent on routine system monitoring without anyone analysing the passage of the Iranian ships, especially the Frigate, one of the Iranian Navy’s ‘showpiece’ warships, would be highly vulnerable to a strike. The Americans had made it clear by this time that they would render Iran’s force projection and operational capacities to nought. It seems that the SLN and the State had failed to link open-source intelligence (OSINT) and US press statements stated operational goals, with the targeting opportunity which was unfolding in the seas off Sri Lanka’s south, which they would have observed using our MDA tools.
The SLN does not have underwater detection or a sub-surface surveillance system in the southern part of the island (which is called the Laccadive Seas in the nautical charts and identified by the International Hydrographic Organisation’s publications) as consecutive Governments (and the incumbent) never have thought of investing in such, or to develop a seabed sensor network due to the fact that the seas are deeper in that region. However, even with such a system in place, the nature of the oceanographic parameters in the area makes it difficult to detect the underwater movement of submarines due to the mixing of low-salinity waters of the BoB and the high salinity waters of the Arabian Sea.
Sri Lanka’s MDA investment is at risk of decay and collapse, with the State not investing on modernising the existing high-frequency surface wave radar (HFSWR) installation and not investing on a planned additional new HFSWR station in Panama (to cover the south-eastern seaboard) which would have given a total coverage of the island’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). To make it clear; the SLN had made the plans and projected them to the State, but the State failed to prioritise providing funding for such critical maritime surveillance systems over the years.
Thus, what is at stake is the Island’s reputation of MDA system to analyse the probable and possible actions at sea. Having data alone is not enough in today’s context and today’s demand is for the analysis; making sense of the data collected through the MDA tools whether Government or commercial, that helps to see surface ships albeit submarines.
Clearly, the Navy’s operational command had ignored to analyse the return passage of the Iranian vessel (as it is a vessel of interest: VoI, under the circumstances) for a potential skirmish at sea. The Laccadive Seas are frequented by submarines operated by all global players - US, France, India, China, Pakistan and the United Kingdom, etc.) - as such is good training grounds with tropical waters (which test underwater sensors to its extremes due to variations of salinity and the temperature difference underwater), the main sea lane of shipping (where all ships indicate their own noise signature for sonar operators to identify and archive data for vessel identification), and most importantly to test each other out by trying to identify other submarines underwater.
As all submarines known to be operating within some 500-750 m water depth area, as available sources point out, to detect a submarine, one needs another submarine. The maritime surveillance aircraft that Sri Lanka got from the US or from Australia are capable only of detection at surface and none of these aircrafts are fitted with submarine detection instruments. To detect a submarine operating at depth from above on an extreme rare case of clear visibility most certainly is coincidence by luck than by choice. Thus, what is at stake is not investing on diversified systems to meet the three spectrums of the oceans: air, surface and underwater.
Does Sri Lanka’s institutional establishments such as the Colombo Information Fusion Centre (IFC Colombo) served the purpose of their very establishment? Hardly so, as all updates and comments become restrained probably because of the political reason, when the Fusion Centre is supposed to connect information for the good of the island’s credibility.
What is at stake: India
The torpedoing incident is a ‘slap on the face’ of India. The Indians having switched from the politically pro-Russian stance in the 1980’s to Pro-Americans by the 1990’s was boasting of their American alliances and this incident has embarrassed Indians. Thus, it is India who is at stake through this torpedo attack as they claim to be the ‘net-security provider’ to the Indian Ocean region.
No country is going to disclose their military intentions to another country and when Indian Premier Narendra Modi visited Israel, they may have not indicated any intentions. Similarly, the US may have not disclosed their submarine operations to India, nor the intention to attack, leaving India also ‘at-sea’ on the incident. Having invited the Iranian Navy to attend their International Fleet Review and the MILAN Naval exercise, the Indian Naval authorities could have made a more thorough threat assessment and done something about the Iranian vessel that is bound to make a return passage as belligerent party - When the ship came to Vizag, it was not a belligerent party but when returning it was a belligerent party.
