The post-independence story of Ceylon, later Sri Lanka, has any number of violent bookmarks that are results of both Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism – deadly pogroms, violent separatism, brutal terrorism, communist insurrections, ultra-nationalist uprisings, and mass protests driven by economic inequality and worker unions. 

The year 1956 was a particularly destructive year for Sri Lanka. In a recent interview, constitutional expert Dr. Asanga Welikala reminds us that, despite the violence and destruction of 1956, “this was the first ever change of government, less than 10 years after independence, by peaceful electoral means; not until 1977 in India did that happen anywhere in the former British Empire… we were displaying a massive democratic maturity as early as 1956.”

The Ceylon National Congress (CNC) formed by Ceylonese elites in 1919 was very much Sri Lanka’s original ‘nationalist’ party. In a 2012 article that studied Sri Lanka’s post-conflict development challenges, Prema-chandra Athukorala and Sisira Jayasuriya note that the CNC was “taking a cue from the nationalist movement in India,” aiming to connect Ceylon towards the trend of decolonisation and devolution already underway in the wider British Empire. 

Athukorala et al note that “ethnic divisions were secondary and the Sri Lankan Tamil elite played a central role in the CNC, collaborating closely with Sinhalese and other ethnic elites in the political discourse with the colonial administration”.

Dr. Welikala also notes that Sri Lankan elites were highly anglicised and multi-ethnic, giving the CNC a diverse and representative character from a communal perspective. As the colonial administration began installing a process for devolving power, it brought about a shift towards territorial representation as opposed to communal representation and then towards universal franchise, which Sri Lanka gained in 1931. 

Athukorala et al summarise that “the Sinhalese elite, recognising the power of their majority position, began to exploit ethnic divisions by appealing to the hitherto dormant Sinhala nationalism” while the Tamil elite were “concerned about the likely architecture of the post-colonial independent state with growing fears that British rule would be replaced by Sinhalese rule”. 

The deracinated ‘brown sahib’

This revealed two sets of social dynamics that played a crucial role in Ceylon’s post-independence history of conflict. First, the Ceylonese Tamil elites (distinct from the ‘upcountry’ or Indian Tamil population) envisioned themselves as being natural heirs to central positions within the fledgling nation’s new hierarchy; roles they had grown accustomed to within the CNC. 

Second, the nationalism of the Sinhala-Buddhist variety, which had become a major force in colonial Ceylon, was ignored by the anglicised and Westernised Sinhalese leadership; Dr. Welikala notes that the Sinhala elites were looked upon as “terrible, deracinated English speaking ‘brown sahib’ elites who were out of touch”. D.S. Senanayake himself “did not want to have anything to do with the pirivena monks… and the Buddha rajya”.

Athukorala et al note that the concerns of Tamil elites “culminated in the quest for a ‘50-50’ formula for representation in the legislature by G.G. Ponnambalam, the leader of the Tamil Congress. To many Sinhalese, this became ‘a symbol of the unreasonable ambition of that minority’ (Wriggins 2011). The Muslim elite, in contrast, opted to work with the Sinhalese elite” (Shastri 1997).

The Ceylonese Tamil and Sinhalese elites thus developed a cocktail of insecurity and distrust toward each other; flowing out of imbalances from the colonial period and the rising tide of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism against the context of British imperial decolonisation. 

There was, however, another crucial dynamic that would become central to Sri Lanka’s post-colonial history: the influence of newly independent India’s own calculations with regard to rising Tamil nationalism in South India, itself a reaction to Gandhi’s efforts to encourage the use of Hindi as a link language for India, replacing English. 

Indian influence in Sri Lankan politics and constitutional evolution is striking in that it still defines much of the national debate by way of the 13th Amendment and the devolution of power. 

This article seeks to focus on the nature of Indian influence in Sri Lanka’s political history by way of its early interventions in Sri Lankan Tamil separatism to illustrate the need for an internal renegotiation of a structure of devolution that is overtly free from Indian influence – a vital project for the legitimacy of any future power sharing agreement in the eyes of all Sri Lankans.

