The birth of such a concept as diplomacy between states has been verified throughout the centuries, from great empires and colonies of times past. Cooperative geopolitical exchange for the benefit of states has stemmed from the simple notion of Quid pro Quo – something for something. Such diplomatic exchanges of defence, influence, resources, and other support have bolstered the development of states through integrated and complex economies. 

However, this also comes with the possibility of a stark disengagement from peace and ethics, since traditional power geopolitics and military assertions often lead diplomacy down a slippery slope. The period around 2023 was substantial to modern conflicts, raising it to the ‘third most violent year’ since 1989, the closing period of the Cold War (Rustad S.A., 2024).  A major player in this area is national security, which is a multilateral venture, one that bridges a nexus between state security and international relations, therefore, decisions felt internationally go under the purview of its measure. Diplomatic commitments and the imperative for national security can become an intentional or unintentional vessel for deteriorating the peaceful engagement among states. This paper simply observes this dissolution of peaceful accord without deriving an opinion on the justification of conflict actors mentioned, detailing how Sri Lanka itself can navigate conflict mitigation, considering factors of influence such as international diplomacy, non-alignment foreign policies, actors in conflicts and state interests.

The clientelism strategy of geopolitics

Envisaging cooperative initiatives reveals a spate of factors that may ignite such disputes, one such area exists in the asymmetry of bilateral relations. This is where a sort of clientelism or a patron-client model approach is enumerated in the geopolitical partnerships of a large state (Patron) and a small State (client) (Howard. F. Stein, 1984). Smaller States opt for the support of those with a higher capacity of resources than themselves, in times of meeting increasing demand for growth, finding a capable collaborator offering the support required may be highly beneficial for both parties and the global security and economy. In a geopolitically enlightened world that seeks development through cross-border relations, this should be seen as a major benefit for the prosperity of states internationally. The asymmetry in the capacity of both nations, however, prompts a deeper understanding of their relationship and why it may develop into a conflict, where the client, in exchange for the required resource, also offers influence to its patron (Client Aligns with Patron) (Glenn. H. Snyder, 2011). A third-party state leveraging its influence with the client for strategic advantage may then see the patron’s influence as a threat to its national security. In these cases, the offer given by the patron or the very diplomatic presence of the patron itself may sour the relations of the client with its geopolitical partners. A strong example of such an accession of conflict would be the Russo-Ukrainian War, where the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and its member states, as the patron, offered Ukraine as the client defence and protection for its membership. Russia, as a third-party having influence and bilateral ties with Ukraine, is threatened by the influence NATO creates, responding with military means to stabilise its national security presence in the region (Switzer T., 2024). It is not the position of this article to claim the intentions of either state, but on the face value of both states’ claims and actions, we may observe the problematic occurrences of establishing cross-border relations in the patron-client model.

The psychology of stakeholders and alignment 

The idea of Quid Pro Quo geopolitics in the economy shouldn’t conventionally trigger a military response; the idea of a threat to economic security is often met with strategically placed trade barriers that affect economic dispositions. However, in agreements, defence and security are at certain avenues involved or begin from the economic integration of the patron and client, which is attributed to the limitations of ‘small state diplomacy’ (Wivel. A, 2023). The conventional positions of States that act as clients are to remain completely under the position of being the client to the patron state, offering a growing military presence for their patron. An extremely valuable case to analyse would be the presence of the Republic of Djibouti in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, as a security and intelligence hub for maritime piracy, hosting military bases from global powers such as China, United States, Russia, France and more all at once (N. A. Yimer, 2021). The leverage of a geostrategic location for economic benefit is highly beneficial for a state such as Djibouti with a low GDP (US dollar 3 billion), which is dwarfed in the face of its patrons, however, it puts the nation in a position of high volatility in shaping geopolitical tensions. Shifting this position in foreign policy is generally difficult, considering the deep integration of their bilateral relations and opportunity cost. Additionally, with a reduction in the number of interstate conflicts and international frameworks prioritising international law, this approach may see less risk.

A new paradigm of conflict

The possibility of sparking future interstate conflicts through Quid pro Quo geopolitics is quite low, as the presence of direct conflict between states has seen a steady decline compared to the Cold War period. The graph, as shown below, confirms this trend and a notable surge of certain conflicts in recent years. Closer to 2023, whilst the number of interstate conflicts reduced, the number of (internationalised) civil conflicts has gradually increased.