India had trumpeted that they have established themselves to provide the net-security to the Indian Ocean region and having been taken by surprise of this American attack, may have to rethink on their stand. Already, as per several Indian-based media reports, the Indian submarines are having repeated technical issues, and apparently, they are not out at sea as they should, giving rise to the question of the Indian Naval prowess in balancing Naval competition in the Indian Ocean.
The absence of an official statement from the Indian authorities on the sinking of the Iranian Frigate and the media coverage of the deliberations of the Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi (from 5-7 March) demonstrate a clear absence of ‘bold and precise talks’ as used to be in Indian forums earlier. The torpedo, it appears, have sunk not only an Iranian ship but also the majority viewpoint of Indians on Americans. And it appears that Russia has gained grounds as a trusted partner.
In fact, the inability of Indian surveillance and intelligence systems to sense that something is about to happen is not a surprise. Similarly, this incident demonstrates that there is a lack of surveillance by Indian submarines in the vast Indian Ocean where the Indian media always talk about Chinese submarines.
The incident apparently has stirred a social media campaign against American attitudes towards India and against the Bharatiya Janata Party-led Government. It is a delicate balance, as India wishes to consolidate on her global role with the help of America’s global status where India thinks that the US needs India as a partner on equal terms. This is another aspect in today’s political environment where internal political stability could be affected through an incident in maritime incidents.
What is at stake: Iran
The Iranian Naval vessel was evidently not at ‘combat station’; meaning not ready for battle at sea. It is very hard to fathom why the Iranians just left their Naval vessels to be sitting ducks without air superiority or air cover.
IRIS Dena, when analysed through the American submarine periscope-recording, stood no chance and was a sitting duck for a submarine’s commanding officer who would don a feather in his command. The explosion surely will not give time for below-deck personnel to seek escape, and the interviewing of the survived personnel would indicate the ship-culture onboard. The vessel sinks within minutes and no matter how well the Naval personnel were trained.
What is at stake is the operational combat efficiency of the Iranian Navy; now of course reduced to a mere two-ship Navy as all their key Naval vessels were destroyed to US-Israel attacks. Having no air-superiority, these Iranian Naval assets were just easy targets for the combined air assaults.
What is at stake: China
China’s defence technology is at stake, and the euphoria that they enjoyed from the Indo-Pak conflict last year (in 2025), of the so-called technology superiority appears to have vanished with Iranian conflict. Despite Iranians domination of the use of drones, ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, the Iranian Air Force failed to protect the air space, and it is the Iranian Naval prowess that vanished with it. Having a plethora of small surface vessels for unconventional Naval warfare does not stand to achieve results if air dominance is lost. And the Chinese radars systems and jamming system it appears have been made ineffective against the technology driven combat action of the US.
What is at Stake: Indian Ocean
The Indian Ocean is at stake, with lapses in the overall regional security architecture being exposed through the torpedo attack. The regional security architecture of the Colombo Security Conclave is the collective body that the region established to protect regional interest and this community is now entrusted with taking tangible action for the benefit of the regional stakeholders. The smaller islands are at stake, more especially the islands closer to the Diego Garcia, just as Sri Lanka’s closeness to the main sea lane of communication. Monitoring the underwater domain is a challenge for these stakeholders but collectively or at least they should start investing on the same.
Conclusion
The Indian Ocean needs to be safeguarded for its own identity, and such needs broader statecraft and swift decision-making in today’s fast-paced geo-political landscape.
The saved Iranian Naval personnel are a key to the whole Middle-Eastern region for Sri Lanka, when these personnel return to their home country, they will be talking about their experience in Sri Lanka. These Naval personnel will be taking a much-publicised picture of Sri Lanka to the region. This, Sri Lanka should exploit to the hilt and a stand taken to exploit to highlight the island’s role in Indian Ocean affairs.
Sri Lanka should be pushing her national interest at this moment, to enhance the island’s credibility and stand. Surely with Iranian cooperation and in-house expertise, Sri Lanka can do much or otherwise at stake is our credibility as a regional maritime player.
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The views and opinions expressed in this column are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of this publication