Indian duress

A 1991 research paper by Roshani M. Gunewardene published in the North Carolina Journal of International Law considers the legality of the Indo-Lanka Accord, from which the 13th Amendment originated, according to the norms of international law; specifically that Sri Lanka’s invitation of the Indian military for the peacekeeping mission in the Northern and Eastern Provinces was “an example of an intervention resulting from a covertly orchestrated invitation coerced by India”. 

While the question of whether or not the invitation of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka was illegal under international law is considered deeply, Gunewardene also provides ample evidence for the charge of implicit and explicit Indian duress. 

Firstly, that Sri Lankan Tamil separatists made contact with sympathetic political groups in Tamil Nadu as early as the late 1970s has been well established. Prof. Rohan Gunaratna noted early LTTE links with Tamil Nadu parties, including Veeramani’s Dravidar Kazhagam (DK) and Nedumaran’s Kamaraj Congress (KC) amongst others. 

Gunaratna states: “Although Tamil insurgents had established a few training camps in Tamil Nadu in 1982, there was no official assistance from the Central Government of India prior to August 1983.”

On an October 2022 episode of Indian variety podcast ‘The Ranveer Show,’ a former member of India’s elite Special Forces Unit Major Abhay Narayan Sapru recalls the ferocity of fighting during the IPKF’s battles with the LTTE and the effectiveness of their guerrilla tactics. 

Major Sapru recalls how IPKF soldiers would question India’s motivations for deployment in Sri Lanka and while it was ostensibly to support Sri Lankan forces, Indian assistance for the LTTE was an open secret in New Delhi and beyond. Major Sapru recalled finding receipts from a clinic in Rameswaram, India among the items confiscated from an LTTE base in the north; a clinic where wounded LTTE soldiers were being treated in South India. 

Tigers in the hills

Prof. Gunaratna also notes that “in the eyes of many Indian hard-liners, Sri Lanka since 1977 had stepped out of the non-aligned orbit and had become an ally of the West,” pointing to Israeli counterintelligence, British counter-insurgency experts, as well as mercenaries from the UK and South Africa all being active in Sri Lanka during this period.  

India was also concerned that Sri Lanka would offer “Trincomalee, one of the finest deep water harbours, to the US Navy” as well as that strong military relationships with Pakistan and China would grow into deeper alliances. By this point, India had already engaged both Pakistan and China in border disputes that continue to this day. 

India’s intelligence branch the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) convinced Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of the need for leverage over Sri Lanka. Prof. Gunaratna states: “The Third Agency of RAW, a supra intelligence outfit, was entrusted with the task. Within a year, the number of… training camps in Tamil Nadu mushroomed to 32. By mid-1987, over 20,000 Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents had been provided sanctuary, finance, training, and weapons either by the Central Government, State Government of Tamil Nadu, or by the insurgent groups themselves.”

Despite the narrative that training camps and bases for separatists and the LTTE were confined to South India, Prof. Gunaratna relates that training was in fact provided from paramilitary camps in Uttar Pradesh in northern India as well as in special training camps by RAW officers in New Delhi, Bombay, and Visakhapatnam. 

“The most secretive training was conducted in Chakrata, north of Dehradun, India’s premier military academy for training service personnel, where RAW had also imparted training to Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Tibetan dissidents.” Major Sapru also confirms the training camps in Chakrata, at a base called ‘Establishment 22’ which was set up with funding from the CIA during the 1962 Indo-China war. 

Major Sapru notes that it was widely understood by his IPKF colleagues that the Indian Central Government, Tamil Nadu, and RAW were playing a “double game”. The IPKF lost over 1,000 soldiers with another 3,000 wounded; it is worth noting that this experience in Sri Lanka has been called ‘India’s Vietnam’ in the media. While the IPKF withdrew in 1990 under an agreement between Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa and newly elected Indian Prime Minister V.P. Singh, there was no memorial to the fallen soldiers of the IPKF in India until 2014, while Sri Lanka commissioned a memorial in 2008. 

