• From Anuradhapura’s batteries to Norochcholai’s coal controversy, SL now has enough warning, and options, to decide whether energy remains a recurring vulnerability or becomes a strategic national asset

President Anura Kumara Dissanayake inaugurated an important shift in Sri Lanka’s energy landscape in Anuradhapura on 18 September. A 10 MW / 40 MW hour (h) battery energy storage system (BESS) was connected to the national grid, allowing electricity generated during periods of lower demand or higher renewable output to be stored and released later. It forms part of a wider Storex programme of 13 installations totalling 130 MW / 520 MWh. On the same day, the President connected the five MW Diyajanani Floating Solar Plant on the Ibbankatuwa Reservoir in Dambulla. Official estimates suggest annual savings of around 2.5 million litres of diesel, 6,440 tonnes of carbon emissions and close to US $ three million in foreign exchange.

Their significance is strategic. Sri Lanka has spent years asking how many MW of renewable electricity it can install. The next question is whether that power can be stored, transmitted and delivered when needed. Storage converts intermittent generation into usable system value.

That matters, because energy is again at the centre of global conflict. The continuing US-Iran conflict, threats around the Strait of Hormuz, insecurity in the Red Sea, attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure and the Russia-Ukraine war have made ports, pipelines, tankers and refineries strategic assets. Brent crude remained above $ 100 a barrel on 18 September. For Sri Lanka, these are not distant developments. A missile fired thousands of kilometres away can eventually arrive here as a higher fuel bill, electricity cost, freight charge or food price.

American concerns over Chinese involvement

Our geography intensifies that exposure. US Ambassador Eric S Meyer’s Senate confirmation process highlighted Sri Lanka’s position beside critical Indian Ocean energy routes, while Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairperson James Elroy Risch separately raised American concerns over Chinese involvement in Sri Lanka’s critical infrastructure and energy sectors. China, meanwhile, accounted for more than 80 per cent of global battery-cell production in 2025, according to the International Energy Agency. India responded to this year’s (2026) Gulf disruption by securing roughly 60 days of oil supply from more than 40 suppliers. The lesson is simple: energy security is built through options, not dependence.

The domestic numbers explain the urgency. The Ceylon Electricity Board’s (CEB) statistical series shows recorded electricity generation rising from 13,090 GW  h in 2015 to 17,812 GWh in 2025, roughly 36% in a decade. In the first quarter of 2026, provisional National System Operator (NSO) figures recorded about 4,431 GWh: 1,213 GWh from major hydro, 1,362 GWh from coal and about 476 GWh in rooftop-solar purchases. The forecast requirement for July-September was around 4,866 GWh. These are competitiveness statistics.

That is why Norochcholai must sit at the centre of the debate. The 900 MW Lakvijaya Plant supplied about 27.3% of recorded electricity generation in 2025. When it performs efficiently, it anchors the system. When it does not, the country can be pushed towards more expensive alternatives.

The Auditor General’s special examination estimated around Rs 2.238 billion in additional coal-consumption losses across nine cargoes and separately identified about Rs 2.333 billion in recoverable penalties. The NSO later produced a provisional first-quarter estimate of approximately Rs 3.366 billion in additional costs associated with substandard coal. These figures measure different items and may overlap, so, they cannot responsibly be added and described as one proven loss. Yet, taken at face value, the headline figures reach Rs 7.937 billion in gross terms, equivalent in scale to roughly Rs 365 for every Sri Lankan based on the 2025 mid-year population. That demands answers.

These remain allegations

Former State Minister and incumbent Opposition Parliamentarian Denagama Vitharanage Chanaka Dinushan, appearing before the Presidential inquiry last August, alleged that tender delays benefited a supplier and questioned how laboratory evidence had been handled. Former Minister Patali Champika Ranawaka later alleged, citing system-control information, that two Lakvijaya units normally supplying around 270 MW each had been restricted to roughly 130 MW as coal stocks diminished. These remain allegations requiring formal findings, and not all oil-fired generation can be attributed to coal quality. But, where procurement, coal stocks or fuel quality reduce output from a 900 MW national asset, the economic consequences are real. The inquiry findings should therefore be published, valid penalties recovered, coal-quality testing disclosed and unit performance made transparent.

