By Erik Brattberg and Evan A. Feigenbaum
In May 2021,the Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh Li Jiming, used a conversation with journalists to caution the country against joining the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or “Quad” – the informal grouping of Australia, India, Japan, and the US that some in Beijing view as a prospective anti-China alliance. “Relations with China will be damaged if Bangladesh joins the Quad,” he warned. Bangladesh Foreign Minister A.K. Abdul Momen responded within a day, reminding China that Bangladesh was free to make its own foreign policy choices and to pursue alignments and relationships in its interest. He also confessed to some surprise that Beijing would wade into the internal choices of another country.
Bangladesh should not have been so surprised. The reality is that China has been emboldened to assert its interests in South Asia more directly because of profound changes in its relationships with states in the region. Over the past decade, it has developed a greater variety of interests and more connections than ever. In parallel, China has developed more channels of influence as well as a greater expectation of deference to its interests and a greater willingness to exercise pressure in their pursuit.
Over the last decade, China has become far more attentive to its South Asian periphery, moving beyond commercial and development engagements to more far-reaching political and security ones. However, most analyses of these changing parameters of engagement have focused on the Chinese end of these relationships, and too often analytical attention is limited to examining specific infrastructure projects or investments under Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This has left an incomplete picture of Chinese engagement, because it misses the degree to which South Asian states are trying to manage and mitigate the impacts of Chinese influence that they view as inimical to their interests, even as they continue to develop political, military, and especially commercial ties with Chinese actors.
The Carnegie Endowment project “China’s Impact on Strategic Regions” comes at a time when states across several regions of the globe are experiencing China’s increased involvement in their polities, economies, and societies, and the consequences that such engagement brings with it. Over the last decade, China has developed a greater variety of interests and more connections than ever with countries, including in parts of Europe and South Asia. With these new channels of influence, it has developed expectations of exceptional consideration for its interests and is willing to exercise pressure in its pursuit for special treatment.
This paper builds on the research carried out through focus groups, extensive interviews, and detailed archival analysis and media mapping in four South Asian states – Bangladesh, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka – to learn from their rapidly evolving relationships with China, as well as explore the impact of Chinese influence cross-nationally and comparatively. All four countries have distinctive vulnerabilities. In some, state institutions are brittle. In others, civil society provides an inadequate check on the actions and powers of the state. Elsewhere, elites are prone to capture, including by external actors, such as China and its proxies. The study attempts to make sense of deepening Chinese activism by framing it in terms of the impact it has on the vulnerabilities in these states.
The paper aims to understand how China leverages specific vulnerabilities in these four states for its interests; how these vulnerabilities can be remedied and how the states can share and learn from each other’s experiences to strengthen their individual and collective hand. Ultimately, the paper hopes to offer policy recommendations that aid the countries in discouraging unproductive Chinese actions and influences, while engendering the kind of engagement that is in their interest. The recommendations are also directed toward the US and its strategic partners to help strengthen these states’ independence of action, bargaining power, and development.
China’s goals
- China’s main asset is its economic levers of influence, and Chinese actors are proactive in wielding these
- China’s tools of influence are becoming much more diverse
- There is no “debt trap” in the four countries
- Countries are learning from each other and changing how they exercise agency as a result
- China and its partners are still having teething trouble – for now
- India is still a more significant strategic player than China