The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that Sri Lanka and India entered into in Colombo yesterday (5), witnessed by Indian Premier Narendra Modi and President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, is expected to build on the existing defence partnership between the Indian Ocean neighbours, according to Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri.
“Today both sides concluded an MOU on defence cooperation, providing further impetus to the existing defence partnership, signifying their shared commitment to regional security and stability,” Misri said, addressing the media last afternoon.
It is learnt that both nations are also planning to improve the trilateral maritime security architecture in the form of the Indo-Maldives-Sri Lanka Colombo Security Conclave (CSC), which has grown in members recently. Modi affirmed this during his address at the Presidential Secretariat last morning.
Origins
The origins for the agreement can be traced back to the ‘Defence Dialogue’ held in 2023, where India and Sri Lanka had in principle agreed to strengthen bilateral defence relations in a structured manner. This is due to the fact that both nations have multiple defence and security agreements, practices, and exchanges, which are governed by multiple documents and through different channels.
The desire to reach an agreement on cooperation was also echoed in the joint declaration issued by Prime Minister Modi and President Dissanayake on 16 December 2024, following Dissanayake’s maiden foreign visit to New Delhi after being elected.
The joint declaration of December 2024 stated: “As a trusted and reliable partner, India conveyed its continued commitment to working closely with Sri Lanka in advancing its defence and maritime security needs and extending necessary assistance towards augmenting its capabilities to address its maritime challenges… In this context, they agreed to explore the possibility of concluding a framework Agreement on Defence Cooperation…”
India has been gradually building up linkages and improving cooperation to ensure security and stability and that its interests are met in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) over the last decade. More recently, the nation has expressed concern to Sri Lanka about allowing Chinese Marine Scientific Research (MSR) vessels to carry out surveys in Sri Lankan waters and call at its ports.
Meanwhile, both Sri Lanka and India have been working together and cooperating with regional and extra-regional nations on combating common challenges such as piracy, trafficking, cyber threats, extremism, and terrorism in the region.
Responding to a question from the media, Misri said: “The President of Sri Lanka, both during his visit to New Delhi and today, has mentioned clearly that Sri Lankan territory will not be allowed to be used in any manner inimical to India’s interest. In fact, if I recall correctly, during discussions today, he (Dissanayake) said that neither Sri Lanka’s land nor its oceans will be allowed to be used in a manner inimical to India’s security.”
The mention of Sri Lankan oceans as stated by Misri is indicative that India’s concerns lie primarily in the maritime domain and likely involve the increased Chinese presence in the region.
With increased presence of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, Chinese State-owned MSRs and long-distance fishing fleets (which have been linked to the Chinese maritime militia), and the rise of non-state actors such as pirates and terrorist groups in the vast expanse of the IOR, India has been working to expand its naval fleet, reach, surveillance, and strike capabilities while building a regional security architecture to counter the Chinese and other actors. Where Sri Lanka fits in all of this is a policy decision that Sri Lanka needs to address diligently and with bipartisan support within the Legislature.
Lack of clarity and confusion
News of a ‘Defence Agreement’ between both countries, announced by New Delhi in the lead-up to PM Modi’s visit, created a stir in Colombo due to the lack of transparency on the matter, drawing criticism within and outside Parliament.
The National People’s Power (NPP) Government, which rode a wave of popular support to power on the promise of better transparency and accountability in governance, was questioned about the agreement and its mute response over the last week elevated public concerns about its nature, fuelled by historic experiences. The anxiety about the agreement and what it entailed grew with the Sri Lankan Government’s Cabinet Spokesmen alluding that the State would explain the agreement after it was signed and the visit of the Indian Premier had ended.
Ministry of Defence Secretary Air Vice Marshal (Retd) Sampath Thuyacontha told The Sunday Morning that the MOU had been “meticulously scrutinised,” had the approval of the Cabinet of Ministers, and was in accordance with domestic laws and national policies.
“The India-Sri Lanka Defence partnership has been and continues to be an invaluable asset for Sri Lanka. During the ‘Defence Dialogue’ held in 2023, both sides agreed to further strengthen defence relations through a formal MOU on Defence Cooperation with a view to continuing the defence partnership and engagements more efficiently and in a structured manner.
“The MOU was meticulously scrutinised and reviewed, and relevant negotiations were conducted in terms of circular instructions issued by the Secretary to the President in January this year in respect of interactions with foreign governments. Approval of the Cabinet of Ministers was duly obtained prior to signature. Any cooperation activities undertaken under this MOU will be in accordance with international best practices and will not conflict with domestic laws and national policies of either Sri Lanka or India.
“Furthermore, when carrying out cooperation activities under this MOU, the parties commit themselves to respect the national and military laws and regulations of the parties and the relevant principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, which include sovereign equality of states, territorial integrity and inviolability, and non-intervention in the internal affairs of the parties,” Thuyacontha explained.
He added: “Through the sound base for defence relations provided through the signing of this MOU, the exchange of tri-service officers, trainings, and staff talks between the forces; exchange of information and cooperation in the defence industry and in the field of defence technology; and research with measures to ensure relevant intellectual property rights will be carried out in a professional manner.
“The MOU will be in force for five years, with the rights reserved for the parties to terminate the same with three months’ advance notice, and continuation for three years onwards thereafter, subject to review of progress and termination, if so inclined, with similar prior notice.”
Misri stated: “The MOU is in itself an umbrella framework document that will make existing defence cooperation initiatives more structured. High-level visits between the countries will increase. More joint exercises will happen, along with capacity building in various areas, exchanges, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) activities, and more port calls by naval units of both countries, and defence industry coordination between both sides will also be explored.”
