The year 1975 was a turning point in the modern history of Sri Lanka. In 2025, after fifty years, it is critical for us to remember that 1975 was the birth year of the separatist insurgency in Sri Lanka, which indiscriminately used terrorism as a tool to reach its goal.
The Mayor of Jaffna, Mr Alfred Duraiappah, was gunned down on 27 July 1975, marking the first-ever political killing by the Tamil New Tigers (TNT), who were the predecessor of the LTTE. While remembering Alfred Duraiappah fifty years after his assassination, I only wish to shed some light on concepts related to Separatism, Insurgency and Terrorism, in a Sri Lankan perspective. This is necessary as the definitions of these terms are highly perception-based and therefore, blurred. As a country which is working hard to attain sustainable peace and reconciliation, our understanding of these concepts needs to be clear as our policies and strategies will be formulated accordingly. I would pen down my perception on Separatism, Insurgency and Terrorism while assigning due respect to all different insights on these concepts and keeping in mind the anon aphorism “One man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter” which cannot be left unquoted at this point.
Insurgency
Insurgency is a strategy which intends to change the political context. Amongst many, Bard O’Neill (2006) provided a pragmatic definition: “a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources (organisational expertise, propaganda, demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics”. It is accepted that guerrilla wars, internal wars, and revolutionary wars fall within the broad category of insurgency. In insurgencies, legitimacy and politics are two key aspects. An insurgency movement would consider the political system of a country as ‘illegitimate’. This perceived illegitimacy provides the insurgent group, the most important ingredient for it to flourish: the purpose. The purpose of an insurgency and its type has a very close relationship. A cardinal common feature of all types of insurgencies is their objective to alter the status quo. Reformist insurgencies have an objective of completely replacing the existing order in the entire State. Examples are ISIS and Al Qaeda in the Middle East and Afghanistan, Shining Path in Peru and Contras in Nicaragua.
The other major category are the Secessionists, who wish to break away from an existing State to create a new State or to join with another. The LTTE sought a new State to be created in Sri Lanka. An example for the insurgents who struggled to join another State is the Provisional Irish Republican Army. They wanted to merge Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland. Within these two main categories, there can be other sub-categories such as Anarchists, Egalitarians and Traditionalists etc. It is observed that most of the Reformist insurgents were driven by left- or right-wing political motives, while most of the Secessionists were driven by ethnic or cultural motives. The LTTE wanted to create a separate State based on Tamil nationalism, thus it can be categorised as a nationalist-secessionist entity. There is another distinct category of Commercialists. These insurgents maintain control over territories to run their illicit trade. They usually use their funds afterwards to further political goals. It is a known fact that Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is such a Non-State Armed Group (NSAG).
The LTTE: Evolution of an Insurgency
David Galula (1964), in his publication, ‘Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice’ highlights two insurgency patterns based on his experience. The Orthodox (Communist) pattern and the Bourgeois-Nationalist pattern. It is obvious that the contemporary insurgencies have evolved immensely since 1950-60 era and are chiefly founded on ideological causes based on ethnicity or religion. Nevertheless, aforementioned patterns are relevant when analysing contemporary non-class-based or non-anticolonial insurgencies. The Orthodox pattern has five steps. The first step is to create a political party. The LTTE (formerly TNT), skipped this step.
Nevertheless, as time went by, when the LTTE grew in strength, they identified the indispensable necessity to have an alternative mechanism to replace the existing governing system in their perceived new State. The second step is forming a United Front through seeking support and gathering like-minded groups who would share the same cause. Guerrilla Warfare is the third step in which the insurgency will transform into a violent phase. As in Vietnam, in this step, the insurgency is expected to grow in strength to consolidate power, will seek to control areas and replace the administration, as the LTTE tried to do. The Fourth Step, ‘Movement Warfare’, will be reached when the insurgency graduates to form a regular army. Here, the insurgent leadership seeks to launch conventional-style military operations. Ideally, the insurgent movement will not abandon the Guerrilla tactics. Mao Zedong stated; “the regular army and the guerrilla operations should fight as two complementary arms”. In modern warfare, this method falls within Hybrid Warfare in which regular and irregular tactics are used in fusion. The LTTE cleverly used this model against the State. Nevertheless, restraint is critical in this step.
Galula states, “if premature, the creation of a regular army, may lead to disaster”. I feel this is a critical mistake the LTTE committed. The fifth step of the orthodox pattern is the Annihilation Campaign, during which the final blow may be struck by the insurgents, fighting a regular campaign to defeat the State forces. The LTTE, in my opinion, often misjudged where they were in their evolution, which was another cardinal reason for its destruction.
