• This is Part I of a two-part series. The second part, will be published in an upcoming issue of The Daily Morning

As the Presidential Election is coming near, the political-ideological division among our friends is visible, and so is the aggressive ‘marketing’ campaign to portray the ‘ideal candidate’ among the key competitors. It is sometimes very heartbreaking to see that the political figures who once betrayed us, the armed forces and the country as a whole, are being portrayed as the ‘saviours’ by their individual campaign managers.

Having joined the Navy in 1986, I, as a 19-year-old school leaver, was not that interested in politics, and I am sure that it was the case for those who joined during that time. But, as we gathered our service-related experiences, we came to live with these and sometimes only we would know the reality on the ground, not the political masters nor the superiors in Colombo. 

Thus, I thought that I should pen down my experiences in two parts: Part I is dedicated to more ‘strategic’ matters and Part II is dedicated to more personal matters. The idea is to pen down the ground realities as I happened to witness the happenings which may otherwise get distorted when being reported through the media or through the mouthpieces made for the purpose.

The most significant was in 2002, on 22 February 2002, to be precise. I was Commanding the Sri Lanka Naval Service Ranadheera (A Chinese made gunboat of the Third Fast Gun Boat [FGB] Squadron) and was in Trincomalee on 21 February 2002. That night, our fast attack crafts (FACs) surrounded an enemy boat cluster bringing in weapons and ammunition from one of enemy’s gun runners (generally, these gun running ships used to transfer their war like material to the enemy boats at about 50-60 nautical miles away from the enemy dominated coastline as the Navy had by this time attacked and sunk two ‘gun runners’ within the maritime jurisdictions; so, the gun runners sought to operate in the high seas and further away from the coastline). P 443 (Israel built Super Dvora Mark I) commanded by then Lieutenant M.R.J.K. Bandara had made the first move in intercepting the enemy cluster at sea and by this time had his Second-In-Command Sub Lieutenant N.A.N.B. Neththasinghe, killed in action whilst managing to halt the landward movement of the enemy’s full boat group. And the enemy boat group, comprised of three logistic boats, and four attack crafts, were now being surrounded by seven FACs. The FACs were going for the ‘kill’ as the boats were fully loaded with war-like material and posed a clear and present threat to the ongoing war efforts.

The Commander of the Navy was Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri, and at around 10 p.m. or so, as the FACs were moving to engage the remaining enemy boats, the orders came from Colombo higher-ups to not attack and to allow the enemy boat group to go. The Area Commander of the Eastern theatre was Rear Admiral Sarath Rathnakeerthi and we all were at the operations room, listening to the incident unfolding off the Mullaitivu-Chalai coastline, when the Area Commander, having received orders through a telephone call, obviously from the Navy Commander, instructed to inform the FACs to disengage and allow the crippled enemy boats to go. Furthermore, the Area Commander informed that both the Navy Commander and the Defence Minister at that time, President’s Counsel Tilak Marapana, will be coming the next morning to be briefed on the incident. Being a versatile hand as a Lieutenant Commander in 2002, immediately after my staff course, I was told to prepare the PowerPoint presentation under the instructions of the Deputy Area Commander then, Commodore Somathilake Dissanayake.

On 22 February 2002, as informed, the Navy Commander came to Trincomalee but waited to receive another set of very important persons (VIPs) coming down from Vavuniya at around 2 p.m., as I recall. We were not aware as to who these other VIPs were but by noon, the local media were broadcasting that the Government had signed a peace agreement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for the cessation of hostilities under a peace deal brokered by the Norwegians. We, on the fleet, were quick to piece up the jigsaw of last night's encounter; the LTTE was bringing in a consignment of weapons and ammunition prior to signing the peace agreement. It was the shipment that we intercepted and let go on the superior's orders.

I was at the makeshift auditorium of the Naval and Maritime Academy, operating the desktop computer for the de-briefing arranged under the Area Commander. At around 2 p.m. or so, the Navy Commander walked in with the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister and the Defence Secretary and several other military top-brass for the de-briefing on last night's encounter, which was a major concern on our part due to the prevailing circumstances. I was under the impression that the debriefing will raise many questions and explanations for us to respond as the situation in the country was tense and politically too it was a hotbed situation.