Prof. Gunaratna has compiled an exhaustive list of the LTTE’s supply chains in India, noting that “LTTE had also converted Madras, the capital of Tamil Nadu, and nine other Tamil Nadu districts, into centres for war supplies to the LTTE… and other activities”:

1. Dharmapuri: Procurement of explosives
2. Coimbatore: Arms and ammunition manufacturing 
3. Salem: Explosives manufacturing and military clothing manufacturing 
4. Periya (Erode): Military clothing manufacturing 
5. Vedaranyam: Coastal area from where supplies were dispatched for the LTTE 
6. Madurai: Transit area 
7. Thanjavur: Communications centre 
8. Nagapattinam: Landing area for supplies from LTTE deep sea going vessels 
9. Rameswaram: Refugee arriving area and recruitment 
10. Tiruchi: Treatment of wounded LTTE cadres 
11. Tuticorin: LTTE trade in gold, silver, narcotics, and other merchandise goods 
12. Madras: Liaison with Tamil Nadu political leaders

Indira Gandhi’s near invasion

Throughout this period, as Gunewardene notes, India “routinely denied all allegations that it was fermenting secessionist movements on its soil”. The Tamil Nadu secessionist movement of the 1960s created another dynamic in Indian politics and those of the South Indian state, which “was now regarded as a major political force in India’s Congress Party politics”. 

Gunewardene also noted intelligence leaks in the years after the fact that reveal Indira Gandhi’s secret plan for an “invasion of Sri Lanka; the 15th Independent Para-Brigade, the paratroopers of the Indian Army, were prepared to capture crucial Sri Lankan air strips in 1984. The plan was never implemented due to Indira Gandhi’s assassination in October.”

Gunewardene lays out further examples of Indian interference and duress. India and RAW had tried to walk the fine line between supporting Tamil separatism, ensuring domestic political stability in relation to Tamil Nadu, and its geopolitical interests in the region. The Sri Lankan Government entered into negotiations with separatist groups at the ‘Thimpu Talks’ in Bhutan in July/August 1985, but by this time much of the north and east of Sri Lanka was under the control of the LTTE. 

When the talks failed to deliver meaningful results, India “made it clear to the separatist groups that it would dismantle the military bases and training camps” in South India unless negotiations started yielding results. Senior political leaders of the LTTE Anton Balasingham and Chandrahasan were deported to the UK and US respectively.

However, the situation spiralled out of control and Sri Lanka’s armed forces launched Operation Liberation (Vadamarachchi Operation) in May 1987 to recapture the Jaffna Peninsula; a combined force of almost 4,000 Sri Lankan troops succeeded in achieving the objective of the operation, but then came direct Indian military intervention. 

On 4 June 1987, the Sri Lankan Navy intercepted a convoy of humanitarian assistance from the Indian Government to the Jaffna Peninsula due to the Sri Lanka Army cutting off supply lines to the north. The convoy included almost two dozen fishing boats carrying 30 tonnes of supplies including medicine and food and was escorted by the Indian Coast Guard. 

A four-hour stand-off ensued before the Indian convoy turned back. This led to Operation Poomalai where the Indian Air Force dropped supplies to Jaffna: “The transport planes were escorted by French Mirage 2000 fighters. India claimed that this was an act of humanitarian intervention. Sri Lanka claimed it was a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Gunewardene, 1991).

The Indo-Lanka Trojan horse?

“India’s dominance as a geopolitical power” was clear to JR and the GoSL as well as the Tamil insurgent groups; they were forced back into negotiations. “Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE… was flown in, along with members of the TULF,” all of whom “ultimately had to yield to the proposals of India. No parliamentary debate or political party consensus between the two ethnic divisions was permitted… Jayewardene announced that the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord would be signed on 29 July 1987”.

