• SL’s indecision and lack of competencies lead to a weak geopolitical posture

Over the last four months, I have had the opportunity to engage in forums in India and China that discussed the Indian Ocean Region. These engagements of an academic nature were attended by policymakers and PhD students from both countries, and this article is based on observations made by me, based on the discussions and views expressed at the forums.

What is striking is the view held by both India and China on Sri Lanka, especially on the way Colombo’s political leadership thinks about bilateral relations. India thinks that Sri Lanka is not making certain decisions because of China, and China thinks Sri Lanka is not making certain decisions because of India. 

Indian youth and some academics are of the view that Sri Lanka has ‘ceded’ its ‘strategic autonomy’ to China, and Chinese academics think that Sri Lanka has ‘ceded’ its ‘strategic autonomy’ to India.  

Whilst the two countries view us through these perspectives, it is the writer’s opinion that Sri Lanka is avoiding making decisions not because of either, but because of the inherent lack of decision-making ability and inefficient strategic thinking to fit present and future geo-strategic postures.

Colombo’s indecision is prompting both China and India to interpret the situation from their perspective, and it is affecting the regional neighbourhood, statecraft, and governance. The region is reading Colombo’s intentions through the Government’s media statements since there is a lack of published policy documents, white papers, or even statements. 

In the absence of coherent policies, naturally, what the President, senior ministers, and the Government state remains the basis for assumptions for the foreign governments, confirmed by actions in governance. These are compounded by social media, as mainstream media restricts expression to a few they associate with, opening wider and more accessible coverage to the global citizen, and where the number of views and comments are the drivers, rather than the accuracy of the information disseminated. 

Divergent perspectives 

About two years ago, I had the opportunity to be part of a discussion with a one-time Deputy National Security Adviser (NSA) of India, now retired, at an academic forum, and what he narrated summarised the Indian concerns even at that time. The retired Deputy NSA said that India had changed and surged ahead significantly, whereas Sri Lanka had not. 

He said there was a ‘gap’ in where India and Sri Lanka stood, where India did not see Sri Lankan political leadership doing anything to fill the gap. What he meant by filling the gap was not in relation to economic terms or means of development, but policies and statecraft. 

The Deputy NSA concluded his remarks by saying that whether Sri Lanka liked it or not, India would have to involve itself. This statement demonstrated the lack of faith in the Sri Lankan Government by New Delhi, as mixed signals are interpreted from the Indian point of view and are naturally deemed detrimental to India’s interests.

At the Chinese engagement, the Chinese scholar highlighted how Sri Lanka engaged China in the historic Rubber-Rice Pact in 1952 despite US Vice President Richard Nixon visiting Colombo in 1953 to convey the Americans’ message not to execute the pact with China. 

He related this to the present-day terminology of ‘strategic sovereignty,’ where Sri Lankan political leadership was bold enough to take decisions based on our national interests, rather than on political interests. In fact, the Rubber-Rice Pact remains a case study even today in engaging with national interests at the forefront, forged as it was in a Cold War-era geopolitical environment that was very different from today, and yet one that remains similar in geopolitical circumstances. 

Whilst India expects Sri Lanka to do its ‘homework’ to meet India’s strategic concerns in the neighbourhood, the country’s relationship with Sri Lanka stands at an all-time high compared to the other neighbours in the West, North, and East, which are sour and bitter. Meanwhile, China also expects Sri Lanka to stand on its feet when it comes to strategic autonomy and decision-making. 

Another striking feature that I observed during these engagements in India and China was in relation to how the youth and academia in both countries view Sri Lanka, where Indian academics and youth perceive that Sri Lanka has ceded its strategic autonomy to China by ‘handing over’ Hambantota, and in China the youth perceives that Sri Lanka is losing its strategic autonomy to India because of increasing Indian influence in the island nation’s affairs.

Status of the Global South 

At the same time, the interactions in India and China disclosed the status of the so-called Global South in today’s context. US President Donald Trump’s ‘Make America Great Again’ slogan, divisions in the Western world, and the defunct nature of global instruments like the United Nations demonstrate today the lack of leadership for the Global South. 