This trend is concurrent with increasing patron-client relationships among States and rising numbers of Non-State Actors (NSAs) in civil conflicts. As discussed, Quid pro quo geopolitics in asymmetric bilateral relationships frequently invoke a patron-client model, one where a much more powerful patron extends necessary support to the weaker client, reciprocating with influence or strategic alignment. This prompts the idea of proxy conflicts, which are essentially military conflicts that include one or more third parties directly or indirectly offering aid to a combatant to influence the outcome (L. Sue Baugh, 2025). When a state has established a relationship with its patron, a third-party state may view this connection as a threat to its own influence and national security. In these cases, the emergence of an NSA in the client state creates an attractive means for the third-party state to compete with the patron for influence. In the model of proxy conflicts, the third-party state would provide weapons, ammunition, and other logistical support for the NSA to counteract the influence and position of the patron’s faction. If the NSA that the third-party state supports is capable of obtaining victory against the client’s government, this would mean that the third-party state has obtained immense strategic control over the region. In this regard, the disposition of conflict itself is undergoing significant change; this may be where states have transitioned in their model of conflict to indirectly face one another to establish strategic influence in regions for the maintenance of their national security. With the increase of strategically powerful nations or semi-global powers, this occurrence may be more prevalent and may have significant impacts on geopolitical stability. 

The applications of international Law

Multilateral treaties and agreements, such as the UN charter in 1945, have enacted the prohibition of the threat or force against the territorial sovereignty among states under Article 2, subsection 4 of the UN charter. Although this is true, international laws have directed it such that states have a right to war (‘Jus Ad Bellum’), contingent on the engaging faction opting for a peaceful outcome (ICRC, 2025). Although the framework is somewhat contentious in its argument, it provides an accountability mechanism for how states are to initiate war, and found wrongfully utilising force without a justifiable cause when they do so. In cases where these newer proxy conflicts arise, they often go under the purview of a disaster scenario, or an uncontrollable circumstance that has no circumscription for which it can disrupt peaceful geopolitics, other than the parties involved. The simple fact that international law fully governs all aspects of warfare, although to an extent viable, is false; this is due to accountability mechanisms in this regard demonstrating challenges. NSAs, per common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, are susceptible to violations of International Humanitarian Laws – justice in war (‘Jus in Bello’); similarly, however, enforcement mechanisms here are gridlocked as well (Mousa. J, 2008). Referring to current international laws, the legality of states funding NSAs is contingent on the support given and the actions of the NSA itself. A valuable case to analyse is the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 1986 Nicaragua vs. United States case, which clarified that providing arms to opposition groups will not constitute ‘armed attacks’ under UN Charter Article 51, justifying self-defence (ICJ, 1987). This shows that the current status of international law is problematic in holding NSAs accountable and addressing interstate intervention from states to the actors, thereby making conflicts more deterrent to peace.   

Colombo and the NAFP

While it is certain that Quid Pro Quo geopolitics presents small states with a pathway of peaceful interstate relations, the viability of such a mechanism rests upon the recalibration of asymmetric relationships within the Patron-Client model. It is imperative that when considering a state's international presence, it does not attach itself to the complete ideology of its patron. The prospect of hedging or non-alignment allows states to avoid fully committing to certain patron states, especially militaristically. In line with the current non-alignment foreign policy, Colombo must be aware of the dynamics of a patron-client relationship and opt for greater transparency and stronger diplomatic processes in the creation of these partnerships. This means a thorough evaluation of; 1. third parties, 2. regional influences, and 3. legal agreements must be involved to mitigate any partnerships sparking conflicts due to regional (and or global) displacements of holistic national security amongst other geopolitical partners. Preserving peaceful geopolitics for Colombo in the global sphere, thereby requires an economic diplomacy framework, expanding upon economic benefits and ventures rather than attachments, which is already a key pillar in our foreign policy. With growing momentum for leveraging our geostrategic location in the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka must take small states like Djibouti as a testament to carefully navigate economic diplomacy and geopolitical paradigms. Revisiting the 2022 docking of China's research vessel, Yuan Wang 5, at the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, where India conveyed a national security concern that the vessel's satellite tracking was capable of monitoring its military information, a tense moment was created between the states. While Sri Lanka permitted the docking, it stipulated that no scientific research be conducted in its waters (Shahid & Sakib, 2023, p. 14), presenting a decision that was felt positively down the line between all three states. In other areas, the dynamics of NSAs and their role in sparking proxy conflicts must also be understood and assimilated into our national security strategy. 

Whilst Sri Lanka has a capable military response strategy, it must also prioritize robust intelligence and legal mechanisms for countering the nuances of states sponsoring these proxies that are national security threats. 

(The author is a Research Intern at the Institute of National Security Studies (INSS), a think tank functioning under the Ministry of Defence. The opinions expressed are his own and not necessarily reflective of the institute or the Ministry of Defence)

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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of this publication