Gunewardene further notes the “dissension within Jayewardene’s Cabinet”; JR sacked his own ally, MP Cyril Mathew, some time earlier. MP “Gamini Jayasuriya, a veteran Cabinet member, resigned… the Prime Minister at that time, R. Premadasa, openly opposed the accord and was absent from the signatory ceremony,” as were seven of the 29 Cabinet members including the Minister in Charge of National Security. 

There were protests around the country, much of it led by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, as well as by student organisations led by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP); the clergy performed ‘satyagraha’; the culmination was perhaps the shocking attack on Rajiv Gandhi in Sri Lanka by a Navy officer using his rifle butt. 

Gunewardene concludes that “India sought to exploit its superior bargaining power to persuade the Sri Lankan Government to accept conditions that would solidify India’s political power over Sri Lanka’s foreign policy,” pointing to the accompanying letters that were exchanged between Gandhi and JR. 

The ‘Exchange of Letters’ as an addendum to the Indo-Lanka Accord is vital to understanding the wider context of India’s motivations in influencing Sri Lanka’s domestic and foreign policy. Gandhi references the letter from JR with a response dated on the same day, 29 July 1987, recalling the importance of preventing “our respective territories to be used for activities prejudicial to each other’s unity, territorial integrity, and security” and noted JR’s acquiescence to “meet some of India’s concerns,” which included but were not limited to the following:

1. Avoiding the presence of “foreign military and intelligence personnel” or ensuring that any such presence does not become “prejudicial to each other’s unity, territorial integrity, and security”.
2. Ensuring that neither Trincomalee nor any other ports will be “made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India’s interests”.
3. Requesting that the restoration and operations of the Trincomalee Oil Tank will be “undertaken as a joint operation between India and Sri Lanka”.
4. Requesting a review of agreements with “foreign broadcasting organisations” to set up facilities related to radio communication to ensure they are not utilised for military or intelligence purposes.

Maximalist majoritarianism

We must acknowledge the dynamics of Sri Lanka’s ethnic strife; that it emanates from two sets of elites, each entrenched in a ‘game of thrones’. It includes Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism which is contrasted against the liberal wing of the political elite and the minority Tamil population with a base of power and support beyond Jaffna, encompassing the Tamil nationalism of South India and India’s own internal Centre-State power struggle. 

As much as Sri Lankan nationalists engage in the simplicities of majoritarianism, assuming the mantle of protector of the ‘Dhamma Deepa,’ as much as the liberals insist on disregarding the deeply-held ambitions of a ‘Sinhala Buddhist’ country, while Sri Lankan Tamil political elites insist on a maximalist federal solution and the equally maximalist separatism of the LTTE that is still in the minds of many Sri Lankans, especially with a diaspora that takes every opportunity to assume the language of Eelam, these complexities require significant compromise.

Sri Lankan administrations must reassess the middle ground on the national question, seeking out a neutral negotiating position with one of the largest economies in the world – India. This releases Sri Lanka from dependency on China as a political bulwark against 13A and thus leaves space for a fresh relationship with Beijing, a relationship that needs renewal given the intrinsic links to Rajapaksa-led development and its ensuing corruption.

The national question remains a bludgeon for the US and EU. Even as travel supplements in major European capitals exclaim the ‘Serendib Isle’ as “paradise found,” Sri Lanka remains mired in the Human Rights Council. 

The UNHRC’s statements and resolutions are extremely damaging to perceptions of justice in Sri Lanka, both as a concept and as a system. Sri Lanka cannot become a logistical hub, a tourist destination, and an investment frontier if it does not begin to dismantle its image as a nation that is denying justice.

Whatever brief period of economic success ‘political stability’ brings, we cannot unlock our potential as a nation without first exorcising the demons of the past. Neither the IMF, nor India, nor the UNHRC can deliver this for our island nation. 

(The writer has over a decade of experience in the banking sector after completing a degree in accounting and finance. He has completed a Master’s in International Relations and is currently reading for a PhD at the University of Colombo. He is also a freelance writer and researcher and can be reached on email: kusumw@gmail.com and Twitter: @kusumw)