Pathfinder Foundation Chairman Bernard Goonetilleke, responding to a question posed by The Sunday Morning about whether there should have been more clarity on the agreement prior to it being signed, opined: “Yes. If more clarity had been provided, space for reaching hypothetical conclusions would have been less. On the other hand, details of defence cooperation are not usually divulged to the public for security reasons.”
Former Commandant of the National Defence College (NDC) Major General (Retd) Amal Karunasekara, responding to a question, stated that a defence agreement with India which provided mutual benefits was timely and worthwhile.
“While a few defence agreements already exist between India and Sri Lanka, the evolving nature of global threats – characterised by blurred boundaries and overlapping domains – calls for a deeper, more comprehensive framework. In today’s context, it is timely and worthwhile to establish robust bilateral defence agreements that can enhance defence capabilities and provide mutual benefits,” he said.
Maj. Gen. Karunasekara added: “China is steadily asserting itself as a dominant maritime power and is poised to surpass even the US in certain aspects. Its increasing presence in the South China Sea and potential expansion into the Indian Ocean raises significant strategic concerns.
“In response, the US has had to rely on regional allies such as Japan, South Korea, and India to maintain a balance of power. From India’s perspective, allowing China to dominate the Indian Ocean would pose a serious threat to its strategic autonomy and long-term interests.
“Given this backdrop, it is logical for India to seek a stronger defence partnership with Sri Lanka. As long as the proposed agreement is carefully examined and ensures mutual benefit, there should be little objection to moving forward. However, transparency is essential.
“The current Sri Lankan Government campaigned on principles of openness and accountability, and any deviation from that, especially regarding critical agreements, would be concerning. Without proper scrutiny and debate, Sri Lanka risks entering into commitments that may be difficult to undo later.”
He added that Sri Lanka must approach such agreements with foresight, ensuring its sovereignty, national interest, and long-term stability were not compromised.
Timing
When asked about why India was keen to pursue a defence cooperation agreement at this stage, Indian thinktank Observer Research Foundation (ORF) Associate Fellow Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, speaking to The Sunday Morning, said: “As India grows, so will its interests and ambitions. In fact, its vision is now given a new avatar from ‘Sagar’ (ocean) to ‘Mahasagar’ (greater ocean). The Defence Cooperation Agreement could be attributed to this fact.
“Over the last few years, India has been expanding defence and security cooperation with Sri Lanka, besides the usual military training. The institutionalisation of the CSC and Information Fusion Centre IOR (IFC-IOR) is an example of this. Furthermore, India has helped Sri Lanka with the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC), a Dornier aircraft, and also a floating dock facility, since the crisis began. This shows India’s interests in enhancing defence cooperation with its neighbours.”
He also opined that while concerns about China in the Indian Ocean remained a significant concern for India, both countries had more complex challenges linked to maritime crime, trafficking of drugs and arms, and the potential threats posed by extremism.
Joint exercises, influence, and kit
India and Sri Lanka would likely seek to build on a long-established bilateral military exercise through the new MOU, a senior military official close to the matter opined, adding that India may also be concerned about increased security cooperation with other countries, such as Japan, Australia, and the US. All three foreign countries had improved their security partnership with Sri Lanka, and aided Sri Lanka by helping the island, especially its Navy and Air Force, build capacity and improve, the official who wished to remain unnamed said.
At present, the Indian and Sri Lankan Armies conduct an annual exercise code named ‘Mitra Shakti’. The Indian and Sri Lankan Navies conduct the Sri Lanka-India Naval Exercise (SLINEX) on an annual basis, where more recently the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) has also partnered with them to improve air-naval synergy. The Sri Lanka Navy and Coast Guard also have other regular bilateral exercises and exchanges.
The Indian Air Force and SLAF have not had a formalised joint training exercise thus far, even though on Indian invitation, the SLAF in mid-2024 dispatched a Beechcraft surveillance aircraft to join ‘Exercise Tarang Shakti,’ which was held at Sulur Air Force Station, Tamil Nadu. While India has joined Sri Lanka’s joint field exercise ‘Cormorant Strike’ in the past, it has been as an observer.
Sri Lanka has also obtained a sizeable cross section of military systems from India, which includes four Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs), much of the island’s small air defence system and related weapons, aircraft like the Dornier maritime patrol aircraft, etc.
A large segment of the armed forces’ land logistics fleet is from Indian automotive suppliers. There are also a number of communication systems and other technical systems that have been provided by India which are in service with Sri Lankan armed forces.
It is reliably learnt that in the early 2020s, India had offered Sri Lanka a Line of Credit to upgrade existing Indian kit, especially the now-obsolete Indra air surveillance radar systems and the Bofors 40 mm AAA gun systems. However, the Sri Lankan Government had not been keen to take on more debt at the time.
India also supports Sri Lanka by providing spare parts for aircraft like the An-32 transport aircraft. It is learnt that a stock of air defence missiles sourced from India was part of the national air defence network and is now unfit for service due to shelf-life ending.
During the previous Government’s period, there was an active dialogue between Colombo and New Delhi on establishing a small arms ammunition plant in Sri Lanka, primarily aimed at export but to also cater to local demand for the 7.62x39 mm M43 and 9x19 mm Parabellum ammunition – a staple for the Sri Lanka infantry.
Sri Lanka, which recently concluded a robust defence review in the form of ‘Defence Review 2030,’ has been struggling over the last decade to modernise and restructure its armed forces. With India’s defence industry now taking off, with both State and private entities competing for massive domestic and foreign orders, it remains to be seen whether the Government will be able utilise such defence cooperation agreements to inject much-needed new technology that is suitable and necessary for modernising the Sri Lankan armed forces.
While the ‘Defence Review 2030’ has been completed, its current status and whether it will be used by the present administration to carry out the planned defence reforms remains uncertain.