The other insurgent design is the Bourgeois-Nationalist pattern. Bourgeois-Nationalists, according to scholars, are aiming to mask the class antagonism by promoting nationalism. Rajesh Tyagi (2009) states; “the LTTE, since its emergence, remained a bourgeois organisation”. The Bourgeois-Nationalists will launch their struggle based on a nationalist or religious agenda and can be designated as ideology-based insurgents, as in the case of the LTTE, ISIS, Al-Qaeda and such like groups. Galula opines that, this pattern is a shortcut because it replaces the first and the second steps of the Orthodox pattern with two quick initial steps of Blind Terrorism and Selective Terrorism to merge with the Guerrilla Warfare step thereafter. In this pattern, the insurgents seek widespread publicity in the initial stage through terrorism to gain power at a quick pace. It is observed that the LTTE – and its predecessor, TNT – practised this in their formative stages and continued to use terrorism, another reason for its defeat. We could also observe the LTTE following another method, the Military-Focused insurgency model, which was used in Cuba. Che Guevara advocates, “It’s not necessary to wait until the conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them”. He meant, if a small insurgent group initiate a struggle focusing on military victories, existing preconditions are sufficient for an insurgency to succeed. I feel the LTTE followed this strategy, misapprehending the psyche of the people and the reality on the ground. Despite its protracted nature, the LTTE insurrection could not create such a winning revolutionary condition.
Terrorism
What is the link between terrorism with insurgencies? The foremost similarity between insurgencies and terrorism is their political nature. Apart from that, it is accepted that terrorism is a tool or a method, within the broader strategy of insurgency. Terrorism is often used to compensate for the asymmetry of strength, to gain recognition, command easy attention, etc by some insurgent groups. Nevertheless, let us not forget that some scholars consider terrorism as a structural component rather than a mere tool. The lower-rung cadres who are indoctrinated into terrorism, may not understand the difference between the utility of terrorism as a tactic or an ideology where the insurgent leadership, has no other option than letting them to continue with acts of terrorism to maintain the optimum ‘morale’ of the rank and file, making terrorism a structural component, thus providing a group identity to the insurgency.
There is no universally accepted definition for terrorism. It has been defined by different actors based on their own perceptions and interests. This is a key reason why we should not identify Non-State Armed Group (NSAGs) merely as terrorist groups, as different international actors perceive them diversly. And, a terrorism-based categorisation may not cover the full length and breadth of such a group.
The UN Commissioner for Human Rights advocates to follow a model definition which states, “Terrorism involves the intimidation or coercion of populations or governments through the threat or perpetration of violence, causing death, serious injury or the taking of hostages”. Considering the above definition and well-documented LTTE acts, I feel there is no need for me to further justify that the LTTE is an organisation which practised terrorism. But of which kind?
The Wave Theory of Modern Terrorism, conceptualised by David C. Rapoport (2006) states; Anarchist (1880s to 1920s), Anticolonial (1920s to 1960s), New Left (1960s to 1990s) and Religious (1979 to 2020s) as the four waves of terrorism. Within these, the third wave gave birth to terror outfits with socialist and nationalist political motives. Thus, the LTTE could be categorised as an NSAG which belongs to the New Left Wave of modern terrorism.
Insurgents, Terrorists and Non-State Armed Groups
The phrase NSAG, while clearly drawing a line excluding them from statehood, recognises such groups as parties to conflicts who could be held accountable under International Law. The Additional Protocol II of the 1949 Geneva Convention, which covers non-international armed conflicts, defines NSAGs as; “dissident armed forces or other organised arms groups, who fight regular armed forces or against each other on the territory of one or several states”.
This indirectly implies, yes, it is not a State-party, but also not just a simple armed gang. This term gained prominence in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. NSAGs could be viewed as non-state parties that use violence to reach political ends. Here, the notion of legitimacy is important to be understood. Some NSAGs, who has been able to establish control over geographic areas and population within it, have gone to the extent of considering them as self-proclaimed quasi-state parties. In certain scenarios, we could see some sympathetic organisations and groups consider these proclamations as legitimate.
In a publication titled ‘The Legitimacy of States and Armed Non-State Actors’, Aoife McCullough (2015) mentions, “Non-state groups gain legitimacy through a range of strategies. Those include filling perceived gaps in State performance (e.g., Al-Shabaab in Somalia, and MILF in the Philippines); drawing on nationalist and religious ideological narratives to build a shared identity (e.g., LTTE in Sri Lanka, Al-Shabaab); and challenging existing States (e.g., LTTE, Provisional IRA)”.
Accordingly, we need to understand, there is a value for the concept of NSAGs in modern conflict studies and international legal apparatus. NSAGs constitute a category bounded by the International Humanitarian Law. Therefore, when defining NSAGs, it is wise to duly designate them, which serves two purposes. Firstly, to get them within the realm of the international legal system and, most importantly, to address the complexities surrounding an NSAG effectively. In that, clearly classifying NSAGs greatly aids in formulating effective and comprehensive counterstrategies. Such inclusive strategies will not only aid States during the conflict, but also in the pre and post-conflict stages. It is appropriate to conclude that, in general, all insurgent groups fall within the broader category of NSAGs. On the eve of the year 2025, reflecting on fifty years of chaos, suffering and an insurgency which held up the progress of our nation for that many years, we should aptly define the strategy of violent separatism and examine it within the accepted classifications and concepts. By doing so, we could continue to progress in the path of addressing the causes of the insurgency better. As Carl von Clausewitz implied in ‘On War’; we must accurately interpret a problem and never misjudge its nature while formulating solutions.
Col. Dissanayaka is a serving officer with the Sri Lanka Army
--------
The views and opinions expressed in this column are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of this publication