In his tract on the ethnic conflict, written on the eve of the second insurrection, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) Founder Rohana Wijeweera framed Indian intervention in Sri Lanka as part of a wider historical process, underscoring the island’s long history of occupation by foreign forces. 

Neither Wijeweera nor the top brass of the party advocated or justified violence against the Sri Lankan Tamil community, even those who were wrongly viewed as ‘fifth columns.’ Yet in making such observations, Wijeweera trivialised both the structural causes of the civil war and the geopolitics of Indian intervention in the region.

India-SL relations: A mixed bag

The JVP is currently the dominant party in the National People’s Power (NPP) alliance, which less than a fortnight ago hosted Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, bestowed on him an award described as the ‘highest honour’ reserved for foreign leaders, took him around Colombo and then Anuradhapura, and signed around, if not more than, six agreements, one of them to do with defence and another on power and energy. 

(On the day of his arrival, Sri Lankan Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya was in Paris, participating in a conference on the preservation of the ‘Sacred City of Anuradhapura’).  

The visit transpired against the backdrop of rising global tensions, and if the press releases are right, the JVP appears to have turned pragmatist. Certainly, the irony of an Indian Prime Minister being taken to Anuradhapura by the NPP should not be lost sight of; in his tract, Wijeweera traced the origins of Indian intervention in the country to the invasion of the Anuradhapura Kingdom in the 11th century AD.

For Sri Lanka, India remains a mixed bag. Some advocate closer integration, economic and even physical, others caution against it, and still others – including the JVP of 30 years ago and countless nationalist outfits today – perceive it as an imperialist power. As Krishantha Cooray has put it in a recent op-ed, while India-Sri Lanka relations have been described as one of “irreversible excellence,” under certain administrations “they have been neither irreversible nor excellent”.

Not surprisingly, what gets lost in the discussion are the nuances and the complexities. As Shelton Kodikara has correctly pointed out, since independence Sri Lanka-India relations have never followed a predictable trajectory. 

One could say this is inevitable, given Sri Lanka’s position in the Indian Ocean and the ruptures in foreign policy that such geographic placements bring with them. However, despite this unpredictability, certain patterns can be discerned – long-standing issues, like the Katchatheevu dispute and the position of the Indian Tamil population – which have conditioned and determined the trajectory of bilateral ties, and continue to do so.

One need not be a pessimist, or even a cynic, to claim that these disputes may never get resolved. If the recent resolution on Katchatheevu by the Tamil Nadu Government should tell us anything, it is that bilateral wrangles never go away. (This explains why SAARC has never fulfilled the historical role it was meant to play).  

That is not to say that geography conditions everything and that nothing will change. Of course, things have changed, somewhat fundamentally; the world order is shifting every day, the patterns of trade are being ruptured every hour, stock markets have come down, and countries are struggling to stay afloat and band together. 

India and Sri Lanka will sooner or later have to come to terms with each other. The question is, given that we have very little time and weight to negotiate for better terms – for instance, with the US over the tariffs – what course can we chart?

Fear vs. pragmatism

Integration is often cited as a way forward. But facilitating closer integration without considering its domestic implications would be difficult. India itself views integration and free trade as a sine qua non of sorts for bilateral ties; at forums and discussions, and in diplomatic circles, it is invoked time and time again. 

However, the disparities in resources and skills between the two countries, the perceptions of such agreements by locals, and the bad press that trade agreements have received at the hands of nationalist and chauvinist elements will make this a difficult if not rocky road. 

It has not helped that the Indian Government itself views free trade agreements and initiatives for integration as a means to a higher geopolitical end. What that end is we do not know, but for nationalists in Sri Lanka, it can only mean near-total capitulation to Indian political interests.

While this may not be so in reality, the fact that after close to 50 years, Sri Lankan nationalist parties and movements – just like the JVP decades ago – can disseminate narratives of Indian domination, shows how successful such narratives have been and how New Delhi has failed to counter them. 

That India has neglected to address in any meaningful, constructive way the bilateral wrangles that have defined its ties with its tiny neighbour – including Katchatheevu – has not helped at all. If India and Sri Lanka are to move forward sensibly, both sides must acknowledge these issues and, even if they cannot be resolved completely, at least agree to disagree and leave it at that.

Time is not on our side. As the world gets ready for US President Donald Trump’s tariffs, it waits with bated breath to see whether the international liberal order which, in the eyes of its advocates, delivered prosperity for all for more than half a century will crumble. 

It is not difficult to bring down the status quo. But once brought down, it will be difficult to restore it to what it once was. The next few months are crucial, and if India and Sri Lanka are to avoid the aftereffects of Trump’s actions, these two countries should define the way forward. 

The JVP is perhaps the best example we have for how a movement or party that saw India negatively can turn around and embrace a politics of pragmatism. When charting our way forward, there should certainly be safeguards in place, especially over security. But there should also be a gradual thawing of the fears that have, for too long, defined these ties.

(The writer is the Chief International Relations Analyst at Factum, an Asia-Pacific-focused foreign policy think tank based in Colombo and accessible via www.factum.lk. He can be reached at uditha@factum.lk)