After all the VIPs were seated, the Area Commander started the debrief and I was running the slides, so painfully made up for the ease of understanding how and what had happened at sea, as the Area Commander in detail narrated the chronology of events. Somewhere, before the halfway point of the debrief, I just happened to have a glance at the audience to study their facial expressions and inquisitiveness, and was only surprised to see that the Premier was eyeing some notes that he was holding in his arms, and both the Defence Minister and the Defence Secretary were sleeping. In a flash, it struck me that if this is the stature of the Defence Secretary and the Defence Minister (who fell asleep during a major debriefing session) that we are having, 'we were sure to be ‘screwed’. I thought. Suffice to say, that under that Defence Secretary, the whole of the military got ‘screwed’ for good, during that tormenting time of Sri Lanka’s political landscape. Having to end up debriefing in such an inconspicuous manner left us all from the fleet units disappointed as the debriefing was finished with no questions asked or inquiries made. It was apparent that the debrief was just another ‘checklist – tick box’ in the day’s agenda of the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, and the Defence Secretary.

This was discussed lengthily afterwards with our immediate superiors in Trincomalee, although we knew that they also would not have any answers to the questions and viewpoints that we raised. And, I am sure that these were brought to the attention of the Navy Commander to be conveyed to the top of the Government as the ground realities were quite different to the reading by the Colombo elites.

One good thing of the peace agreement signed on 22 February, 2002, was that it missed the seas. Whoever drafted the clauses of the agreement, missed the sea, as the complete focus was on the land. It reminds me of the constitutional drafters of our political bosses at the latter stage; they all were looking from the party political or leader’s point of view, thereby making the Constitutions since Independence remain to be with lapses and loopholes even after 75 years. As a result, the peace agreement in 2002 was not applicable to the Naval operations at sea, and we thrived on it. 

My personal research points out that it was drafted by a group of diaspora high-ups and that it was possible that only Erik Solheim from Norway had seen it. Otherwise, the Norwegians cannot miss the ocean issues that easily. And later on, I learnt that none in our Defence structure knew what will be there in the text, till it was signed on 22 February 2002. Thus is the narration of my exposure to the first betrayal as I analyse the developments at that time. A similar betrayal fell on the Army Intelligence subsequently through the Athurugiriya safe house raid and as a result, many assassinations took place in Colombo. There always will be opportunistic officials who exploit political favours at the cost of national security.

Having steered the war-winning tactics at tactical and operational levels, we went through betrayals of this nature in many forms of avatars. Thus, when I study the current propaganda machinery of the political candidates, I wonder where they were, in that so-called ‘saviour’ mode, then. 

All Governments, from President J.R. Jayewardene, to present, have made party politics to be the top-most strategy, and not a national strategy. There simply is no ‘national strategy’ and that is the reason why I foresee that we cannot have a fully fledged national security advisor office under the prevailing political culture; because, no political party wants anything superior to their party political agenda, irrespective of how they portray themselves as the saviour of the hour, as they have done for the last 75 years.

I wish to conclude this note with a discussion point that I had with a former Deputy National Security Advisor of India some years back after a very healthy academic session abroad. I quote “See Admiral, India has changed a lot, and India has surged ahead a lot. But, you have not. There is a gap, and we do not see any of your political bosses doing anything to fill that gap. So, whether you like it or not, we will have to put our fingers into that”. I guess that illustrates where our political bosses stand and what they have created by way of governance for the future generations of this island nation. I leave that to be deciphered by the reader.

(The writer is a retired Rear Admiral and was a former Chief of Staff and the Chief Hydrographer of the Sri Lanka Navy, and the Joint Chief Hydrographer to the Government. He is an international consultant for undersea cables for the United Nations. Article first published on Author’s LinkedIn account on 11 September 2024, reproduced with permission.)

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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of this publication