Sri Lanka must simultaneously accelerate the alternative. The CEB recorded around 1,935 MW of rooftop solar capacity in 2025. Rooftop exports and other solar generation delivered just over 2,000 GWh to the grid, excluding electricity consumed behind the meter. The NSO has also tendered 250 MW / 1,000 MWh of standalone batteries and another 150 MW / 600 MWh alongside existing solar plants. Together, those programmes represent 400 MW and 1,600 MWh of nominal storage.

India gives this transition a regional dimension. The 120 MW Sampur solar project is being developed through a 50:50 NTPC-CEB joint venture. President Dissanayake and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Damodardas Modi jointly broke ground for its first 50 MW phase during Modi’s April 2025 visit, with an agreed tariff of about US Cents 5.97 per unit. At full capacity, an illustrative 20% capacity factor would produce roughly 210 GWh annually, around 1.2% of Sri Lanka’s 2025 recorded generation. Yet, energy performance certificate selection and related transmission work have moved more slowly than the political momentum suggested. India has supplied investment, technical capability and high-level commitment; implementation now depends on translating those agreements into generation and transmission infrastructure.

The India-SL high-voltage direct current interconnection

The larger prize is the proposed India-Sri Lanka high-voltage direct current interconnection. Two-way electricity trade could allow exports when Sri Lanka has surplus renewable generation. That matters particularly to the North and North-West, where Mannar, Pooneryn and surrounding areas possess significant wind and solar potential. With storage and transmission, these regions could become energy-producing economic corridors. Bhutan has demonstrated how electricity exports to India can generate national revenue, although its hydropower is seasonally constrained. Sri Lanka’s combination of hydro, solar and wind offers a different possibility: turning part of what we currently spend foreign exchange importing into something that we can eventually earn foreign exchange exporting. India’s proximity and vast electricity market make it a natural counterpart to such an ambition.

Russia should be considered within the same diversified framework. Sri Lanka confirmed fuel negotiations with Russia and China earlier this year, with payment arrangements on the Russian side remaining unresolved. Russian interlocutors have also raised concerns about outstanding obligations said to approach $ 250 million. Unresolved energy liabilities become a burden on the country’s credibility, and Sri Lanka should move towards the reconciliation of legitimate dues and a workable payment arrangement rather than allowing them to remain unresolved. Equally, opening procurement discussions or placing supply expectations with Russian partners and subsequently sourcing elsewhere without clear commercial closure is not a sustainable practice; reliable energy partnerships require consistency, transparency and respect for agreed commitments.

Large and small hydro supplied around 43.4% of Sri Lanka’s recorded electricity in 2025. Nuwara Eliya and surrounding catchments have powered the country for generations, communities living around those assets should see a development dividend. Reliable feeders, fibre connectivity, cold storage, agricultural processing, technical training and selected digital services could broaden an economy still heavily dependent on plantation and agrarian work.

That becomes more urgent as water grows less predictable. The World Meteorological Organisation says that the current Super El Niño is firmly established, is expected to become very strong and has a near 100% probability of persisting through February of next year (2027). That does not mean uniform drought across Sri Lanka, it makes reservoir management, catchment protection, dry-weather reserves and generation diversification economic priorities.

The way forward: expand solar where the grid can absorb it; build storage where it reduces curtailment and expensive peak generation; publish Sampur milestones; disclose Norochcholai performance and coal-quality data; turn Trincomalee into usable strategic storage; advance the India interconnector; diversify fuel procurement; and study nuclear power methodically rather than ideologically.

Anuradhapura marks a welcome movement from energy planning into actual grid infrastructure. Sri Lanka’s real test lies between Anuradhapura and Norochcholai, Sampur and Trincomalee, the Central Highlands and the electricity meter.

Sri Lanka cannot afford another energy crisis and then call it misfortune. We already know where the risks lie, which projects are delayed and which institutions must do better. If procurement failures are tolerated, strategic assets are mismanaged and reform remains trapped in announcements, then the next crisis will not be entirely imported from abroad; part of it will be made here at home. Energy security is not measured at an inauguration. It is measured at the factory floor, at the fuel pump, at the electricity meter and, finally, at the kitchen table. The real test of policy: when a Sri Lankan reaches for the switch, the light should come on and the bill should not push the family back into darkness.

The writer is a legal professional, the Vice President of International Affairs and Communications of the Democratic People’s Front, Tamil Progressive Alliance, and the Co-Chair of The Millennium Project’s Sri Lanka Node

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The views and opinions expressed in this column are those of the writer, and do not necessarily reflect those of this publication