Whilst many initiatives are in motion for de-dollarisation, there appears to be a lack of leadership of emerging powers, especially India. The forums discussed the status of the Indian Ocean Region should India-China relations stand to give leadership to the Global South and how much would have been achieved in economic and political frontage. However, India’s ambition to rise to global leadership has left it blinded to what the country could better gain by collaborative partnership in leadership for the Global South than in its self-centred ambition to rise to the top. 

At the same time, South Asia, despite boasting the world’s highest population and consumer market in addition to fast-growing economies, is affected by the age-old India-Pakistan rivalry. Ironically, both countries do not see the opportunities presented under the prevailing circumstances had both countries improved their political relationships. 

Sour relationships affect not only these two countries but the entire South Asia region, and the real beneficiaries of these divisions are the West and the US. South Asia and the entire Indian Ocean Region, in fact, would have been a different landscape had these three countries – India, China, and Pakistan – resolved their differences and worked towards leading the Global South.

For India, this is a matter of ‘crossing the Rubicon’ due to the nationalist euphoria it has created through the media and national sentiments against Pakistan. However, the changing global order dictates that such drastic decisions be taken in order to achieve greater strategic aspirations for the betterment of oneself and the globe. 

India is heavily dependent on affiliation with the US to rise in its ambitions, but for the US, India is just another tool – an important one it cannot dispense with, but not relevant in the US’s geostrategic initiatives. Whilst India is hanging on to American affiliation, China, on the other hand, stands on its own as its economic and military influence has better coverage than the Indians’.

Engaging the Global South 

In today’s geostrategic posture, China and India stand to lead the Global South, and there is a second tier of global players like Pakistan, Brazil, South Africa, and perhaps Japan to complement efforts for the global common good. This is especially important for the Indian and Pacific Oceans. 

In today’s context, Iran has demonstrated resilience in standing against the combined efforts of the US, Israel, and their regional and extra-regional partners. The ongoing crisis in the Middle East demonstrates the declining world order in a highly divided world. 

In analysing conflicts, the Ukrainian and Gaza conflicts have been trigger points for a divided world and defunct global instruments such as the United Nations, for the Indian Ocean Region, even more than for Ukraine. Clearly, the Western Hemisphere of President Trump is articulated in his strategic thoughts, making the division of the global players more visible and apparent.

However, giving leadership to the Global South is a risky venture and one that is likely to face the wrath of the US. Whilst India surely would not wish to do this, China, it appears, is poised to provide such leadership. Americans will surely not want India to side with China, given the enormous potential should these two nations merge. 

Would lesser players like Sri Lanka step forward to help bridge these two nations for the betterment of the Indian Ocean Region? These are the diplomatic skills this island nation has lacked over years of partisan politics against national interests. This is where the Rubber-Rice Pact stands as a case study to demonstrate the effect when the island nation took decisions based on national interest within a very different political culture. 

The present geopolitical environment has given lesser players a greater opportunity to engage the region and global instruments by voicing their own national interests and taking steps to go the extra mile, but no political master wants to tread that extra mile. And there are reasons for this, as internal political circumstances are not stable to attempt that extra mile. 

This was demonstrated during the Indian Ocean Conference in Mauritius, which took place from 10 to 12 April, when Sri Lanka was absent from the forum because of the No-Confidence Motion in Parliament on 10 April. And in the end, Sri Lanka lost an opportunity to engage the region, since despite winning the vote in Parliament, the accused resigned soon after due to mounting pressure, whereas the Indian Ocean Conference was left unattended, leaving Sri Lanka’s voice unheard in an important regional forum. Shame, indeed.  

In conclusion, Sri Lankan decision-makers need to wake up to current global trends and address how others view the nation by redrafting engagement schedules. At the core lies the need for making swift decisions. It should be noted that when national interests are placed at the forefront, it is very easy to make decisions, whereas when political interests are placed at the forefront, decision-making becomes very difficult. 

In relation to providing leadership to the Global South, although we may not wish to exercise this power, we can surely influence both leading and secondary players to work on cooperating in order to enable better prospects for the Indian Ocean Region.         

(The writer is the former Chief Hydrographer/Chief of Staff of the Sri Lanka Navy, who post-retirement writes on the maritime environment and analyses regional developments in maritime and geostrategic scope. He remains an International Consultant for undersea cables and maritime intelligence)

(The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the official position of this publication)